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Embedded questions and concealed relative questions  
in Hausa and Akan1 
 
Malte Zimmermann – Universität Potsdam 
 
Abstract. The central goal of this paper is to instigate cross-linguistic research on the 
interpretation of embedded interrogatives and concealed relative clauses. The empirical focus is 
on the West African languages Hausa and Akan, which prominently employ relativized DPs for 
expressing embedded questions. The paper first discusses the different ways for interpreting and 
analyzing embedded wh-interrogatives: interpretations vary from strong exhaustive via 
intermediate and weak exhaustive to non-exhaustive. We will then present data on concealed 
relative questions in Hausa and Akan, focusing on the issues of how such structures are 
compositionally interpreted, and how they behave in terms of (non-) exhaustivity. Drawing on 
existing analyses of concealed and interrogative questions in English, we tentatively propose two 
formal analyses for concealed relative questions in the two languages discussed.  
 
1  Introduction: Embedded interrogative questions in English 
 
Embedded questions in English are proto-typically realized in the form of yes/no- or wh-
interrogatives, which occur embedded under a range of predicates (Karttunen 1977): 
 
(1) Sigurd knew/ found out/ told us/ was surprised at [CP who left]. 
 
Two central questions on embedded wh-interrogatives are what their semantic interpretation is 
eg. in terms of exhaustivity, and how this interpretation comes about. In particular, what is the 
meaning contribution of the embedded (interrogative) clause? What is the contribution of the 
embedding predicate? And what is the contribution of (covert) EXH-operators, if any? In 
response to these questions, the following assumptions are commonly made: (i.) Embedded 
questions as in (1) take the form of interrogative clauses, which denote alternative propositions 
(Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977) or partitions (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984) at some level of 
their compositional semantic derivation; (ii.) The interpretation of embedded wh-interrogatives 
as (non-)exhaustive is variable, depending on context and embedding predicate. The observable 
surface interpretations of embedded interrogatives are derived from the interaction of alternative 
propositions with (lexicalized) EXH- or MAX-operators, or from the absence of such operators. 
 The core objective of this paper is to take a closer, cross-linguistically informed look at these 
basic assumptions on the meaning of embedded questions. The study of questions focuses for the 
most part on Western Indo-European languages (German, Romance, Slavic). But, to my 
knowledge, there is no systematic formal semantic work on the meaning of embedded questions 
in African languages, at least some of which seem to differ in the way in which embedded 
questions are structurally realized. For instance, Hausa (Chadic, Afro-Asiatic) has two alternative 																																																								
1 Research for this paper was carried out within research project “Exhaustiveness in embedded questions across 
languages”, funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) in Priority Program SPP1727 Xprag.de (2017-2020). 
I would like to thank my Co-PI Edgar Onea (Graz) and Carla Bombi (UP) for discussion of the materials presented. 
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ways for expressing embedded questions. First, as an embedded wh-interrogative (2a). Secondly, 
as a complex relativized DP (2b), or so-called concealed relative question (CRQ):  
 
(2) a. Musa  ya          san    [  wà / wàne                    (ne)   ya              tàfi  Kano]  
                Musa 3SG.M.PFV   know   who.SG / WHO.SG.M.      FOC 3SG.M.PFV   go Kano 
               ‘Musa knows who went to Kano.’  
 b. Musa  ya          san     [  wa-n-dà                      ya   tàfi       Kano] 
                Musa 3SG.M.PFV   know    one.SG-DEF.M-REL.     3SG.M.PFV go         Kano 
               ‘Musa knows who went to Kano.’ (lit.‘Musa knows the one that went to Kano.) 
 
In §3, we show the CRQ-strategy to be preferred in out-of-the-blue translations into Hausa, 
whereas with most embedding predicates it seems to be the only available strategy for coding 
embedded questions in Akan (Kwa, Niger-Congo). The question is, then, how to derive 
embedded question meanings from	the meaning of relativized DPs. More generally, the findings 
on Hausa and Akan point to the importance of concealed questions (CQs), as exemplified in (3). 
CQs are often treated as marginal in English, and yet, judging by the Hausa and Akan data, they 
seem to be a common cross-linguistic source for embedded question interpretations: 
 
(3) John knows the winners / the persons that won.    (= knows who the winners are) 
 
Also, connecting the formal analysis of concealed questions (CQs) with embedded wh-
interrogatives, the question arises what predictions such analyses will make for the interpretation 
of CRQs as strongly, weakly or non-exhaustive. This question is normally set aside in the 
analysis of CQs, cf. Nathan (2006:27), but will be explicitly addressed in §4. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the (EXH-)interpretation and formal 
analysis of embedded wh-interrogatives in English. Section 3 introduces data from Hausa and 
Akan, focusing on the phenomenon of CRQs. Section 4 discusses three analyses of English CQs, 
focusing on the questions of how such structures are compositionally interpreted, and how they 
behave in terms of (non-) exhaustivity. Whereas most analyses treat CQs as strongly exhaustive, 
the analysis in Nathan (2006) is compatible with a weak exhaustive interpretation of CQs. This, 
in turn, would be compatible with variability in the EXH-interpretation of CRQs in Hausa and 
Akan. We will sketch a Nathan-style analysis for Hausa, juxtaposing it to a competing analysis 
in terms of Xiang’s (2016) choice function-based analysis of wh-interrogatives. Section 5 
concludes. Note that the results are preliminary in that data on Hausa and Akan come from only 
one speaker each. There is thus urgent need for further empirical confirmation; see eg. FN4. 
 
2  Interpretation of embedded interrogatives in English:  
Data and Analysis 
 
2.1  Variable Interpretation: Different degrees of (non-) exhaustivity 
 
Embedded interrogatives allow for up to four different interpretations depending on embedding 
predicate and context: Strong exhaustive (SE), non-exhaustive (NE), weak exhaustive (WE), and 
intermediate exhaustive (IE). SE interpretations are found with the matrix predicate know, as in 
2
© 2018 by Malte Zimmermann
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 1-16
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
  
(4a). For (4a) to be true, Sigurd knows for everybody that left that she left and he knows for 
everybody that didn’t leave that she didn’t leave. That is, Sigurd knows the complete true 
answer, and he knows that this is the complete true answer. Therefore, (4a) is equivalent to its 
negated counterpart (4b) (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984). The SE reading is modelled in (5). 
 
(4)      a. Sigurd knows [who left]. ⇔ b. Sigurd knows [who didn’t leave]. 
 
(5) [[ who leftSE ]] w =λp<s,t>.∃x[p(w) ∧ p = λw’. x left in w’ and nobody else left in w’] 
 
At the opposite end of the EXH-scale, there are NE mention-some questions: These typically 
contain a possibility modal as in (6a) (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984, Xiang 2016: 38), and they 
can be modelled as denoting sets of propositions containing at least one true answer, (6b). 
 
(6) a. Pekka learnt [where he can purchase a Finnish newspaper]. 
   (eg. Pekka found out that he can buy a Finnish newspaper at Suomen Kauppa) 
 b. [[ where P. can purchase a Finnish newspaperNE ]] w = P<st,t>, such that P ⊂ {λw.     
      Pekka can purchase a Finnish newspaper in x| x∈SHOP}and ∀p∈P[p(w)]  
  
NE interrogatives show indefinite behavior in denoting restricted variables, corresponding to the 
behavior of the indefinite determiners in (7) (Heim 1982). The semantic effect can be modelled 
by means of choice functions (Reinhart 1997, Xiang 2016): 
 
(7) [[ a/some man]] = fCH([[ man]] ) = x, such that x∈[[ man]]   
 
WE embedded interrogatives as in (8a), by contrast, denote propositional sets containing the 
complete list of true answers (and nothing else), as in (9). Because of this, WE interrogatives are 
not equivalent to their negated counterpart (8b). In (8a), for instance, Jaden may be surprised at 
everybody who is dating Karina, but not at who is not. 
 
(8) a. Jaden is surprised at [who is dating Karina]. ≠ 
 b. Jaden is surprised at [who is not dating Karina]. 
 
(9) [[ who is dating KarinaWE ]] w = λp<s,t>.∃x[p(w) ∧ p = λw’. x is dating Karina in w’] 
 
WE readings are commonly found with emotive/cognitive verbs such as be surprised at or 
wonder (Berman 1991, Heim 1994:139). They are also attested with the communication verbs 
tell, remind, and write down (Karttunen 1977:11, Heim 1994:137). (10) illustrates for tell:  
 
(10) John told Mary (correctly) who passed the test, … 
     (≈ John gave Mary the complete list of people who left) 
 (i) …, but his list mistakenly included a few students that did not. 
 (ii) …, indeed, in his eagerness, he even named a few students that did not. 
 
Finally, Spector (2006), Klinedienst & Rothschild (2011), and Uegaki (2015) claim that 
embedded interrogatives can also have intermediate exhaustive readings. Predications of the 
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form X P [wh] with factive or cognition verbs (discover) and with non-factive communication 
verbs (tell, predict) are claimed to be true if x stands in P-relation to all true answers to wh, and, 
moreover, X stand in no P-relation to any false answer to wh. Accordingly, (11a) will be IE-true 
if Arthur told us for everybody who sang that this person sang and for everbody else, Arthur did 
not make any false claims that this person sang. Likewise, Cremers and Chemla (2016) show in 
an experimental study that speakers judge (11b) as true in an IE-scenario: All blue squares are 
correctly predicted, and there’s no false prediction that any of the non-blue squares be blue. 
 
(11) a. Arthur told us [who sang].  
 b. John predicted [which of the four squares were blue]. 
 
In sum, embedded interrogatives may have up to four different surface readings, as informally 
summarized in (12), where WE stands for the set of true answers to the question. The four 
readings are ordered in terms of logical strength SE>IE>WE>NE: If a question clause is true on 
a stronger reading to the left, then all weaker readings to the right are entailed to be true as well.  
 
(12) a. SE: All p∈WE are true & all q∉WE are false (= Only p’s∈WE are true) 
 b. IE:  All p∈WE are true & and ¬∃q∉WE that is falsely claimed to be true. 
 c. WE: All p∈WE are true 
 d. NE:  There is some P⊂WE, such that the elements of P are true  
 
In conclusion, we list a few potential confounds for the empirical investigation of the meaning of 
embedded interrogatives: The domain of quantification may be uncertain (George 2011, G&S 
1984:87), or there may be non-complementary background predicates (George 2011:88f.). Verbs 
of saying like tell oscillate between veridicality and non-veridical interpretations (Egré and 
Spector 2015). The intended granularity of the answer may differ (eg. Lahiri 2002), and there 
may be various conceptual covers associated with possible answers (Aloni 2001). These factors 
must be controlled for in experiments and fieldwork on embedded question interpretation. 
 
2.2 Formal Modelling 
 
The literature offers various ways for modelling the (non-)exhaustive interpretationof questions. 
The analyses differ in the underlying interpretation assigned to embedded interrogatives as well 
as in the origin of the EXH-effect, if present. We can distinguish between Q-operator, lexical, 
and covert MAX/EXH/ANS-operator accounts, respectively.  
 In Q-operator approaches, the interrogative semantics is essentially determined by the 
workings of a left-peripheral question operator, predicting a uniform semantic interpretation. For 
Karttunen (1977), wh-interrogatives come with underlying WE-readings: The set of true 
propositions (<st,t>) is derived from the interaction of Q-operator and existential wh-expression:  
 
(13)   a. [[ whi Q]] = λq<st>.λw<s>.λp<st>. ∃x [p(w) ∧ p = [λxi.q](x)]  
   b. [[ who Q is dating K. ]]  (w) = λp<s,t>. ∃x [p(w) ∧ p = λw’. x is dating K. in w’] 
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For Groenendijk & Stokhof (1982, 1984), by contrast, interrogatives come with a basic SE-
interpretation: They denote a partition that is derived from the meaning of Q plus λ-abstraction 
over the wh-index. The extensional type of embedded interrogative is thus <st>.  
 
(14)   a. [[ whi Q ]] = λq<st>.λw.λw’. [ λxi.q(w’) = λxi.q(w) ] 
   b. [[ who is dating K.]] (w) = λw’. [λx.x is dating K. in w’ = λx.x is dating K. in w] 
 
In lexical approaches, the semantics of embedded interrogatives is largely determined by the 
embedding predicate. Such approaches typically assume a Karttunen-style WE-interpretation for 
the embedded interrogative. For Heim (1994:133), the SE-interpretation typically observed with 
interrogatives embedded under know (3) comes from the lexical meaning of this predicate: To 
know a question means to know the SE-answer to this question in the sense of G&S (1984): 
 
(15)     a. [[ know ]] (w)(q)(x) = 1 iff x believes λw’[q(w’) = q(w)] in w  
     b. [[ Sigurd knows who is dating Mary ]] (w) = 1 iff 
  Sigurd believes the proposition that the set of true answers to question 
 intension q is the set of true answers to q in evaluation world w, i.e. he believes 
 the complete answer and he also believes that this is the complete answer. 
 
Crucially, know differs from other embedding predicates such as be surprised at or tell, which do 
not require access to a full SE- partition, but simply express an attitude to the conjunction of all 
true answers (WE), some true answer (NE), or even to the question intension q with wonder or 
ask; cf. (23) to (25) below. The lexical account is thus well-suited for capturing variability in the 
interpretation of embedded interrogatives. In the same vein, Spector (2006) proposes that 
embedding predicates are potentially three-ways ambiguous between SE-, WE- and IE-reading. 
 Other accounts model the variable EXH-interpretation of embedded interrogatives by adding 
covert semantic operators to a basic WE interrogative interpretation. For instance, Rullmann & 
Beck (1999) derive the SE-reading from the underlying WE-reading by inserting a covert 
maximality (MAX)-operator at LF. The function of MAX is to pick the maximal true answer 
from the set of true answers. Klinedienst & Rothschild (2011), assume three semantic readings 
for embedded interrogatives: Their basic interpretation is WE. IE- and SE-readings are derived 
by inserting a covert EXH-operator in matrix or embedded clause, respectively: 
 
(16) a. WE: Pred [wh-interrogative] b. SE: Pred [ EXH [wh-interrogative]]  
      c. IE: EXH [ Pred [wh-interrogative]]  
  
The matrix subject is required to have a P-attitude towards the complete list of true answers in 
WE (16a), to have a P-attitude towards the exhaustified list of true answers in SE (17b)(eg. to 
know the full list and knowing that it is the full list), and to have an exhaustified P-attitude to the 
full list of true answers in IE (16c) (i.e. no P-attitude to false answers). Uegaki (2015) presents a 
slightly modified picture, according to which interrogatives have but two distinct LFs, namely 
the WE- and IE-configurations in (16a) and (16c), respectively, whereas the SE-reading is 
pragmatically derived. Finally, Theiler (2014) deviates from most operator accounts in assuming 
basic NE reading for embedded interrogatives. The WE-reading is derived by adding a 
[+completive] ANS(wer)-operator, the strong reading by combining ANS- and EXH-operator.   
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 In the past 20 years or so, then, most researchers take the WE Karttunen- interpretation to be 
the basic reading of embedded questions, which is presumably coded in a question-mood 
operator. Furthermore, there is a general consensus that the [+/-EXH]-interpretation of embedded 
questions is to some extent flexible. Importantly, the study of embedded questions focuses 
largely on embedded wh-interrogatives in European languages. From a cross-linguistic 
perspective, this raises the question of whether CRQs in Hausa and Akan are as flexible as 
English interrogatives, or whether they have stronger underlying EXH-interpretations. This 
question is highly relevant because it is not clear that interrogatives are indeed the preferred 
strategy for realizing embedded questions across languages: as will be shown below, the 
preferred strategy in Hausa and Akan are CRQs. If so, the analysis of EXH-effects in embedded 
questions will have to rely on the analysis of such CQRs and also of free relative-based questions 
in English (Caponigro 2003). Differences in the interpretation of interrogatives and CRQs might 
then be responsible for the co-existence of two embedded question strategies in Hausa, cf. (2). 
 
3  Concealed Relative Questions in Hausa and Akan 
 
As already mentioned in §1, the two typologically unrelated West African languages Hausa and 
Akan have a second strategy for expressing question embedding, next to wh-interrogative 
clauses: CRQs in Hausa were illustrated in (2), repeated here.2 
 
(2) a. Musa  ya          san    [  wà / wàne                   (ne)   ya              tàfi  Kano]  
                Musa 3SG.M.PFV   know   who.SG / WHO.SG.M.     FOC 3SG.M.PFV   go Kano 
                ‘Musa knows who went to Kano.’  
 b. Musa  ya          san     [  wa-n-dà                      ya   tàfi        Kano] 
                Musa 3SG.M.PFV   know    one.SG-DEF.M-REL.     3SG.M.PFV go         Kano 
               ‘Musa knows who went to Kano.’ (lit.‘Musa knows the one that went to Kano.) 
  
Newman (2000: 502, my emphasis) points out that “One can express the semantic equivalent 
(more or less) of an indirect question by means of a relative clause construction headed by a 
noun or a relative pronoun.” Indeed, CRQs were offered as spontaneous translations of the 
corresponding wh-interrogatives in English, suggesting that they may indeed be the preferred 
choice for expressing embedded questions in Hausa.  
 Next to the verb sani ‘know’ in (2), CRQs were solicited as translations for wh-interrogatives 
with different verbs of cognition and communication, as illustrated in (17a) to (19a). The (b/c)-
sentences show the corresponding wh-interrogatives to be licit as well, except under the verb 
annabta ‘predict’ in (19b) (H. Abubakari, p.c.): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								2	Hausa examples are presented in Boko script with L tone diacritics (`). Akan examples are given without tones. 
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(17) Translated: ‘It surprised Musa [who went to Kano].’ 
 a. Yaa              baa   Musa màmakì  (game)  dà [wa-n-dà                ya              tàfi  Kano]  
                3SG.M.PFV  give   Musa surprise   about   P   one.SG-DEF.M-REL  3SG.M.PFV go   Kano 
            b. Musa    ya          yi  màmakì-n  [wàne (nè) ya/wàce(cè)    ta             tàfi Kano] 
                 Musa 3SG.M.PFV  do surprise-of   who.M.SG 3SG.M.PFV/who.F.SG 3SG.F.PFV go Kano 
            c. Musa ya           yi màmakì-n    [wà        ya/ta              tàfi  Kano] 
                Musa 3SG.M.PFV   do surprise-of    who.SG  3SG.PFV.M/F  go Kano 
 
(18) Translated: ‘Musa told us [who went to Kano].’ 
 a. Musa ya         fàd’a  manà   [wa-n-dà           ya       tàfi    Kano]  
                Musa 3SG.M.PFV   tell    1PL-IO   one.SG-DEF.M-REL    3SG.M.PFV    go      Kano 
            b.  Musa ya                fàd'a manà  [wàne (nè) ya/wàce(cè)     ta          tàfi  Kano] 
                 Musa 3SG.M.PFV   tell  1PL-IO  who.M.SG3SG.M.PFV/who.F.SG 3SG.F.PFV go   Kano 
            c.  Musa ya                fàd'a  manà   [wà            ya/ta               tàfi   Kano] 
                 Musa 3SG.M.PFV   tell     1PL-IO   who.SG     3SG.PFV.M./F.  go    Kano  
 
(19) Translated: ‘Musa predicted [who went to Kano].’ 
 a. Musa   ya           annabtà     gàme dà    [wa-n-dà                   ya  tàfi Kano]  
                Musa  3SG.M.PFV   predict       about          one.SG-DEF.M-REL    3SG.M.PFV  go  Kano 
            b.*?Musa   ya           annabtà     (gàme dà)  [wà           ya/ta  tàfi  Kano]   
                   Musa   3SG.M.PFV    predict         about         who.SG    3SG.PFV.M./F. go  Kano 
                 Intended: ‘Musa predicted who went to Kano’    
 
The infelicity of (19b) is surprising from the perspective of English CQs, for which the following 
generalization holds (Aloni & Roelofsen 2011: 471): “A generalization that emerges […] is that 
any verb that selects for CQs also selects for wh-complements”; cf. also Baker (1968). By 
contrast, the Hausa verb annabta selects for a relative concealed question, but not for a wh-
complement. The variable realization of embedded questions as wh-interrogatives or CRQs in 
Hausa raises a more general question about the interpretive potential of the two structures: Are 
they equivalent in expressive power? Or do they differ in terms of answerhood conditions, 
presuppositions, or exhaustivity? Empirically, semantic equivalence would predict free 
substitutability salva veritate, i.e. a parallel distribution. Differences in semantic interpretation 
would be correlated with differences in syntactic and contextual distribution. 
 Notice that the difference between wh-interrogatives and CRQs does not per se lie in the fact 
that the latter are overtly specified for [number] and [gender] features, presumably in the form of 
a presupposition restricting question domain and answer space. While this additional information 
certainly adds to the expressive force of CRQs, we can observe that the same is possible with the 
wh-interrogatives in (2) and (17b/18b), in which number and gender of the individual(s) in 
question are explicitly specified by wane ne (M.SG), wace ce (F.SG) and suwa(ne ne) (PL) and by 
the relative form of the preverbal person-aspect marker (Newman 2000).3 If anything, Hausa 
displays a split between number-gender specified wh-interrogatives and their underspecified 
counterparts (with bare wa ‘who’) in the (c)-clauses: The gain in expressive power by 																																																								3	 It is possible that the gender-number specification expressed by nee/cee is responsible for the emergence of 
exhaustivity effects with wh-interrogatives and focus constructions with nee/cee (Hartmann & Zimmermann 2007). 
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number/gender-specification is thus not restricted to CRQs, so that these cannot be preferred on 
grounds of greater informativity. A similar situation obtains in English, which also displays a 
split between obligatorily specified CQs (20a) and which-NP-interrogatives (20b), on the one 
hand, and unspecified bare wh-interrogatives, on the other (20c) (Xiang 2016).  
 
 (20)    a. John found out [the winner/s].            specified for [SG] / [PL] 
  b. John found out [which participant/s won].                      specified for [SG] / [PL]  
    c. John found out [who won].                       unspecified for [number] 
 
The observable parallels between Hausa CRQs and the English concealed question in (20a) raise 
the question of whether CRQs in Hausa (and Akan) come with the specific characteristics of 
concealed DP-questions in English, to be discussed in §4. This position receives intuitive support 
from the observation that the presence of restrictive relative modifiers supports the semantic 
construal of embedded DPs as CQs in English, too (Nathan (2006:118f.). 
 CRQs are also regularly found in Akan, cf. (21a). Embedded wh-interrogatives are possible 
as well, at least with the embedding predicate ask (Saah 1994:77f.), (21b): 
 
(21) a. Kwadwo     nim     [nipa    ko     [ aa     ɔ-kɔ-ɔ        Kumase]]. 
     Kwadwo    know    person  one REL   3SG-go-PAST  Kumasi 
               ‘Kwado knows the person that went to Kumasi.’ (≈ K. knows who went to K.) 
 b. Mary   bisa-a     [sɛ       hena   na       o-huu    Kofi] 
                 Mary  ask-PST    COMP who     FOC     3SG-saw Kofi 
                ‘Mary asked who saw Kofi.’ 
 
Still, the distribution of embedded wh-interrogatives in Akan seems much more restricted than in 
Hausa. Preliminary investigations suggest that CRQs under verbs other than wonder or ask have 
no wh-interrogative counterparts. Korsah (p.c.) remarks for question embedding under know and 
tell that “[a]s far as I can tell, Akan has only the relative strategy”. (22) shows a CRQ with tell:4 
  
(22)  Kwadwo   ka-a       [nipa      ko   [aa  ɔ-kɔ-ɔ              Kumase]]  kyerɛ-ɛ        Adwoa. 
            Kwadwo   tell-PST    person  one REL 3SG-GO-PST     Kumasi     show-PST      Adwoa 
            ‘Kwadwo told Adwoa the person that went to Kumasi.’ (… who went to K.) 
 
Same as in Hausa, the head noun of the relative clause in (21a) and (22) is specified for number 
(by ko), thereby making CRQs more informative than their wh-interogative counterpart in (21b). 
This might, at least in part, account for the general choice of CRQs over bare wh-interrogatives.  
 The possibility of embedded wh-interrogatives under matrix verb bisa ‘ask’ in (21b) may be 
due to selectional restriction. For instance, Aloni & Roelofsen (2011:474) analyze the question-
																																																								4	There appears to be some inter-speaker variation in the expression of embedded questions in Akan. A second 
speaker consistently rejected embedded wh-interrogatives as well, but he volunteered a different relative question 
construction involving a free relative clause without overt head NP, cf. the variant of (21a) in (i).  
(i)		 Kwadwo   nim   [deε/nea  ɔ-kɔ-ɔ          Kumase ] 
 Kwadwo   know  RELFREE 3SG-go-PAST   Kumasi 
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embedding predicate wonder in (24a) as selecting for propositional concepts of type <s,<st>>. 
From this, they derive the incompatibility of wonder with CQs (23b). 
 
(23) Alex is wondering a.   [CP how much the milk is]                          (no answer expected) 
    b. *[DP the price of milk ] 
 
The verbs ask and wonder indeed seem to express an epistemic subject’s relation to an abstract 
question meaning, and not to the (more or less) exhaustive answer to this question. This is 
different with the variant ask for (German erfragen), which expresses a relation between the 
subject and the answer to the question What is the price of milk? 
 
(24) a. *Alex asked [the price of milk].5 b. Alex asked for [the price of milk].  
 
If Akan bisa ‘ask’ turns out to be also incompatible with CRQs, we can postulate the following 
lexical entry for proper question-embedding predicates (q = intensional question meaning). 
 
(25) [[ wonder / ask / bisa ]]  
 = λq<sst>. λx<e> .λw. ∀w’∈ BOULx,w : x finds out the w-true answer to q in w’. 
 
Interestingly, the CRQs in (21a) and (22) feature the (specific) numeral marker ko on the head 
NP, and not the DEF-marker no. This raises the question of whether CRQs can be introduced by 
both indefinite and definite NPs, as shown in (26ab), with corresponding NE or WE/SE-reading: 
  
(26) a. with ko: Kwadwo knows a person that went to Kumasi.                   (NE) 
  b. with no: Kwadwo knows the person that went to Kumasi.                      (WE/SE) 
 
Alternatively, ko might denote a choice function,6 which, depending on whether or not the 
complex relative NP denotes a singleton set, will result in NE or WE/SE-interpretation. Choice 
functions play a crucial role in the question analysis of Xiang (2016), to which we turn in §4.3. 
 
4 Concealed Questions: Meaning Composition and Exhaustivity 
 
In this section, we first introduce the semantic characteristics of English CQs (§4.1). As will 
emerge, CQs are semantically more restricted than their wh-interrogative counterparts. In §4.2, 
we briefly present three formal analyses of CQs focusing on the compositional procedure and 
predictions on question exhaustivity, if any. As will be shown, any analysis of CQs will have to 
resort to some sort of type-shift in order to raise the basic DP denotation to the propositional 
level. Finally, we will sketch two possible analyses for Hausa and Akan CRQs in §4.3, one based 
on the CQ-analysis of Nathan (2006), the other on the wh-interrogative analysis in Xiang (2016).  
 
 																																																								5	But see Nathan (2006:44, ex.29g) for a diverging grammaticality judgment.	6	See	e.g.	Renans (2017) for a choice function-analysis of indefinite numeral ko(me) ‘one’ in related Gaa (Kwa).	
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4.1  Semantic characteristics of English concealed questions 
 
In English, many attitude verbs allow for CQs in combination with object DPs. For instance, the 
prominent interpretation of (27a) is that Marc knows what the price is. And (27b) has a reading 
on which Marc knows which price Fred knows (without necessarily knowing the amount). In 
general, CQs can denote into the same semantic dimensions as wh-interrogatives, cf. (28): 
 
(27) a. Marc knows [DP the price]                          NOT: *‘Marc knows 3 kronor.’  
 b. Marc knows [DP the price that Fred knows]. 
 
(28) a. John knows the president of the US.   = who the POTUS is 
 b. John knows the meeting place.   = where the meeting place is 
      … 
 c. John knows the manner in which to succeed = how to succeed 
 
As already discussed in connection with Hausa (19), English CQs can be embedded under a 
subset of predicates selecting for wh-interrogatives (Nathan 2006:44, Roelofsen & Aloni 
2011:471), including know, forget, learn, discover, tell, show, decide, predict, investigate etc., 
 Importantly, (definite) CQs in English always denote specificational or identity questions 
(Nathan 2006, Romero 2007): CQs are questions about the identity of the semantic value of a 
definite description, i.e. an individual concept (29, 30a). CQs never denote predicational 
questions about properties of contextually specified individuals, such as eg. What is x?, (30b). 
 
(29) [[ CQ ]] = ? [[ the NP]] = x<s,e> 
 
(30) a. Margret knows [the capital of Italy]. =  Margret knows that the coI is Rome.  
     (QUD: The capital of Italy is what city?) 
 b. Margret knows [Rome].  (no CQ interpretation) 
      ≠  Margret knows that Rome is the capital of Italy. (QUD: What is Rome?) 
 
Nathan (2006:21) concludes that “insofar as a concealed question denotes a question, that 
question is an identity question, i.e. one of the form who X is or what X is”.7 Because of this 
semantic restriction to specificational question meanings, English CQs have a narrower 
distribution than wh-interrogatives. Moreover, English CQs do not allow for deictic reference 
even on their specificational readings, unlike wh-interrogatives. Nathan (2006:22) observes that 
which one DP is is not a possible meaning of CQs, accounting for the infelicity of (31): 
 
(31) I bought milk at the store (with a couple of other things). The receipt lists three   
 unnamed items: one cost $1.49, the second cost $1.99, and the third cost $2.49. 
 #I don't know [the price of milk]. (cf. I don't know which one the price of milk is.) 
 
																																																								7	CQs pattern with it-clefts, which allow for specificational, but not for predicational interpretations (Percus 1997). 
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Finally, CQs are semantically more restricted than identificational wh-interrogatives in not 
allowing for de re-interpretations (Greenberg 1977). (32b) must be interpreted de dicto. 
 
(32) a. John found out [who the murderer of Smith was].    
      eg. 1 if John found out the identity of The Strangler (who also murdered Smith) 
 b. John found out the murderer of Smith.   
 
To sum up, English CQs are more restricted in semantic interpretation and distribution (under 
embedding predicates) than their wh-interrogative counterparts. This directly accounts for the 
limited occurrence of CQs and the preference for wh-interrogatives in English. Moreover, it 
would account for why wh-interrogatives exist side by side with CQRs in Hausa: If the latter are 
more restricted semantically, the expression of other interpretations might rely on wh-
interrogatives. Still, this does not account for why CRQs are preferred out of the blue in Hausa, 
unless embedded questions are identificational questions per default. Also, it does not account 
for why relative questions are the only available option in Akan in most cases. We need to 
establish whether the restriction to CRQs in Akan entails a corresponding loss in expressivity. 
 
4.2  Compositional derivation and exhaustivity of English CQs 
 
This section gives a brief overview of three recent formal analyses of CQs in English, focusing 
on the compositional derivation and the predicted level of exhaustivity. The analyses in Romero 
(2007) and Aloni & Roelofsen (2011) appear to predict CQs to come with obligatory SE-
readings (at least under the verb know). This is because they resort to the workings of maximality 
or partitioning (SE-) operators in deriving propositional question meanings from underlying 
individual concepts denoted by DPs. The analysis in Nathan (2006), by contrast, appears more 
flexible re exhaustivity, as type-shifting applies to (relative) NP-meanings, and the maximality 
operator denoted by the definite article only applies at the propositional level. 
 For Romero (2007), English CQs denote proposition intensions (<s,st>). The CQ-meaning is 
derived by letting the partitioning operator ANSSTR of type <se,<s,st>> in (34a) apply to the 
individual concept meaning of the (definite) DP, thereby raising it to propositional level. 
Because of partitioning, the resulting CQ comes with an SE-interpretation (34bc). 
 
(33) [The price of milk] is known to John. 
 
(34)  a. ANSSTR = λy<s,e>λwλw’. y(w’) = y(w) (y = w*.ιxe[price(x,milk,w*)] ) 
 b. [[ [ANSSTR The price of milk]CQ ]] 
 = λwλw’.[λw*.ιxe[price(x,milk,w*)](w’) = λw*.ιxe[price(x,milk,w*)](w)] 
 = λwλw’.[ιxe[price(x,milk,w’)] = ιxe[price(x,milk,w)] ] 
            c. [[ [ANSSTR The price of milk]CQ is known to John ]] 
 = λw.∀w’∈Doxj(w) [ιxe[price(x,milk,w’)] = ιxe[price(x,milk,w)]] 
 
Romero’s proposal leaves open the possibility that DPCQ-meanings also combine with an 
ANSWE-operator, but this would still require some type-shifting of the individual concept DP- 
meaning to propositional level. Assuming the operator meaning in (35), (33) would come out 
true iff  John knows that there is a unique maximal price of milk, and what this price of milk is. 
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(35)  ANSWE = λy<s,e>λw.λp<st>. ∃x[ p(w) ∧ p = λw’. x = y(w’)]                [cf. Nathan 2006:81] 
 
It follows that John knows that nothing else is this maximal price of milk: The SE-effect persists 
in (35) because the individual concept meaning of DPCQ interacts with semantic identification.8  
 The cover-based pragmatic analysis of CQs in Aloni & Roelofsen (2011:451-2) resembles 
Romero’s analysis in important ways. SE is directly built into the meaning of a partitioning 
operator ‘?’, cf. (36a), which is present in all CQs. And again, a type-shifting operator, namely 
‘↑’ in (36b) applies to the individual concept meaning of the DP, which is subject to pragmatic 
cover resolution. The operator ?x in (36a) picks out all and only those worlds v in which ϕ is 
assigned the same truth value as in w under the same cover resolution of x to c. If P in (36b) is 
contextually resolved to the identity relation λy. y = z, and z to the (default) naming cover, this 
gives rise to the identity question reading. On this pragmatic resolution, (37a) would come out as 
true, for instance, iff John knows (Kj) which element from the naming cover [Rome, Athens, …] 
is identical to the individual concept ιx.x is capital of Italy, cf. (37b), The interaction of ?-
operator, identification and DP-meaning (<s,e>) yields an SE-reading. 
 
(36) a. [[ ?x.ϕ ]] M,w,gR = {v | ∀c∈R(x): [[ ϕ  ]] M,w,gR[x/c]= [[ ϕ  ]] M,v,gR[x/c]}  
 b. ↑(z,P) α = ?z.P<se,t>(α); P a contextually given predicate of individual concepts 
 
(37) a. John knows the capital of Italy. 
 b. Kj(?z.[λy<se>.y = z](ιx. x is capital of Italy)) = Kj(?z.z = ιx.x is capital of Italy)   
 
The analysis in Nathan (2006) differs regarding the semantic type of CQs and the compositional 
derivation. For Nathan, CQs denote unique propositions (<st>), derived by type-shifting the 
meaning of relational NPs (<e,et>) to propositional level (<st,t>). The DEF-operator applies at the 
propositional level, picking the unique proposition in a given context C, cf. (38): 
  
(38) [[ the mayor of Berlin]] = ιp<st>. [[ ∃xe.p = λw1.[[ mayor of B ]] (x)(w1)] ∧ C(p)] 
 
The DPCQ in (38) denotes the unique proposition p such that (a) for some individual x, p 
expresses that x is A mayor of Berlin, and (b) p meets a contextual restriction C, most frequently, 
that it be true in evaluation world w. According to Nathan (2006:18), the sentence Rajesh knows 
the mayor of Berlin will then be true if Rajesh knows the proposition that Michael Müller is the 
mayor of Berlin. Crucially, Rajesh’s knowing the unique true proposition of the form λw.x is 
mayor of Berlin does not entail his knowing that this IS the unique true proposition, at least on a 
de re-construal of (38), thereby making (38) compatible with WE-interpretations; see FN9. 
 As Nathan’s question-type shifter applies to relational nouns only, he postulates (ibid.:19) 
that a DP can be a concealed question iff its head noun is relational, or, in case of non-relational 
head nouns, if it is modified in certain ways, eg. with a relative clause. On a type-shifted 
interpretation, the RC maps NP-interpretations of type <et> to sets of propositions, cf. (39): 
 																																																								8	Cf. Nathan (2006) for discussion, as well as Rullmann (1995) and Beck & Rullmann (1999) for precursor analyses 
with MAX-operators in wh-interrogatives. 
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(39) a. [[ that Kim visited last month]]   = 
   λP <s,et>.λp<st> . ∃xe [p = λw1 . [P(w1)(x) ∧ Kim visited x last month in w1]] 
            b. [[ city that Kim visited last month]]   = 
                 λp<st> . ∃xe [p = λw1 . [[[ city]] (w1)(x) ∧ Kim visited x last month in w1]] 
            c. [[ the city that Kim visited last month]]  = 
                 ιp<st> . ∃xe[p = λw1.[ [[ city]]  (w1)(x) ∧ Kim visited x last month in w1]] ∧ p(w) 
 
Nathan’s treatment of CQs is relevant for three reasons when it comes to the analysis of CRQs in 
Hausa and Akan: Firstly, it offers an explicit formal analysis of the semantic role of relative 
clauses in CQ-formation. Secondly, the meaning of CQs does not involve partitioning (SE), nor a 
maximality/uniqueness condition on individual (concept)s (SE). Nathan’s approach is thus 
compatible with a more flexible interpretation of CRQs, at least in principle, in also allowing for 
WE-interpretations. Finally, the analysis is not built around individual-denoting DPs, for which 
reason is extends easily to CQs with indefinite determiners (and NE mention-some 
interpretations). This may be useful for the analysis of CRQs containing specific indefinite 
determiners in Akan (21a) and (22), for instance. More generally, the different predictions on the 
interpretation of CQs underline the need for more empirical work on the (non-)exhaustivity of 
CRQs. More empirical information on the interpretation of CRQs will certainly help to decide as 
to whether Nathan’s analysis applies to them, or not. We will sketch such an analysis next. 
  
4.3 Suggestions for possible analyses of the CQRs in Hausa and Akan 
 
Applying the analysis in Nathan (2006) to the syntactic structure in (40) yields the semantic 
derivation in (41) for the CRQ from (2b) above.9 (42) gives the meaning of the full clause:  
 
(40) [DP wa1 [DP `n [NP t1 [CP dà [TP ya táfi Kano]]]]] 
 
(41) a. [[ RC]]  = [[ dà ya táfi Kano ]] 
   = λP<s,et>.λp<st> . ∃xe [p = λw1.[P(w1)(x) ∧ x went to K. in w1]] 
            b. [[ NP ]]  = [[ wa ]]  = λw.λx. x is a person in w 
            c. [[ NP RC ]]   = λp<st>. ∃xe[p = λw1.[person’(w1)(x) ∧ x went to K. in w1]] 
            d. [[ DEF NP RC]]   = ιp[∃x[p = λw1.person’(w1)(x) ∧ x went to K. in w1] ∧ p(w)] 
 
(42) [[ (2b)]] w  = 1 iff ∀w’∈DOXMUSA(w):  
                              [ιp[∃xe[p = λw1.[person’(w1)(x) ∧ x went to K. in w1]] ∧ p(w)]](w’) 
                          ≈ Musa knows the unique w-true proposition of the form ‘x went to Kano’ (WE) 
 
Crucially, uniqueness in (42) is evaluated relative to evaluation world w, and thereby not part of 
the doxastically accessible propositional content: (42) represents the WE-interpretation of (2b).10  																																																								9	 In	 Hausa, the definite determiner `n/`r follows the NP, viz. mutumî-n ‘man-DEF’ (eg. Newman 2000). We 
postulate, that the order NP>DET is derived by Aboh(2004)-style movement of NP to SpecDP. 10	The formal implementation raises a non-trivial issue: the requirement that the embedded proposition be true in 
evaluation world w is satisfied by binding the world/situation variable (Schwarz 2009) of the CQ-definite to w. As 
mentioned below (38), this deictic behavior of the DEF-operator gives rise to a de re-construal. Alternatively, the 
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 Alternatively, CRQs, and in particular those with overt specific indefinites, such as Akan 
(21a) and (22), may receive an analysis in terms of Xiang’s (2016) analysis of wh-interrogatives 
and free relative questions; see also Caponigro (2003). The analysis appears well-suited for a 
number of reasons: (i.) The core of the wh-interrogative denotes a property (<e,st>), not a 
propositional set. This would correspond to the meaning of NP+CP-constituents in CRQs. (ii.) 
The wh-element is of type <e,st> and functions as a modifier on the topical property (= the 
background predicate), which is denoted by the rest of the interrogative. This would correspond 
to the role of head noun and relative clause in CRQs, which also combine by means of predicate 
modification. (iii.) The wh-core is headed by a covert answer operator ANS, selecting for the 
maximally informative proposition(s) in the answer space, and by a covert choice function-
operator, which selects (one of) the maximally informative proposition(s). Applied to Akan 
CRQs, this choice function operator may be spelt out by the specific INDEF marker ko, given that 
such indefinites are often treated as choice-function denoting (Reinhart 1997).11 Referring the 
reader to Xiang (2016: 14ff.), this would yield the structure in (43) for the CRQ in (22a): 
 
(43) [DP    nipa1   [DP   ko       [ANS     [NP<e,st> t1 [CP<e,st> aa       ɔ-kɔ-ɔ    Kumase]] 
                   person       CHOICE             REL      went      Kumasi 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In light of the discussion, one may wonder about the cross-linguistic implications of the regular 
occurrence of CRQs in Hausa/Akan for the analysis of embedded wh-questions in English? The 
question is whether a unified analysis is possible on which English wh-interrogatives are 
reanalyzed as embedded CRQs, with the matrix predicate selecting for a free relative clause 
(Jacobson 1995, Caponigro 2003)? Xiang’s (2016) analysis constitutes an important step towards 
a unified analysis, but it still leaves open a number questions: Do CRQs come with more limited 
interpretive options like the CQ-couterparts (see §4.1)? Do CRQs show a different exhaustivity 
behavior than wh-interrogatives? And why does the range of licit wh-expressions in wh-
interrogatives and free relatives differ in English (Caponigro 2003)? There seemed to be no such 
difference between English wh-interrogatives and Hausa/English CRQs. 
 Deferring the question of whether a unified analysis for wh-interrogatives and relative-based 
questions is possible to future research, we conclude more generally that there is cross-linguistic 
(and language-internal) variation in the formal expression of embedded complement questions, 
namely as wh-interrogative questions or CRQs (or free relatives). This raises the issue of whether 
there is a corresponding difference in the semantic interpretation of embedded questions. 
However, the interpretion of concealed questions as SE, IE, WE, or NE has been little explored 
so far, not to mention the interpretation of CRQs in Hausa and Akan. It was shown that existing 
formal analyses of concealed questions differ in their predictions regarding the exhaustivity of 																																																																																																																																																																																		
world variable may be bound by the matrix predicate, on a de dicto-construal. Uniqueness would then be established 
relative to the doxastically accessible worlds, thereby giving rise to SE-readings. Notice that the de re (world) 
analysis clashes with the No de re-constraint on CQs illustrated in (31) for English. More research is required. 11	Notice that the Hausa element wa(a), which is found as wh-element in wh-interrogatives and as an unspecific 
person head noun in CRQs, also forms part of the specific indefinite determiners wani (m.), wata (f.), wasu (pl.), 
thereby motivating a choice function analysis for Hausa CRQs as well. 
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questions, thereby raising the need for substantial empirical work on CRQs in Hausa and Akan 
and on concealed or free relative questions in English alike. 
 
References 
Aboh, E.O. (2004). The morphosyntax of complement-head sequences: Clause structure and  
word order patterns in Kwa. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Aloni, M. (2001). Quantification under Conceptual Covers. PhD thesis. Amsterdam. 
 
Aloni, M. & F. Roelofsen (2011). Interpreting concealed questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 
34, 443–478. DOI 10.1007/s10988-011-9102-9 
 
Beck, S. and H. Rullman (1999). A Flexible Approach to Exhaustivity in Questions. Natural 
Language Semantics 7, 249–298. 
 
Berman, S. (1991). On the Semantics and Logical Form of Wh-Clauses. PhD thesis, University 
of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
 
Caponigro, I. (2003). Free Not to Ask: On the Semantics of Free Relatives and Wh-Words Cross-
linguistically. PhD thesis, UCLA. 
 
Cremers, A. and E. Chemla (2016) A Psycholinguistic Study of the Exhaustive Readings of 
Embedded Questions. Journal of Semantics 33, 49‒85. 
 
Egré, P. and B. Spector (2015). Embedded questions revisited: an answer, not necessarily the 
answer. Synthese 192, 1729-1784. 
 
George, B. J. (2011). Question Embedding and the Semantics of Answers. PhD thesis, UCLA. 
 
Greenberg, B. (1977). A semantic account of relative clauses with embedded question 
interpretations. Ms., UCLA. 
 
Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof (1982). Semantics analysis of wh-complements. Linguistics and 
Philosophy 5, 175–233. 
 
Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof (1984). Studies on the Semantics of Questions and the 
Pragmatics of Answers. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam. 
 
Hartmann, K. & M. Zimmermann (2007). Exhaustivity Marking in Hausa: A Re-Evaluation of 
the Particle nee/cee. In E. O. Aboh et al. (eds.), Focus Strategies in Niger-Congo and Afro-
Asiatic. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin. 241-263. 
 
Heim, I. (1982). The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. PhD thesis, UMass. 
 
Heim, I. (1994). Interrogative semantics and Karttunen’s semantics for know. In R. Buchalla and 
A. Mittwoch (eds.), Proceedings of IATL 9, 128–144. Jerusalem: Academon. 
 
Karttunen, L. (1977). Syntax and Semantics of Questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 1, 3–44. 
 
Klinedinst, N. and D. Rothschild (2011). Exhaustivity in Questions with Non-factives. Semantics 
and Pragmatics 4(2), 1–23. 
 
Lahiri, U. (2002). Questions and Answers in Embedded Contexts. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Matthewson L. (2004). On the Methodology of Semantic Fieldwork. International Journal of 
American Linguistics 70(4), 369‒415. 
 
Nathan, L. (2006). On the interpretation of concealed questions. PhD thesis, MIT. 
 
Newman, P. (2000). The Hausa Language. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
15
© 2018 by Malte Zimmermann
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 1-16
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
  
 
Reinhart, T. (1997). Quantifier scope: how labor is divided between QR and choice functions. 
Linguistics and Philosophy 20, 335–397. 
 
Renans, A. (2017). Two Types of Choice-Functional Indefinites: Evidence from Ga (Kwa). 
Topoi. DOI 10.1007/s11245-017-9479-3. 
 
Romero, M. (2007). On Concealed Questions. In M. Gibson and J. Howell (Eds.) Proceedings of 
Semantics and Linguistic Theory XVI. pp. 208-227 Ithaca, NY: CLC. 
 
Rullmann, H. (1995). Maximality in the Semantics of Wh-Constructions. PhD thesis, UMass. 
 
Saah, K. (1994). Studies in Akan Syntax, Acquisition and Sentence Processing. PhD thesis, 
University of Ottawa. 
 
Schwarz, F. (2009). Two Types of Definites in Natural Language. PhD thesis, UMass. 
 
Spector, B. (2006). Aspects de la pragmatique des opérateurs logiques. PhD thesis, Université 
Paris Diderot, Paris. 
 
Theiler, N. (2014). A Multitude of Answers: Embedded Questions in Typed Inquisitive Semantics. 
MSc thesis, ILLC, Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
 
Uegaki, W. (2015). Interpreting questions under attitudes. PhD thesis, MIT. 
16
© 2018 by Malte Zimmermann
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 1-16
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
Focus strategies in Limbum1
Imke Driemel — Leipzig University
Jude Nformi Awasom — Leipzig University
Abstract. Limbum exhibits two morphologically marked focus strategies involving the particles
a´ and ba´. We show that the two focus markers differ in their functional complexity. While a´
introduces an existence presupposition operating on focus alternatives, ba´ additionally encodes
an exhaustivity presupposition as well as a mirative component. The latter makes it possible for
Limbum to show the mirror image of what is traditionally observed as a markedness distinction
between information focus and contrastive focus: focus a´ marking is accompanied by syntactic
fronting while ba´ marked constituents can be left in-situ. Limbum, furthermore, shows that focus
by itself does not presuppose existence, since this restriction is only present when accompanied by
the particle a´, which must be left out if the context does not satisfy this presupposition.
1 Introduction
Limbum – a Grassfields Bantu language, spoken in Cameroon – shows a very extensive focus
marking system, involving particles as well as syntactic re-ordering. Its basic word order is SVO,
with TAM markers preceding the verb. Like most African languages, Limbum is a tone language
and has three level tones (High, Mid, Low) and five contour tones (High-Mid, High-Low, Mid-
Low, Low-Mid, Low-Low) which are contrastive and are marked on syllables.
(1) NwE`
man
fO¯
DET
a`m
PST3
tı´h
cut
Ngu¯
wood
‘The man cut the wood.’
Focus signals the presence of alternatives (Rooth 1992, Krifka 2008). Typical contexts for focus
are given in (2)-(4), where (2) triggers information focus, while (3) and (4) are instances of con-
trastive focus. The latter is standardly distinguished from the former by adding semantic and/or
pragmatic conditions on the alternatives, be it exhaustivity (Szabolcsi 1981, Kiss 1998, Vallduvı´
and Vilkuna 1998, Horvath 2010, 2013), exclusivity (Beaver and Clark 2008, van der Wal 2011,
Orenstein and Greenberg 2013, van der Wal 2014), or unexpectedness (Zimmermann 2008, Hart-
mann 2008, Skopeteas and Fanselow 2009, 2011, Frey 2010).
(2) A: Who stole the cookie?
B: [PEter]F stole the cookie. Q-A congruence
(3) A: Mary stole the cookie.
B: (No,) [PEter]F stole the cookie. correction
(4) An [AMErican]F farmer talked to a [CaNAdian]F farmer. contrast
While information focus is often encoded by means of a canonical focus structure, the contrastive
1We would like to thank Mira Grubic and the audience of TripleA 4 in Gothenburg for helpful comments.
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focus is realized with a relatively more marked focus strategy. Depending on the language, this
difference can manifest itself in the opposition of in-situ vs. ex-situ structures (Hartmann and
Zimmermann 2014, Fiedler et al. 2010), different levels of prosodic prominence (Bolinger 1961,
Alter et al. 2001, Katz and Selkirk 2009), or the opposition of prosodic prominence and reorder-
ing/clefting (Skopeteas and Fanselow 2009). From a pragmatic point of view, the different levels
of complexity receive an explanation by the observation that contrastive information often comes
with an unexpectedness flavour, which, thus, requires the more marked focus strategy in order
to facilitate common ground update (Skopeteas and Fanselow 2009, Zimmermann 2008, 2011,
Zimmermann and Onea 2011).
Focus by itself can be left unmarked in Limbum, see (5). Note that wh-words behave com-
pletely parallel to focused constituents, supporting the hypothesis that they are intrinsically focused
(Beck 2006, Haida 2007).
(5) A: wE`
you.SG
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
nda¯
who
‘Who will you meet?’
B: mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
Nga`la´
Ngala
‘I will meet NGALA.’
The two marked strategies are shown in (6) and (7). The a´ strategy seems similar to cleft construc-
tions, where the focus marker appears clause initially, followed by an optional complementizer,2
and the focused constituent. In contrast, the particle ba´ co-occurs with focused constituents in-situ.
(6) A: a´
FOC
nda´
who
wE`
you.SG
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
‘Who is it that you will meet?’
B: a´
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
(cı´)
(COMP)
mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
‘I will meet NGALA.’
(7) A: wE`
you.SG
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
ba´
FOC
nda´
who
‘Who (if not X) will you meet?’
B: mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
ba´
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
‘It is Ngala whom I will meet.’
We will show that the a´ strategy is compatible with information focus, while the ba´ strategy shows
signs of contrastive focus, i.e. exhaustivity and unexpectedness. The pattern, thus, instantiates
the exact mirror image to the standard dichotomy, which is that contrastive focus tends to be
more marked than new information focus. Pragmatic reasoning can therefore not be the source of
different levels of markedness in Limbum. Hence, we propose that the notion of unexpectedness is
directly encoded in the focus marker ba´. Section 2 will demonstrate how unmarked focus differs
from focus marked by the particle a´, while section 3 develops an analysis for the particle ba´. In
section 4 we compare contexts which in principle should allow for both marked strategies but
where only one of them is felicitous. Section 5 wraps up.
2Glossing cı´ as COMP is an oversimplification. See Becker et al. (to appear) for a syntactic analysis that takes cı´ as
the head of a left peripheral focus projection.
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2 Existence focus
Both unmarked focus and a´ marked focus are compatible with question-answer contexts, an addi-
tional example is given in (8).
(8) Context: Tata comes across a dead animal in the backyard. He shows it to Yaah and asks:
Tata: (a´)
FOC
nda¯
who
a`
3SG
zhv0¯
kill
nya`
animal
‘Who killed the animal?’
Yaah: (a´)
FOC
Nfo`
Nfor
a`
3SG
zhv0¯
kill
nya`
animal
‘NFOR killed the animal.’
We conclude that the presence of alternatives does not have to be marked morphologically.3 The
subtle difference between the strategies lies in the presence of an existence presupposition with the
latter, but not with the former. The following context ensures that the proposition is true for at least
one alternative, thus an existence presupposition is satisfied. The particle a´ is required in such a
case.
(9) Context: Tata comes across a dead animal in the backyard. The animal appears to have been
killed by someone since it shows multiple knife wounds. He shows it to Yaah and asks:
Tata: (a´)#
FOC
nda¯
who
a`
3SG
zhv0¯
kill
nya`
animal
‘Who is it that killed the animal?’
Yaah: (a´)#
FOC
Nfo`
Nfor
a`
3SG
zhv0¯
kill
nya`
animal
‘NFOR killed the animal.’
Following the work of Rooth (1985, 1992), we implement this observation in the framework of
alternative semantics, see (10). Focus marker a´ associates with focus alternatives and introduces
an existence presupposition that operates on those alternatives.4
(10) Ja´  Ko =  w : 9p[p 2 J Kf ^ p(w) = 1].J Ko(w) = 1
For intonational languages such as English, the possibility of an existence presupposition is still
under debate (Dryer 1996, Rooth 1999, Geurts and van der Sandt 2004, Bu¨ring 2004). The di-
alogue in (11) tests for presupposition status and suggests that focus on its own cannot introduce
an existence presupposition. Since the context assures that Peter doesn’t know if somebody saw
John, an existence presupposition would not be satisfied, nevertheless intonational focus is felici-
tous. The control structure is a cleft which uncontroversially introduce an existence presupposition
(Percus 1997, Velleman et al. 2012) and is, thus, infelicitous.
3Another context in which one would expect focus marking to occur obligatorily is under the scope of focus
sensitive adverbs such as only. Again, a´ is optional, as will become apparent in the next section, see (18)A.
4Another way to introduce an existence presupposition is by forming the disjunction of the propositions in the
alternative set: Ja´  Ko =  w : SJ Kf = 1.J Ko(w) = 1
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(11) Did anyone see John? (Dryer 1996: 490)
Peter: I don’t know. I know MARY didn’t see him.
Peter’: I don’t know. # I know it wasn’t MARY that saw him.
Again, Limbum seems to make a clear distinction in that the a´ strategy patterns like the cleft in
(11). In (12), Yaah’s answer is infelicitous if focus marker a´ is present because the existence
presupposition contradicts the fact that Yaah answers the question if someone is playing the drums
with I don’t know. In other words, the existence presupposition is stable under negation.
(12) Shey: mE`
1SG
shı¯
PROG
yo¯P
hear
yu¯
thing
mO¯P.
one
NwE`
person
mO¯P
one
shı¯
PROG
bo¯P
play
ncu`h
drum
a`
Q
‘I heard something. Is somebody playing the drums?’
Yaah: mE`
1SG
rı`N
know
ka¯P
NEG
mE`
1SG
shı¯
PROG
kwa`Pshı¯
think
nE¯
that
(#a´)
FOC
Nfo`
Nfor
ı´
3SG
shı`
PROG
bo¯P
play
ncu`h
drum
kaˆP
NEG
‘I don’t know. But I don’t think NFOR is playing the drums.’
A similar projection test can be constructed with a modal operator, see (13). As above, the presence
of a´ renders the answer infelicitous.
(13) Shey: NwE`
person
mO¯P
one
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
lo¯
borrow
ya´
1SG.POSS
sa`P
cutlass
a´
Q
‘Did someone borrow my cutlass?’
Yaah: mE`
1SG
rı`N
know
ka¯P
NEG
ka`de´P
can
ba¯
be
nE¯
that
(#a´)
FOC
Nfo`
Nfor
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
lo¯
borrow
‘I don’t know. It is possible that NFOR borrowed it.’
Additional evidence comes from the fact that a´ cannot scope over quantifiers that denote the empty
set. This is predicted since such an assertion would contradict an existence presupposition.
(14) (*a´)
FOC
NwE`
person
mE
1SG
mu¯
PST2
yE¯
see
ka´P
NEG
‘I saw NOBODY.’
This section has shown that focus itself does not have to be morphologically marked. The particle a´
introduces an existence presupposition that operates on the alternatives of the focused constituent.
Limbum, thus, provides a unique window into the discussion of existence focus, in that it ties the
existence presupposition to an additional marker – a counter-argument to theories that take focus
alone to be the reason for the presupposition (Geurts and van der Sandt 2004).
3 Exhaustive, mirative focus
A good way to illustrate how ba´ is different from a´ and unmarked focus is by comparing the context
in (15) to the contexts in (8) and (9). The context in (15) introduces an unexpectedness component,
both on the hearer’s and on the speaker’s side. The ba´ strategy is the only option here – a pattern
that clearly contrasts with (8) and (9) where the ba´ strategy is excluded.
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(15) Context: Tata comes across a dead animal in the backyard. He immediately suspects Shey
to have killed the animal but it turns out that Shey is not the culprit. Shey knows that Tata
suspected him although it was Nfor who killed the animal. Tata shows the animal to Shey
and asks:
Tata: #(a´)
FOC
nda¯
who
a`
3SG
zhv0¯
kill
nya`
animal
‘Who is it that killed the animal?’
Shey: #(a´)
FOC
Nfo`
Nfor
a`
3SG
zhv0¯
kill
nya`
animal
‘NFOR killed the animal.’
Tata0: a`
EXPL
zhv0¯
kill
ba´
FOC
nda¯
who
nya`
animal
‘Who (if not you) killed the animal?’
Shey0: a`
EXPL
zhv0¯
kill
ba´
FOC
Nfo`
Nfo
nya`
animal
‘It is Nfor who killed the animal.’
The exhaustive component can be exemplified with correction scenarios and co-occurrence re-
strictions with additive particles such as also (see Becker and Nformi 2016). A correction context
requires an utterance with an explicit alternative, followed by another alternative in a second utter-
ance, automatically canceling the first one. In such contexts, the ba´ strategy is obligatory.
(16) Context: Ndi bought a pair of shoes. Njobe does not remember correctly and tells Tanko
that Ndi bought a dress. Ndi corrects Njobe saying that she bought shoes (instead).
Njobe: ı´
she
ba´
PST2
yu¯
buy
bcE`P
dresses
‘She bought dresses.’
Ndi: #mE`
I
ba´
PST2
yu¯
buy
bla´ba´P
shoes
‘I bought SHOES.’
Ndi0: #a´
FOC
bla´ba´P
shoes
(cı´)
(COMP)
mE`
I
ba¯
PST2
yu´
buy
‘I bought SHOES.’
Ndi00: mE`
I
ba´
PST2
yu¯
buy
ba´
FOC
bla´ba´P
shoes
‘It is shoes that I bought.’
Exhaustivity also prevents ba´ from co-occurring with the focus sensitive adverb fO´N ‘also’, since
additives5 require a proposition to be true for at least one non-selected alternative, whereas ba´
5The scalar additive ka´P ‘even’ seems to be restricted to topics rather than foci since it cannot co-occur with a´ or
ba´ and is, thus, untestable for our hypotheses. As (i) shows, ka´P has to precede the focused constituent, while a´ is
illicit independent of where exactly in the left periphery the particle occurs. A similar pattern can be shown for ba´,
albeit with the additional restriction that constituents under the scope of ka´P have to undergo fronting, see (ii).
(i) (*a´)
FOC
ka´P
even
(*a´)
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
(*a´)
FOC
mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
‘I will meet even NGALA.’
(ii) *mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kOnı¯
meet
(*ba´)
FOC
ka´P
even
(*ba´)
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
(*ba´)
FOC
‘It is even Ngala whom I will meet.’
In (iii) we show that topics in general need to be fronted and can optionally leave a resumptive pronoun – both of
which is true for constituents under the scope of ka´P, see (iv) and (v). Focused constituents marked with a´ require
fronting as well. A resumptive pronoun, however, is not allowed to show up, see (vi).
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requires all non-selected alternatives to be false.
(17) Shey: Nfo`
Nfor
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
yu¯
buy
rka¯r.
car
‘Nfor bought a car.’
Ndi: ı´
Nfor
mu¯
PST2
yu¯
buy
ntu`mntu`m
motorbike
fO´N.
also
‘He bought a MOTORBIKE also.’
Ndi0: a´
FOC
ntu`mntu`m
motorbike
(cı´)
COMP
ı´
3SG
mu¯
PST2
yu¯
buy
fO´N.
also
‘He bought a MOTORBIKE also.’
Ndi00: *ı´
3SG
mu¯
PST2
yu¯
buy
ba´
FOC
ntu`mntu`m
motorbike
fO´N.
also
‘It is a motorbike he also bought.’
To show that mirativity is at work independently of exhaustivity, we show the behaviour of ba´
under the scope of another exhaustive operator ca`Pca`P ‘only’. If one ensures exhaustivity with
ca`Pca`P, ba´ becomes licit only if the selected alternative is also unexpected.
(18) Context: Shey is looking for Ngala and Tanko who are supposed to be at the market. Shey
tells Ndi to go find Ngala and Tanko and bring them back.
(iii) mbaˇ
money
fO¯,
DET
wo¯ye`
they
o´
3PL
;
PERF
fa¯
give
(zhı´)
it.RES
nı`
PREP
ye¯
3SG
we´e´
already
‘The money, they already gave it to him/her.’
(iv) ka´P
even
Nga`la´
Ngala
mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
(ye¯)
3SG.RES
‘I will meet even NGALA.’
(v) *mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kOnı¯
meet
ka´P
even
Nga`la´
Ngala
‘It is even Ngala whom I will meet.’
(vi) a´
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
mE`
I
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
(*ye¯)
3SG.RES
‘I will meet NGALA.’
We take this as evidence that ka´P can only scope over topics. Hence, ka´P is incompatible with the a´ strategy, which is
shown in (i). Since topics have to be fronted, (ii) is unacceptable, independent of the presence of ba´.
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A. Yaah comes back with Ngala.
Yaah: mE`
I
?
PERF
kO´nı´
find
Nga`la´
Ngala
ca`Pca`P
only
‘I only found NGALA.’
Yaah0: a´
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
ca`Pca`P
only
(cı´)
COMP
mE`
I
?
PERF
kO´nı´
find
‘I found NGALA only.’
Yaa00: #mE`
I
?
PERF
kO´nı´
find
ba´
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
ca`Pca`P
only
‘I only found NGALA.’
B. Yaah comes back with Njobe.
Yaah: mE`
I
?
PERF
kO´nı´
find
ba´
FOC
Njobe
Njobe
ca`Pca`P
only
‘I only found NJOBE.’
Both the exhaustive and the mirative component seem to be non at-issue, as the following two
tests suggest. For the continuations in (19) to be informative (and thus felicitous), exhaustivity –
encoded by either ba´ or ca`Pca`P – must be at-issue. As (19)i shows, the ba´ continuation is infe-
licitous, i.e. ba´ asserts the ordinary semantic value of the focused constituent, while presupposing
an exhaustified focus alternative set. In contrast, (19)ii suggests that ca`Pca`P asserts exhaustivity,
similar to its English counterpart only.
(19) mE`
1SG
rı`N
know
nE¯
that
Tata
Tata
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
zhe¯
eat
mNgO`mbe´
plantain
ka¯p
but
ku¯
just
yo¯P
hear
nE¯
that
...
‘I know Tata ate PLAINTAIN but I’ve just heard that...’
(i) ba´: exhaustivity not at-issue
... #ı´
3SG
mu¯
PST2
zhe¯
eat
ba´
FOC
mNgO`mbe´
plantain
‘it was PLAINTAIN she ate.’
(ii) ca`Pca`P: exhaustivity at-issue
... ı´
3SG
mu¯
PST2
zhe¯
eat
mNgO`mbe´
plantain
ca`Pca`P
only
‘she only ate PLAINTAIN.’
The non at-issue status of the mirative component is suggested by the fact that it can project out
of the antecedent of conditionals. Compare (20) to (21), where adding ba´ in (21) lets the mirative
interpretation of the selected focus alternative project through, so that it escapes cancellation in the
consequent. This is not true for (20), due to the absence of ba´.
(20) [ka¯P
if
ba¯
to.be
nE¯
that
ı´
3SG
mu¯
PST2
nO¯
drink
mbro`P]
wine
mE`
1SG
lE¯P
surprise
ka¯P
NEG
‘If it is WINE that he drank, I’m not surprised.’
Comment: The lack of surprise can be directed at the choice of beverage.
(21) [ka¯P
if
ba¯
to.be
nE¯
that
ı´
3SG
mu¯
PST2
nO¯
drink
ba´
FOC
ble¯e¯]
blood
mE`
1SG
lE¯P
surprise
ka¯P
NEG
‘If it is BLOOD that he drank, I’m not surprised.’
Comment: The lack of surprise can only be directed at the person, given that this person does
unusual things all the time. It cannot be directed at blood.
Besides unexpectedness and exhaustivity, ba´ additionally encodes existence (just like a´), shown
here by the inability to occur with a negative quantifier, see (22).
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(22) Tanko
Tanko
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
yu¯
buy
bflaˇwa`
flowers
Nga`la´
Ngala
a`
3SG
yu
buy
(*ba`)
FOC
yu¯
thing
ka¯P
NEG
‘Tanko bought flowers but Ngala bought NOTHING.’
Existence is presupposed, since it can project through negation, compare (23) to (24). Once a
focused constituent is preceded by ba´, the existence of the selected alternative cannot be denied,
even if ba´ is embedded under negation.
(23) [Tata
Tata
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
sO¯
win
mba`N
game
ka´P]
NEG
a`ndZO´P
because
NwE`
person
mO`P
one
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
sO¯
win
ka¯P
NEG
‘TATA did not win the game because nobody won.’
(24) *[a`
EXPL
mu¯
PST2
sO¯
win
ba´
FOC
Tata
Tata
mba`N
game
ka´P]
NEG
a`ndZO´P
because
NwE`
person
mO`P
one
a`
3SG
mu¯
PST2
sO¯
win
ka¯P
NEG
‘It is not TATA who won the game because nobody won.’
Since we would like to model the exhaustivity as well as the existence requirement as a presuppo-
sition, we run into the problem of making the entailed content look trivial – a problem which has
been discussed for English clefts (Velleman et al. 2012).
(25) It was Mary who laughed.
a. 9x[laughed(x)] existential presupposition
b. 8x[laughed(x) ! (x = m)] exhaustive presupposition
c. laughed(m) entailed prejacent
An additional problem relates to the observation that the exhaustive presupposition does not project
through negation. This is true for clefts (Velleman et al. 2012, Bu¨ring and Krizˇ 2013), see (26), as
well as for the ba´ strategy, shown in (27).
(26) It wasn’t Mary who laughed; it was Bill.
(27) mE`
1SG
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
ba´
FOC
Nga`la´
Ngala
ka´
NEG
‘It is not NGALA I will meet.’
... mE`
1SG
bı´
FUT1
kO¯nı¯
meet
ba´
FOC
Nfo`
Nfor
‘It is NFOR that I will meet.’
We would like to follow Bu¨ring and Krizˇ (2013) who offer a solution towards these problems by
making the exhaustive presupposition dependent on the assertion. Thus, (25-b) has to be reformu-
lated along the lines of If Mary laughed, then nobody else did. Bu¨ring and Krizˇ (2013) make use
of a max operator in their exhaustivity presupposition, which is based on mereological parthood,
see (28) and (29). For the cleft in (30) for example, the max operator derives the sum of all invi-
tees, given that all predicates are always closed under fusion and therefore each have a maximal
element.
(28) max(P ) = { x 2 P | ¬9y 2 P [x < y] }
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(29) CLEFT:=  z. P : 8x 2 max(P ) [z 6< x].P (z)
An example for a positive cleft is given in (30). Following the denotation of (29), the presupposi-
tion, given in (30-b), has two inferences: (i) Fred is the sole invitee, (ii) Fred is not invited. Given
the assertion in (30-a), only (ii) is a licit inference. Hence, an exhaustive effect arises.
(30) It was Fred she invited.
a. ASS: She invited Fred.
b. PRES: Fred is not a proper part of the sum of all invitees.
. &
haFred is the sole invitee
((((
((((
(((((hhhhhhhhhhhhh
Fred was not invited at all
A negative cleft, thus, does not presuppose exhaustivity because that particular inference arising
from the presupposition is blocked by the assertion in (31-a).
(31) It wasn’t Fred she invited.
a. ASS: She didn’t invite Fred.
b. PRES: Fred is not a proper part of the sum of all invitees.
. &
ha(((((
((((
((hhhhhhhhhhhFred is the sole invitee Fred was not invited at all
We adopt this analysis for ba´, make it focus sensitive and add an existence presupposition and a
scalar component, see (32). The first line encodes existence, the second exhaustivity, and the third
mirativity.
(32) J[ba´ ↵F ] P Ko = 9x [x 2 J↵Kf ^ JP Ko(x) = 1] ^
8y 2 J↵Kf [y 2 max(JP Ko) ! J↵Ko 6< y] ^
8z 2 J↵Kf [z 6= J↵Ko ! JP Ko(z)  likely JP Ko(J↵Ko)] .JP Ko(J↵Ko)
(where for any P 2 Det,max(P ) = { x 2 P | ¬9y 2 P [x < y] }
This section has developed an analysis for the focus marker ba´ – a particle that operates on focus
alternatives, imposing an existence, an exhaustivity, and a mirative restriction on the non-selected
alternatives. Evidence for the analysis comes from context tests, co-occurrence with other focus
sensitive adverbs, and the projection behaviour.
4 Maximize presupposition
The correction context in (16) only allows for the ba´ strategy. The fact that the a´ strategy is blocked
in such contexts straightforwardly follows if we adopt the principle of maximize presupposition
(Heim 1991, Percus 2006, Sauerland 2008). A definition is given in (33).
(33) Maximize Presupposition:
Do not use   if a member of its Alternative-Family  is felicitous and contextually equivalent
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to  .
a. Lexical alternatives: Alternatives are only defined for lexical items. For any lexical item,
the alternatives consist of all “presuppositionally stronger” items of the same syntactic
category.
b. Alternative-Family: Let the Alternative-Family of a sentence   be the set of sentences
that you get by replacing at least one alternative-associated expression in   with an
alternative.
(Percus 2006)
The focus particle ba´ belongs to the alternative-family of a´ since it is presuppositionally stronger
and of the same syntactic category, i.e. a focus particle that takes a focused constituent as its
complement.6 Hence, it will block a´ in correction contexts where it is felicitous. Other pairs of
expression which belong to alternative-families are listed in (34). We would like to add hba´, a´i to
this list.
(34) hthe, ai, hboth, everyi, hknow, believei, hSING, PLURi, hPAST,PRESi, ...
The blocking pattern can be replicated for contrast and selection contexts. While the expression of
contrast only obligatorily requires a ba´ marker if the selected alternative is truly unexpected, com-
pare (35) to (36), the competing a´ marker is never allowed to occur with the contrasted alternative,
see (37) and (38).
(35) Ta´nko´
Tanko
kı´
HAB
nO¯
drink
mndzı¯p,
water
Nga`la´
Ngala
cı´
but
nO¯
drink
(ba´)
FOC
mbro`Pmbv0´
palm.wine
‘Tanko drinks water but Ngala drinks palm wine.’
(36) Ta´nko´
Tanko
kı´
HAB
nO¯
drink
mndzı¯p,
water
Nga`la´
Ngala
cı´
but
nO¯
drink
*(ba´)
FOC
ble¯e¯
blood
‘Tanko drinks water but Ngala drinks blood.’
(37) *Ta´nko´
Tanko
kı´
HAB
nO¯
drink
mndzı¯p,
water
a´
FOC
ble¯e¯
blood
cı´
but
Nga`la´
Ngala
nO¯
drink
‘Tanko drinks water but Ngala drinks blood.’
(38) *Ta´nko´
Tanko
kı´
HAB
nO¯
drink
mndzı¯p,
water
a´
FOC
mbro`Pmbv0´
palm.wine
cı´
but
Nga`la´
Ngala
nO¯
drink
‘Tanko drinks water but Ngala drinks palm wine.’
Selection contexts, where the alternative set is made explicit, present another environment where
we see maximize presupposition at work. A selection context is given in (39), in the form of
an alternative question. Note that ba´ cannot occur inside of a coordinate structure, so that the
alternative question is in fact ambiguous towards which alternative Shey thinks is less likely. Just
as in contrast contexts, ba´ becomes obligatory if the focused constituent expresses an unexpected
alternative, which is the case in scenario B but not in scenario A. The a´ strategy, however, is
blocked in both scenarios.
6Again, see Becker et al. (to appear) for a syntactic analysis.
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(39) Context: Shey is about to cook dinner. Shey knows that Yaah loves yams and assumes she
will prefer it over fufu, but he asks her nevertheless.
Shey:a`
you
bı´
FUT2
zhe¯
eat
ba´
FOC
mbrE`P
yams
kE`
or
ba¯a¯
fufu
a`
Q
‘Will you eat fufu or yams?’
A. Shey was right: Yaah prefers yams. Yaah
does not know what Shey thinks that Yaah
prefers.
Yaah: mE`
I
bı´
FUT2
zhe¯
eat
mbrE`P
yams
‘I will eat YAMS.’
Yaah0: #a´
FOC
mbrE`P
yams
(cı´)
(COMP)
mE`
I
bı´
FUT2
zhe¯
eat
‘I will eat YAMS.’
Yaa00: mE`
I
bı´
FUT2
zhe¯
eat
ba´
FOC
mbrE`P
yams
‘It is yams I will eat.’
B. Shey was wrong: Yaah wants to eat fufu.
Yaah knows that Shey knows what Yaah
prefers.
Yaah: #mE`
I
bı´
FUT2
zhe¯
eat
ba¯a¯
fufu
‘I will eat FUFU.’
Yaah0: #a´
FOC
ba¯a¯
fufu
(cı´)
(COMP)
mE`
I
bı´
FUT2
zhe¯
eat
‘I will eat FUFU.’
Yaa00: mE`
I
bı´
FUT2
zhe¯
eat
ba´
FOC
ba¯a¯
fufu
‘It is fufu I will eat.’
At this point, it is worth asking whether the unmarked focus strategy can qualify as a competitor
for maximize presupposition. Following the definition in (33), it might not since alternatives are
only defined for lexical items. However, having the unmarked strategy instantiated as a competitor
could potentially explain why it is illicit in (9) on the hand and in (15) and (16) on the other
hand, where in the former it loses against the a´ strategy and in the latter two it loses against the
ba´ strategy. The selection and contrast contexts, given in this section, then clearly show that the
unmarked strategy is an option so long as mirativity is not established between speaker and hearer.
Future research is needed to verify the patterns.
5 Summary
In this paper, we have shown that focus does not need to be morphologically marked in Limbum.
The two attested focus particles a´ and ba´ do not encode focus interpretation per se, but rather re-
quire focus alternatives to operate on. The focus marker a´ imposes an existence restriction on the
alternatives, while the focus marker ba´ additionally (i) exhaustifies over the non-selected alterna-
tives and (ii) restricts the selected alternative to be the least likely. Since we hard-wire mirativity
into the semantics of ba´, unexpectedness as a pragmatic concept is not reflected by the opposition
of an unmarked and a marked structure. This is why the a´ strategy can be more marked (particle +
fronting) but impose less semantic restrictions, while the ba´ strategy is less marked (only particle)
and imposes more semantic restrictions. Limbum, furthermore, provides novel evidence against
the assumption that the background, triggered by focus marking, introduces an existence presup-
position. At least for Limbum, it can be shown that an additional focus particle is required, i.e.
focus marking by itself cannot trigger such a presupposition.
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Abbreviations
1,2,3 1st, 2nd, 3rd person PL Plural
1-,2-,5-, Noun classes PREP Preposition
COMP Complementizer PRV Preverb
COP Copula PST1 Recent past tense
DET Determiner PST2 Distant past tense
DEM Demonstrative PST3 Remote past tense
EXPL Expletive REL Relative pronoun
FOC Focus marker SG Singular
FUT1 Near future tense
HAB Habitual
INCL Inclusive
PERF Perfective
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Intensifying ideophones in three Luhya languages1
Margit Bowler — University of California, Los Angeles
John Gluckman — University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract. Ideophones are typically described as “marked words that depict sensory imagery”
(Dingemanse 2011, 25). This paper addresses ideophone data from three Luhya languages: Ll-
ogoori, Lunyore, and Lutiriki (Bantu, Kenya). Our primary claim is descriptive: we show that
there is a closed class of (previously undescribed) Luhya ideophones. We illustrate how the Luhya
data is consistent with what is known about ideophones cross-linguistically, and give a preliminary
semantic analysis of the Luhya ideophones as degree intensifiers.
1 Introduction
This paper addresses ideophones in three Bantu languages in the Luhya subfamily: Llogoori, Lun-
yore, and Lutiriki.2 In this paper, we make both descriptive and theoretical contributions to the
ideophone literature. Descriptively, we add novel data to the existing typology of ideophones
cross-linguistically. We illustrate that, despite looking superficially distinct from other documented
ideophone systems, the Luhya ideophones have the core properties of ideophones. Theoretically,
we give a preliminary semantic analysis of the Luhya ideophones as degree intensifiers.
Ideophones have been described across the world, including in the languages of Asia (Japanese;
Hamano 1994), Australia (Yir-Yoront; Alpher 1994), the Americas (Tseltal; Henderson 2016), and
Europe (Basque; Antun˜ano 2016). Some authors, including Voeltz and Kilian-Hatz (2001), argue
that ideophones occur in every language. Despite their frequency, the debate for how to classify
a given lexical item as an ideophone is far from settled. To this end, we begin by reviewing
the existing ideophone literature to give a general definition for what makes a lexical item an
ideophone.
1.1 How to classify a lexical item as an ideophone
Ideophones are lexical items that often describe sensory imagery and tend to be morphosyntacti-
cally “marked” in some way (Dingemanse 2011, Voeltz and Kilian-Hatz 2001, Childs 1994, Doke
1We would like to thank our wonderful Llogoori consultant, Mwabeni Indire, for generously sharing his time
and his language with us. Additional Llogoori data in this paper comes from the second author’s fieldwork in Kenya
(summer 2016); we would like to thank Abigail Sanya for the Lunyore data, and Kelvin Alulu for the Lutiriki data. We
thank audiences at AAA 4, ACAL 48, the UCLA American Indian Seminar, the UCLA Morphology Reading Group,
and the UCLA Semantics Tea for their feedback on earlier versions of this project, as well as Mark Dingemanse and
Jessica Rett.
2The Luhya subfamily (Guthrie: JE.41, JE.30, JE.18) consists of 25 (or so) closely related languages spoken in
western Kenya, northwestern Tanzania, and eastern Uganda. There are approximately 5 million speakers of Luhya
languages, with a relatively high degree of mutual comprehension between speakers of different languages (Simons
and Fennig 2017, Marlo 2017). Llogoori is also referred to as Maragoli, Luragooli, and Logoori, among other names;
Lutiriki is also referred to as Tiriki.
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1935, among many others).3 Dingemanse (2012, 654) remarks that ideophones are “easy to iden-
tify, but difficult to define;” typological work has shown that ideophones have a wide range of
phonological and morphosyntactic properties. We therefore begin by giving examples of typolog-
ically diverse ideophone data from Kisi (Niger-Congo), Wolaitta (Omotic), Tseltal (Mayan), and
Tsonga (Bantu).
(1) Kisi (Niger-Congo)
o`
PRO
kwe´
go
de´e`e`...
IDEO
‘She went de´e`e` (slowly).’4 (Childs 1988, 178-179)
(2) Wolaitta (Omotic)
Galla´so-y
Gallasso-NOM
k’ap’k’a´p’a.
IDEO
‘Gallasso is k’ap’k’a´p’a (greedy).’ (Amha 2001, 57)
(3) Tseltal (Mayan)
pura
just
ch’il-bil-?,
fried-PERF-B3
tsok’
IDEO
x-chi-?
NT-say-B3
ta
P
mantekat.
lard
‘Just fried, it goes tsok’ in the lard.’ (Henderson 2016, from Pe´rez Gonza´lez 2012, 162)
(4) Xitsonga (Bantu)
Magezi
Magezi
u
SC1
ri
COP
ti-nka,
REFL-IDEO
hi
by
xihloka.
axe
‘Magezi chops himself nka with an axe.’
(Msimang and Poulos 2001, 240, from Marivate 1982)
The data in (1)-(4) demonstrates some of the grammatical properties that are often (but not
always) described for ideophone systems cross-linguistically. Common phonological properties of
ideophones include: (i) the ability to lengthen vowels for expressive effect, as in (1); (ii) the ability
to partially or totally reduplicate the ideophone, as in (2); (iii) the presence of sound symbolism
or onomatopoeia, perhaps as in (3); (iv) the presence of phonemes or tones not otherwise found
in the language; and (v) unusual phonation such as creaky voice, breathy voice, or falsetto. These
unusual phonological and phonetic properties have led linguists to propose that ideophones often
contribute meaning that is “depictive rather than descriptive” (Essegbey 2013).
Common morphosyntactic properties of ideophones include: (i) occurring clause-peripherally,
as in (1) and (2); (ii) co-occurring with a quotative marker or verb of saying or doing, as in (3); (iii)
3Here and elsewhere in this paper, we do not use the term “expressive” in the Pottsian sense. Instead, we follow
the convention in the ideophone literature to use it as a conceptual description of the ideophones’ often onomatopoeic
or “depictive” properties.
4Abbreviations used in this paper include: 1-20 ‘noun class,’ 1 ‘first person,’ 2 ‘second person,’ 3 ‘third person,’
AC ‘anticausative,’ ASP ‘aspect,’ AUX ‘auxiliary,’ CAUS ‘causative,’ CL ‘noun class,’ COP ‘copula,’ DEF ‘definite,’
EXPR ‘expressive,’ FUT ‘future,’ FV ‘final vowel,’ IDEO ‘ideophone,’ NEG ‘negation,’ NOM ‘nominative,’ PERF ‘per-
fective,’ PL ‘plural,’ POSS ‘possessive,’ PRO ‘pronoun,’ PROG ‘progressive,’ PRT ‘particle,’ QM ‘quotative marker,’ REC
‘reciprocal,’ REFL ‘reflexive,’ SC ‘subject class,’ SG ‘singular,’ TNS ‘tense.’
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the inability to combine with other morphemes, as contradicted by (4); (iv) patterning morphosyn-
tactically distinctly from other lexical categories in the language; and (v) the ability to stand alone
as a complete utterance.
As shown by (1)-(4), there is a great deal of variation in ideophone systems cross-linguistically.
We now review Dingemanse and Akita (2016)’s proposed ideophone typology, as this range of
variation is relevant to our claim that the Luhya lexical items we discuss are in fact ideophones.
1.1.1 Variation in ideophone systems: Dingemanse (2017) and Dingemanse and Akita (2016)
Dingemanse (2017) and Dingemanse and Akita (2016) argue that ideophones occur along inversely
correlated scales of “expressiveness” and “grammatical integration.”5 Their criteria for expressive-
ness and grammatical integration are based on existing typological observations about ideophone
systems, as laid out in §1.1.
Dingemanse and Akita (2016) propose that an “expressive” ideophone shows some or all of the
following properties: (i) intonational foregrounding through marked prosody, lengthened vowels,
or so on; (ii) unusual phonation; (iii) the presence of tones or phonemes not found elsewhere in
the language; and (iv) accompaniment by iconic gesture. A “grammatically integrated” ideophone
shows some or all of the following properties: (i) inability to stand alone as a complete utterance;
(ii) ability to occur clause-internally; (iii) ability to embed in morphosyntactic structure; and (iv)
lack of syntactic optionality. These properties are summarized in Figure 1 below.
Description Depiction
Bound constructions Free constructions
Grammatical integration
Expressiveness
Figure 1: Inverse correlation between grammatical and expressive properties of ideophones
(Dingemanse 2017, 133).
Dingemanse (2017) proposes that ideophone systems can vary with respect to their expressive-
ness versus grammatical integration. For instance, Dingemanse observes that ideophones in Semai
(Mon-Khmer) tend to be highly expressive, whereas ideophones in Somali (Cushitic) tend to be
more grammatically integrated. However, internal variation within a single language’s ideophone
system is also possible: one language may have both expressive and grammatically integrated
ideophones. Indeed, Dingemanse (2017) argues that in Siwu (Niger-Congo), a single ideophone
can be more or less expressive in different contexts.
In §2, we show ideophone data from Llogoori, Lunyore, and Lutiriki. We argue that (in Dinge-
manse and Akita 2016’s terms) the Luhya ideophones are relatively highly grammatically inte-
grated, with a corresponding relatively low degree of expressiveness.
5Dwyer and Moshi (2003) make a similar observation about ideophone classes. They propose to distinguish be-
tween “primary” ideophones (corresponding roughly to Dingemanse and Akita 2016’s expressive ideophones) and
“grammaticalized” ideophones (corresponding roughly to Dingemanse and Akita 2016’s grammatically integrated
ideophones).
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2 Basic Luhya ideophone data
We give examples of Llogoori, Lunyore, and Lutiriki ideophones in (5)-(7). (Hereafter, unless
otherwise noted, we give examples in Llogoori, our primary language of study.) The Luhya ideo-
phones select for a semantic class of lexical items that they can co-occur with. Luhya ideophones
typically occur clause-finally and provide an “intensified” reading of the lexical item that they
select. As suggested by (5)-(7), the Luhya ideophones tend to be cognate across the languages.
(5) Llogoori
a. amaaze
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
pa.
IDEO
‘The water is very hot.’
b. riawa
5.flower
ni
COP
ri-akanyu
5-red
khai.
IDEO
‘The flower is very red.’6
(6) Lunyore
a. maatsi
6.water
ne
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
pa.
IDEO
‘The water is very hot.’
b. esausi
9.sauce
ne
COP
i-nzakanyu
9-red
kha.
IDEO
‘The sauce is very red.’
(7) Lutiriki
a. matse
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
pa.
IDEO
‘The water is very hot.’
b. intso
9.house
ni
COP
y-amuchi
9-red
kha.
IDEO
‘The house is very red.’
We list some Llogoori ideophones and their associated semantic classes in Table 1. The items
within a given semantic class all have similar meanings; for instance, the ideophone ti combines
with lexical items describing darkness or dirtiness, whereas zi combines with lexical items describ-
ing stillness or coldness. (The data in Table 1 is not an exhaustive list of all the lexical items each
ideophone can co-occur with, nor is it an exhaustive list of all of the Llogoori ideophones.)
Ideophone Lexical item(s)7 Meaning
mno8 kuyaanza (verb) ‘to be happy,’ ‘to like’
mahooru (noun) ‘longing’
-ndugi, -noru (adjective) ‘sweet’
pa -hiu (adjective) ‘hot’
kuhia (verb) ‘to be hot’
-roro (adjective) ‘spicy,’ ‘bitter’
ti -mwamu (adjective) ‘black’
-chafu (adjective) ‘dirty’
zi -zilu (adjective) ‘cold,’ ‘still’
-chinganu (adjective) ‘quiet’
Table 1: Lexical items selected by Llogoori ideophones.
6The voiceless velar fricative kh in (5b) is an uncommon phoneme in Llogoori, although it is frequent in many of
the other closely related Luhya languages.
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The Luhya ideophones cannot occur with lexical items outside of the semantic class that they
select. For instance, the Llogoori ideophones pa and khai in (5) cannot be substituted for the other,
as in (8). The ideophone pa is restricted to lexical items describing hotness or spiciness, whereas
khai is restricted to lexical items describing redness. Furthermore, ideophones can pick out only
a subset of meanings within their given semantic class. The ideophone du can occur with lexical
items describing fullness in the sense of a cup or a room, as in (9a); however, it cannot occur with
an expression describing a person’s sensation of being full, as in (9b).
(8) a. * amaaze
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
khai.
IDEO
Intended: ‘The water is very hot.’
b. * riawa
5.flower
ni
COP
ri-akanyu
5-red
pa.
IDEO
Intended: ‘The flower is very red.’
(9) a. kikoombe
7.cup
ki-ikwizor-a
7-full-FV
du.
IDEO
‘The cup is very full.’
b. * Sira
Sira
y-a-ku-i-goot-a
1-TNS-ASP-REFL-sate-FV
du.
IDEO
Intended: ‘Sira is very full.’
This property of semantic class selection distinguishes the Luhya ideophones from the Luhya
degree intensifier saana ‘really.’ We show Luhya degree intensifier data, and discuss how saana
‘really’ differs from the ideophones, in §3.
2.1 Grammatical properties of the Luhya ideophones
Luhya ideophones can occur with adjectival predicates, as in (5), and with verbal predicates, as in
(10)-(11).9
7We give verbs in their infinitival form, including the class 15 infinitival prefix ku-. We give adjectives in their root
form; Luhya adjectives obligatorily host a prefix indicating the noun class of the noun that they combine with.
8Mike Marlo (p.c.) notes that in Swahili, muno is a canonical degree intensifier (like English really) that is not
restricted to any lexical class. While Llogoori mno is likely a borrowing from Swahili, its distribution differs from
Swahili in that it is in fact subject to lexical restrictions. This could be a point of variation across Luhya; in Lutiriki,
mno appears to pattern more like Swahili.
9Luhya ideophones almost always combine with stative predicates. However, a very small number of ideophones
given to us by our Lunyore consultant can combine with eventive predicates:
(1) Lunyore
a. esaal’a
9.stick
si-mekukh-il-e
9-break-TNS-FV
piap.
IDEO
‘The stick broke piap.’
b. ya-khu-pak-il-e
1-ASP-hit-TNS-FV
pap.
IDEO
‘He just hit me pap.’
Unlike the other Luhya ideophones that we’ve discovered, our speaker reported that piap/pap is the sound that
breaking and hitting make; that is, they are iconic. These ideophones, like the others, are limited to combining with a
particular semantic class: pap can only describe a hitting event, whereas piap can only describe a breaking event.
We ultimately choose to exclude these ideophones from our analysis. We suspect that they are borrowings from a
Luo language; our Lunyore consultant also speaks fluent Luo, is married to a Luo speaker, and regularly uses Luo in
her daily life. Furthermore, these ideophones resemble typical Nilotic ideophone data (Mark Dingemanse, p.c.).
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(10) Llogoori
Sira
1.Sira
yi-zuriz-i
1-fill-FV
kikoombe
7.cup
du.
IDEO
‘Sira filled the cup to the brim.’
(11) Lunyore
rishirti
5.shirt
ri-n-nyik-il-e
5-1SG-be.tight-APPL-FV
ka.
IDEO
‘The shirt is very tight (on me).’
A small number of Luhya ideophones can combine with nouns, as in (12)-(13).10
(12) a. inzankanyu
9.redness
khai
IDEO
‘intense redness’
b. uvwizulu
11.fullness
du
IDEO
‘extreme fullness’
c. mahooru
6.longing
mno
IDEO
‘intense longing’
(13) m-v-ey-e
1SG-COP-ASP-FV
na
NA
mahooru
6.longing
mno.
IDEO
‘I really miss you.’
(Lit. ‘I am with intense longing.’)
The Luhya ideophones cannot stand alone as predicates; that is, they cannot occur without any
associated lexical item, as in (14).11
(14) amaaze
6.water
ni
COP
*(ma-hiu)
6-hot
pa.
IDEO
Intended: ‘The water is very hot.’
The ideophones also cannot stand alone as complete utterances, as in (15)-(16). (We return to
this issue in §3.2.3.)
(15) Hot bathwater context: You run a bath, then touch the bathwater and discover that it’s
extremely hot. You exclaim:
a. * pa!
IDEO
b. ì:#ha
˚
!
EXPR
‘Ouch!’12
10We previously postulated that the ideophones can combine with “prepositional predicates,” consisting of the
preposition na ‘with’ followed by the noun and ideophone, as in (13). However, given the new data in (12), we now
assume they combine directly with the noun, which then in turn can combine with na.
11A possible exception to this is the ideophone du, which one Llogoori consultant accepts as a predicate. Curiously,
this ideophone is only accepted in combination with the copula kova, and not the copula ni. We currently have no
explanation for these facts, and do not account for them in our analysis in §3.
(1) a. kikoombe
7.cup
ki-v-ey-e
7-COP-ASP-FV
du.
IDEO
‘The cup is full.’
b. * kikoombe
7.cup
ni
COP
du.
IDEO
‘The cup is full.’
12Here we use the Extended IPA symbol # to represent ingressive airflow during the production of the lateral frica-
tive. So far, we have collected approximately 15 Llogoori (Pottsian) expressives that are akin to English expressives
like ouch and oops. These morphemes pattern syntactically very differently from the Luhya ideophones; they can
stand alone as complete utterances, and they necessarily precede the proposition they co-occur with.
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(16) Sweet tea context: Imali makes you some tea and asks how sweet it is with the question in
(16a). You respond as in (16b).
a. icha
9.tea
i-v-ey-e
9-COP-ASP-FV
na
with
uvunoru
11.sweetness
vuri?
how.much
‘How sweet is the tea?’
b. i. * mno!
IDEO
ii. saana!
really
‘Very!’
iii. ni
COP
i-noru
9-sweet
mno!
IDEO
‘It is very sweet!’
The Luhya ideophones cannot be moved away from their associated lexical item, as the cleft
construction in (17) illustrates, and do not combine with complementizers, quotative markers, or
light verbs of saying or doing, as in (18).
(17) * du
IDEO
ni
COP
sia
how
Sira
1.Sira
y-izuriz-i
1-fill-FV
kikoombe.
7.cup
Intended: ‘To the brim is how Sira filled the cup.’
(18) * maaze
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
{kuresia
{like
/
/
ndee
COMP
/
/
ga-vor-a}
6-say-FV}
pa.
IDEO
Intended: ‘The water is hot like pa.’ / ‘The water goes pa.’
The Luhya ideophones behave in many ways like adverbial elements; they typically occur
at the right edge of the clause, and are always syntactically optional, as in (19). In expressions
with verbal predicates, ideophones occur immediately after the direct object, inside of other verbal
modifiers such as manner adverbs, as in (20). In the presence of an applied object, such ideophones
occur after both objects, as in (21).
(19) (*pa)
IDEO
kibiribiri
7.pepper
ni
COP
(*pa)
IDEO
ki-roro
7-spicy
(pa).
IDEO
‘The pepper is (very) spicy.’
(20) Imali
Imali
yi-zuriz-i
1-fill-FV
(*du)
(IDEO)
kikoombe
7.cup
(du)
(IDEO)
{geraha
{slowly
/
/
na
with
maaze}
6.water}
(*du).
(IDEO)
‘Imali filled the cup to the brim slowly/with water.’
(21) Imali
Imali
yi-zuriz-il-i
1-fill-APPL-FV
(*du)
(IDEO)
Sira
Sira
(*du)
(IDEO)
kikoombe
7.cup
(du).
(IDEO)
‘Imali filled the cup for Sira to the brim.’
If the adjective that the ideophone selects for is in an attributive position, the ideophone must
occur immediately after it; it cannot occur at the end of the clause, as in (22b). (We are agnostic as
to whether Luhya attributive adjectives involve relative clauses.)
(22) a. maaze
6.water
ma-hiu
6-hot
pa
IDEO
ga-v-ey-e
6-COP-ASP-FV
mu
in
kikoombe.
7.cup
‘The very hot water is in the cup.’
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b. * maaze
6.water
ma-hiu
6-hot
ga-v-ey-e
6-COP-ASP-FV
mu
in
kikoombe
7.cup
pa.
IDEO
Intended: ‘The very hot water is in the cup.’
If multiple adjectives modify a single noun, the order of the adjectives is free. However, the
ideophone must immediately follow the adjective that it selects for.
(23) a. riaua
5.flower
ri-nini
5-big
ri-akanyu
5-red
khai
IDEO
‘the big very red flower’
b. riaua
5.flower
ri-akanyu
5-red
khai
IDEO
ri-nini
5-big
‘the big very red flower’
c. * riaua
5.flower
ri-akanyu
5-red
ri-nini
5-big
khai
IDEO
Intended: ‘the big very red flower’
All of the data so far is generally consistent with treating the Luhya ideophones as adverbs.
However, we argue in §2.3 that the Luhya ideophones should be treated as a unique class, distinct
from adverbs.
2.2 Expressiveness of the Luhya ideophones
All Luhya ideophones can be reduplicated to express a more intense meaning.13 A small set of
ideophones can also undergo triplication, which results in a further intensified meaning and oc-
curs with a unique prosodic contour that is used for all triplicated ideophones. (We return to the
triplicated ideophones in §3.2.3.)
(24) amaaze
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
pa
IDEO
pa.
IDEO
‘The water is extremely hot!’
(25) amaaze
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
papapa.
PAPAPA
‘The water is BOILING hot!’
The Luhya ideophones are not inherently associated with either negative or positive evalua-
tions. That is, the utterance in (26) is felicitous in a context in which the water being very hot is a
good thing (26a), a bad thing (26b), or neither.
(26) a. Positive evaluation context: You fill a bath for your wife, who is cold and wants to
warm up. You tell her that the water is ready (i.e., it’s very hot).
b. Negative evaluation context: You try to enter a hot tub and discover that the water is
too hot to be comfortable. You warn another nearby bather about its temperature.
13The sole trisyllabic ideophone in Llogoori, zululia, expresses this additionally intensified meaning by lengthening
the second vowel: /zulu:lia/. (This ideophone combines with predicates describing vertical height, e.g. -tambe ‘tall’.)
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amaaze
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
pa.
IDEO
‘The water is very hot.’
The Luhya ideophones only occasionally display marked phonation or intonation (typically a
raised pitch), and are only occasionally accompanied by iconic gestures (Mike Marlo, p.c.). They
are also able to be used naturally in written language. Speakers do not report that the Luhya ideo-
phones are interpreted iconically; one possible exception to this is pa, which may be interpreted as
the sound of water boiling. Finally, the Luhya ideophones are not “productive;” speakers cannot
spontaneously coin new ones, unlike reports of spontaneous ideophone generation in languages
like Semai (Mon-Khmer) (Diffloth 1972). The Luhya ideophones form a closed class; we have
identified fewer than 15 ideophones in each of the languages that we investigated.
2.3 Why do we call these morphemes ideophones?
In the terminology of Dingemanse (2017) and Dingemanse and Akita (2016), the Luhya ideo-
phones display a relatively low degree of expressiveness and a relatively high degree of grammat-
ical integration, as shown in Figure 2. (Compare with Figure 1.) The Luhya languages pattern
similarly to languages like Somali (Cushitic) in having consistently “non-expressive” ideophones
(Dhoorre and Tosco 1998).
Luhya Somali Japanese Siwu Semai
Figure 2: Approximation of different ideophone systems on a scale of grammatical
integration/expressiveness; adapted from Dingemanse (2017, 136).
Given the lack of expressiveness and their syntactic similarity to other adverbial items, the
reader may question why we choose to call these lexical items ideophones. However, like other
described ideophone systems, the Luhya ideophones: (i) are constrained in their distribution by the
semantic class of the lexical item they select for; (ii) undergo reduplication to express additional
intensification; (iii) (almost always) have a fixed number of syllables; (iv) have a consistent syllable
shape (i.e., they are almost always open syllables); (v) can contain phonemes that are otherwise
infrequent in the languages; and (vi) denote “exaggerated” shades of meaning (i.e., extremely hot,
not lukewarm).
Furthermore, a number of other languages have similar ideophone systems. We give examples
in (27)-(31) of intensifying ideophones in Hausa (Chadic), Siwu (Niger-Congo), Wolof (Niger-
Congo), Xitsonga (Bantu), and Zulu (Bantu). In each of these examples, the relevant ideophone
patterns like the Luhya ideophones in (i) selecting for a particular lexical item or semantic class,
and (ii) contributing an intensified reading of the lexical item that it selects for. Note that sev-
eral of these languages are typically thought of as having canonical examples of highly depictive
ideophone systems.
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(27) Hausa (Chadic)
a. fari
white
fat
IDEO
‘snow white’14
b. tsofo
old
kutuf
IDEO
‘very old’ (Newman 1968, 109)
(28) Siwu (Niger-Congo)
i-tı`
C.I-head
si
if
i-fudza-O
S.I-be.white-2SG.O
"fututututututu".
IDEO.pure.white.EM4
‘That your head may become white "fututututututu" [pure white].’15
(Dingemanse 2017, 123)
(29) Wolof (Niger-Congo)
daf-a
do-COP
n˜uul
black
kukk.
IDEO
‘It’s pitch black.’ (Harold Torrence, p.c.)
(30) Xitsonga (Bantu)
khuwani
clay.pot
ri
COP
tele
be.full
ntlwi!
IDEO
‘The clay pot is very full.’ (Kubayi 2009, 43)
(31) Zulu (Bantu)
w-a-thula
1SG-PST-be.silent
du.
IDEO
‘(S)he was absolutely silent!’ (Claire Halpert, p.c.)
Furthermore, we observe that there are ideophones in many non-Luhya Bantu languages that
are cognate with the Luhya ideophones (Samarin 1971). Indeed, previous classifications of simi-
lar items in other Bantu languages directly refer to these lexical items as ideophones (Schadeberg
2003). Thus, given the previous classification, the ideophonic properties of the relevant Luhya lex-
ical items, and the existence of other intensifying ideophones cross-linguistically, we feel justified
in our proposal to treat these items as ideophones.
3 Towards an analysis
Since Luhya ideophones intensify the predicate that they combine with, we propose to treat them
as degree modifiers akin to English very or really. In the following section, we lay out our proposal
to treat the Luhya ideophones as cross-categorial degree modifiers. We begin by providing a brief
background on degree semantics.
14We note that a small set of English adjectives combine with similarly lexically restricted intensifiers; these in-
clude jet black and bitter cold, among others. However, English expressions like jet and bitter occur elsewhere in
the language as fully fledged lexical items. We therefore do not believe that these lexical items should be considered
ideophones.
15Dingemanse (2017) uses arrows " to indicate general prosodic foregrounding.
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3.1 Degrees
Degree theories of gradable adjectives argue that gradable predicates combine with both a degree
argument (d 2 Dd) and an individual argument (x 2 De), and assert that the adjective holds of the
individual x to degree d (Bartsch and Vennemann 1972, Cresswell 1976, Heim 2001, among many
others). We give a basic denotation for the English gradable adjective hot in (32).
(32) JhotK =  d x. hot(x,d) (“x is hot to degree d”)
English degree intensifiers like really, very, extremely, and so on contribute the meaning that
the degree of the adjective with respect to the individual is above some contextual standard.16 We
give a basic denotation for the English degree intensifier really in (33a), and provide a denotation
for the intensified adjective really hot in (33b).
(33) a. JreallyK =  G<d<et>> x. 9d: G(x,d) & d > standard
b. Jreally hotK =  x. 9d: hot(x,d) & d > standard
(“there exists a degree d such that x is hot to degree d and d exceeds the
contextual standard of hotness”)
3.2 Luhya ideophones as cross-categorial degree intensifiers
We propose that the Luhya ideophones, like English really, are fundamentally degree intensifiers.
The ideophones provide an extremely intensified reading of the predicate that they combine with.
In combination with gradable adjectives, the ideophones assert that the degree to which the grad-
able adjective holds greatly exceeds the contextual standard (represented in (34) with “!!>”).17 We
give the truth conditions for a Llogoori expression containing the ideophone pa in (35).
(34) a. JIDEOK =  G<d<et>> x. 9d: G(x,d) & d !!> standard
b. Jhot IDEOK =  x. 9d: hot(x,d) & d !!> standard
(35) maaze
6.water
ni
COP
ma-hiu
6-hot
pa.
IDEO
‘The water is very hot.’ = 1 iff 9d: hot(water,d) & d !!> standard
The Luhya ideophones differ from the canonical Luhya degree intensifier saana ‘really’ in
three main ways. First, speakers report that saana contributes a less intensified reading of the
predicate that it combines with. Second, saana is not restricted to combining with any particular
semantic class; it freely combines with all gradable predicates. Third, saana can stand alone as a
felicitous answer to degree questions (16b-ii), whereas ideophones cannot (16b-i).
This analysis of the ideophones as degree intensifiers can easily account for their ability to
co-occur with adjectival predicates, as shown in (5)-(7). All of the adjectives that the ideophones
16In utterances without any degree intensifier or measure phrase, we assume that the predicate combines with
some phonologically null morpheme that contributes the meaning that the individual that the predicate combines with
“stands out” with respect to the property denoted by the predicate (Kennedy 1999, Rett 2008). We remain agnostic
with respect to the precise denotation for this morpheme, since it is not crucial to our proposal.
17This notation is inspired by Kennedy and McNally (2005, 373)’s proposal for English much.
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co-occur with are uncontroversially associated with degree scales (e.g. -hiu ‘hot,’ -zilu ‘cold,’ -noru
‘sweet,’ and so on).18 In the following subsections, we address how we can extend this proposal to
account for the ability of the ideophones to combine with nominals and verbal predicates.
3.2.1 Ideophones in combination with nominals
Only three of the Luhya ideophones can combine with nominals in addition to adjectives. We show
examples of these three ideophones in (36), repeated from (12).
(36) a. inzankanyu
9.redness
khai
IDEO
‘intense redness’
b. uvwizulu
11.fullness
du
IDEO
‘extreme fullness’
c. mahooru
6.longing
mno
IDEO
‘intense longing’
To account for this data, we assume that a subset of Luhya nouns (mahooru ‘6.longing,’
vuyaanzi ‘11.happiness,’ and uvwakanyu ‘11.redness,’ among others) include degrees in their de-
notations. Proposing to introduce degrees into the nominal domain is not novel; several authors
have previously argued that some nouns include degrees (Morzycki 2009 for English, Bochnak
2013 for Luganda, among others).
We roughly assume Bochnak (2013)’s analysis of verbal nominalizations in Luganda (Bantu).
Bochnak proposes that Luganda nominalized gradable predicates are relational: that is, they denote
relations between individuals and degrees. (This follows prior proposals for relational nouns by
Nicolas 2004 and Moltmann 2009.) We assume this analysis for the relevant Luhya nominals,
which we also term “relational.” However, we note that the Luhya relational nouns differ from
Bochnak (2013)’s Luganda nominals in that they do not have a verbal core. The Luhya relational
nouns are of type <e<d,t>>; we use the variable R to refer to items of this type. We give a
denotation for the Llogoori relational noun mahooru ‘6.longing’ in (37).
(37) JmahooruK =  x d. longing(x,d) “the individual x instantiates longing to degree d”
To account for the ability of ideophones to combine with the relational nouns, we assume
that the ideophones in (36) have the denotation in (38a), termed IDEON . This is identical to the
denotation for ideophones that combine with adjectives, as in (34a), with the exception of the
semantic type of the first argument that the ideophone combines with.
(38) a. JIDEONK =  R<e<dt>> x. 9d: R(x,d) & d !!>
b. Jmahooru IDEON K =  x. 9d: longing(x,d) & d !!> standard
To account for data like (39), we assume that na is of type <<e,t><e,t>>.
18An apparent possible counterexample to this is the ability of the ideophone zi to combine with the verb kukuzila
‘to be cold’/colloquially, ‘to be dead.’ In these cases, we assume the gradable meaning of ‘to be cold’ as the basic
meaning of kukuzila. Our Llogoori consultant reports that such uses of zi are a colloquialism meaning ‘to be dead.’
(1) imbwa
9.dog
y-a-kuzil-a
9-TNS-cold-FV
zi.
IDEO
‘The dog is dead as a doornail.’
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(39) m-v-ey-e
1SG-COP-ASP-FV
na
NA
mahooru
6.longing
mno.
IDEO
‘I really miss you.’ (Lit. ‘I am with intense longing.’)
= 1 iff 9d: longing(I,d) & d !!> standard
Postulating a second denotation for the Luhya ideophones introduces a bit of messiness into
our analysis. However, the ambiguity proposed here is consistent with the overall distribution and
use of ideophones cross-linguistically. As we discussed in §1.1.1, following Dingemanse (2017)
and Dingemanse and Akita (2016), one language may have many different kinds of ideophones.
Given what we know about the diversity of ideophone systems both within and across languages,
we have no reason to assume that the Luhya ideophones should form a homogenous class with
respect to their semantics.
3.2.2 Ideophones in combination with verbal predicates
We observed in §2.1 that the Luhya ideophones can also combine with verbal predicates, as in
(40)-(41).
(40) Lutiriki
Sira
1.Sira
yi-tsurits-a
1-fill-FV
shikoombe
7.cup
tu.
IDEO
‘Sira filled the cup to the brim.’
(41) Llogoori
marova
6.earth
ga-uum-i
6-dry-FV
gada.
IDEO
‘The earth dried a lot [until it was hard].’
All of the verbs that can co-occur with ideophones have a gradable adjectival core, including
kumwama ‘to blacken’ (from -mwamu ‘black’), kwuuma ‘to dry’ (from -uumu ‘dry’), and so on.
As shown in (34), it is simple to treat the ideophones as degree modifiers of gradable adjectives.
Although we do not give a full semantics for the Luhya ideophones in combination with verbs in
this paper, we believe that the gradable adjectival core of these verbs can provide a starting point
as to their semantics.
Kennedy and Levin (2008) give a semantics for English degree achievement verbs (e.g. to cool,
to widen) that uses degrees. They link the use of degrees in the semantics to the gradability of the
verbs’ adjectival cores. They propose that degree achievement verbs include a derived measure
of change function that measures the degree to which an object changes along a scalar dimension
as the result of participating in an event.19 We set aside the precise formal implementation of this
theory for now; however, we note that a proposal along these lines that either includes or introduces
degrees in the denotations of verbs derived from gradable adjectives could account for the data in
(40)-(41). If we follow Kennedy and Levin (2008)’s proposal, the paraphrased meaning of (40),
19 This measure of change functionm4 is defined formally as follows (Kennedy and Levin 2008, 18):
(1) For any measure functionm,m4 =  x e. m"m(x)(init(e))(x)(fin(e)),
where init(e) and fin(e) refer to the initial and final temporal intervals of an event, and m"d is a difference function
that takes an individual and returns the difference between the individual’s projection on a degree scale and the
(arbitrary) comparative standard.
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including the ideophone, would be something like “Sira filled the cup to a degree that greatly
exceeds the contextual standard of what counts as ‘full.’”
3.2.3 Triplicated Luhya ideophones
Some of the Luhya ideophones can undergo triplication. When triplicated, the ideophones pat-
tern very differently from non-triplicated ideophones. The triplicated ideophones can be clefted
(contrary to (17)), and can stand alone as complete utterances (contrary to (15)-(16)).20
(42) dududu
DUDUDU
ni
COP
sia
how
Sira
1.Sira
y-izuriz-i
1-fill-FV
kikoombe.
7.cup
‘Dududu (to the brim) is how Sira filled the cup.’
(43) Sira
Sira
y-izuriz-i
1-fill-FV
kikoombe
7.cup
ndi
how
nang’ga?
in.what.sense
‘How did Sira fill the cup?’
a. geraha.
slowly
‘Slowly.’
b. dududu.
DUDUDU
‘To the brim.’
c. * du.
IDEO
We propose that the triplication data in (42)-(43) involves the formation of (non-degree inten-
sifying) adverbs. The semantics of the triplicated ideophones differs from the semantics of the
non-triplicated ideophones in (34a) in that the triplicated ideophones (i) do not combine with a
gradable predicate (i.e., something of type <d<e,t>>), and (ii) do not existentially quantify over
degrees. We propose that the triplicated ideophones are similar to English “extreme” adjectives
like gigantic and gorgeous in that they inherently pick out high degrees on their associated scale;
in the case of dududu, the scale is one of fullness. These adverbs then freely distribute like other
adverbs.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we described the distribution and interpretation of ideophones in Llogoori, Lunyore,
and Lutiriki. We sketched a preliminary proposal to treat Luhya ideophones as cross-categorial
degree intensifiers, assuming the inclusion of degrees in the Luhya semantic ontology.
The Luhya ideophone data demonstrates the heterogeneity of ideophone systems cross-linguistically.
Descriptively, the Luhya ideophones pattern very differently from highly depictive ideophone sys-
tems, which are often taken to be the norm. Theoretically, our degree-based proposal differs from
other formal accounts of ideophones as depictions (Baglini 2016 for Wolof) and demonstrations
(Henderson 2016 for Tseltal). Given the diversity of ideophone systems across languages, it is
reasonable to postulate similar diversity in the formal theories used to account for them.
Finally, the data in this paper raises interesting questions with respect to the behavior of ideo-
phones diachronically. Poulos (1999) posits that ideophones can undergo “grammaticalization,”
20The clefting data in (42) is only available in Llogoori; it is unavailable in Lutiriki and we do not have the relevant
data for Lunyore.
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which he associates with the loss of the ideophones’ onomatopoeic properties and their eventual
inclusion within an existing lexical category such as verbs or adverbs. We tentatively claim that the
Luhya ideophones are in the process of being integrated into the set of Luhya adverbs. Some of the
ideophones are less restrictive in their semantic class selection than others, suggesting that they are
transitioning into being general degree intensifiers. For instance, mno picks out lexical items hav-
ing to do with sweetness, happiness, and loneliness in Llogoori, whereas it distributes more freely
in Lutiriki. Since Luhya speakers often live in highly multilingual environments, they may have
begun borrowing ideophones from other languages (footnote 9); Mark Dingemanse (p.c.) notes
that ideophones are among the first lexical items lost when speakers are no longer immersed in
their language. However, much further diachronic study is needed to understand the trajectory of
the Luhya ideophones.
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Genericity in event semantics:  
A look at Yoruba generic sentences1 
 
Taofeeq Adebayo – Tulane University 
 
Abstract. I propose a theory of genericity that is grounded in neo-Davidsonian event semantics 
(Parsons 1990, 2000; Higginbotham, 2000; etc.). I distinguish broadly between three types of 
individual: kind individuals, generic individuals and concrete individuals. A distinction is made 
between particular events and generic events on the one hand; and between kind-level states, 
individual-level states, stage-level states and generic states on the other hand.  I propose that only 
generic individuals require the presence of the Gen operator and that kind and concrete 
individuals are existentially closed with the logical form of kind individual involving a type-
shifting operation. Also, I propose that generic events and generic states contain the generic 
predicate ‘gen (e)’ which turns concrete eventualities into generic ones and that the other types 
of eventuality also have their respective predicates that distinguish them from one another. When 
this framework is applied to genericity in Yoruba, it is shown first that Kimian states 
(Maienborn, 2007) in Yoruba have an E-position that the generic predicate (the imperfective) 
máa-ń targets (contrary to expectation), and second that in some constructions máa-ń is best 
treated as an overt realization of the operator Gen. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
My major concern in this paper is to propose a theory of genericity based on neo-Davidsonian 
event semantics (advanced in such works as Parsons (1990, 2000)), and to account for generic 
sentences in Yoruba. The main motivation for this proposal is based on the distinctions in (1).  
 
(1) a. Dogs bark.                                 [(generic dogs) (bark generically)] 
b. Dogs are friendly.                                        [(generic dogs) (are friendly) 
c. John smokes a lot.                 [(an individual John) (smokes generically)]  
d. It rains at night in Lagos.  (some event of raining occurs generically at night in Lagos) 
 
According to Carlson (1989), generic sentences express regularities. Both entities (individuals) 
and eventualities (syntactically realized as VPs and their adjunctions) can be regular or generic in 
a generic sentence (where generic sentences are taken to include habituals and reference to kind). 
Generic entities and eventualities can occur together as in (1a) and independently as in (1b-d).  
Assuming that the distinctions made in (1) are accurate, this paper argues for two sources of 
genericity in the syntax which can both be combined in a single clause as well as function 
independently as shown in (1). I argue that a proper understanding of genericity requires a 
distinction between generic, kind and concrete individuals and between generic and non-generic 
eventualities. As a result, we can distinguish between entity-driven genericity and eventuality-
																																								 																				
1 I am very grateful to Lucas Champollion for his comments and recommendations on the first draft of this paper. I 
am also grateful to the audience at Triple A4, whose comments have influenced this paper in a number of ways. I 
take full responsibility for the remaining shortcomings of the paper. 
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driven genericity. This distinction is close to Krifka et al’s. (1995) distinction between 
characterizing statements and reference to kind but differs in a number of ways that become clear 
below. Languages differ in what sorts of NPs and predicates can be generic based on the 
configuration of the syntax. However, there are a number of cross-linguistic generalizations that 
can be made on the semantics of generic individuals and eventualities. For example, we can 
make a pre-theoretical assumption that all languages have generic individuals and eventualities 
as well as other kinds of individuals and eventualities, which are considered below.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I lay out a theoretical framework for genericity 
in event semantics in Sections 2 and 3. I then apply this to Yoruba generic sentences in Sections 
4 and 5. I identify some preliminary advantages of the framework in section 6. The two most 
important conclusions in this section are that Kimian states in Yoruba do have an E-position and 
that the Operator Gen is pronounced in some constructions in the language. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Three ontological types of individuals  
 
The many theories of NP/DP referencing in generic sentences include: uniform kind-referencing 
(Carlson, 1977 and others), neo-Carlsonian Approach (Chierchia, 1998 and others), the 
Ambiguity Hypothesis (Gerstner-Link and Krifka, 1993 and others), theory of incorporation 
(Farkas and de Swart, 2003 and others). For an elaborate description of the development of 
theories on this topic, see Mari et al. (2013). But works on NP/DP referencing that are directly 
relevant to the ontological distinction made below are those that address the distinction between 
specific and nonspecific NPs. Discussions of this distinction can be found in Baker (1973), 
Hawkins (1978) Fodor and Sag (1982) and Enç (1991). A common distinction between the two 
relates to the scope of the NP. NPs with narrow scope are generally taken to be nonspecific (a 
student in (2c)) while those with wider scope are taken to be specific (a student in (2b)).  
 
(2) a. Every teacher in that school beat a student yesterday. 
b. A student was such that all the teachers in that school beat him yesterday. 
c. For each of the teachers in that school, there was a student they beat yesterday. 
 
Another distinction that plays a major role in the ontology developed below can be found in 
Krifka et al. (1995). According to Mari et al. (2013:6), Carlson (i.e. 1977) was the first to 
propose an ontology for kind, distinguishing it from ‘normal individuals’ like John. This 
ontology is recognized and advanced in Krifka et al. (1995). The NP ‘dinosaurs’ in ‘Dinosaurs 
are extinct’ refers to the kind individual, ‘dinosaur kind’. Krifka et al. (1995) also make a 
distinction between specific and non-specific NPs but this distinction was different from the 
traditional distinction that is based on the difference between (2b) and (2c). For them, a specific 
NP refers to a particular individual while a nonspecific NP does not refer to any specific 
individual in particular. In the following examples (Krifka et al. 1995:16), ‘a dog’ (3a) refers to a 
specific dog while ‘a dog’ (3b) refers to dogs in general. 
 
(3) a. A dog is barking.   b. A dog barks.  
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The result of the above discussion is that there is a conflict of terminology regarding what is 
a specific NP and what is not. Recognizing this conflict, Krifka et al. (1995:15) put their own 
classification on a purely pre-theoretical level. In what follows, I attempt to resolve this conflict 
in the categorization that I propose. Now let us consider what we have established up to this 
point. First, we have established, based on Carlson (1977), that there is such a thing as a kind 
individual distinct from ordinary individual. Making this distinction also makes us realize the 
existence of normal or ordinary individual, which is often referred to in the literature as specific 
individual (e.g. Krifka et al., 1995:15 and Pelletier, 2010:11). Two kinds of individuals are thus 
sufficiently recognized in the literature: kind individuals (e.g. dinosaurs in the example above) 
and specific individuals (a dog in (3a)).  A general distinction that Carlson (1977:442) makes 
between kind individual (or kind-level individual) and specific (or normal) individual is that the 
former can be here and there while the latter is confined to a location at a given time. Using this 
diagnostic, we can posit that the individuals referred to in (2b), (2c) and (3a) are normal 
individuals (in the sense that we have been using the term ‘normal’), while dinosaur refers to 
kind individual. However, the reference that the NP dogs in (3b) make is not as quite 
determinable using the kind-normal distinction above. It does not refer to a dog located at a 
particular location and time, and it does not refer to a kind the same way that dinosaurs does. 
This, therefore, forces us to recognize another kind of individual that is in a medial position 
between kind individual and normal individual: an individual which is not specific and is abstract 
like kind individual, but which is different from kind individual in that it accumulates its 
properties from generalizations about instances of a kind. I call this ‘generic individual’ and 
assume that it is this abstract individual that NPs like a dog in (3b) refer to. The idea of a generic 
individual is not unheard of. A similar idea can be found in the philosophy literature. Fine 
(1983), for instance, argued in defense of a long-standing idea about the concept of arbitrary 
objects which are distinguished from individual objects.  
Let us now go back to the conflict of terminology identified above. In all of the examples 
above where we have identified specific or normal individuals, the common characteristic of all 
the NPs is that they refer to concrete instances which are located in time and space. For this 
reason and to escape the terminological problem associated with the specific-non-specific 
distinction, I will refer to this kind of individual as ‘concrete individual’ which can, then, be 
subdivided into different categories to account for the differences among (2b), (2c) and (3a). 
Consider the following examples of the three kinds of ontological individuals established so far: 
 
(4) a. Dogs are everywhere. [kind indiv.]     b. A dog barks. [generic indiv.]	
c. A dog is barking. [concrete indiv.]      d. Everyone brought a dog each.[concrete indiv.] 
e. The dog is barking.  [concrete indiv.]  f. Jack barks at night. [concrete indiv.] 
 
We can now examine each of these individuals one at a time. I start with concrete 
individuals. These individuals have nuances that make them distinct from one another. The 
difference we pointed out between (2b), (2c) and (3b) suggests strongly that we must be able to 
distinguish different kinds of concrete individuals in our system. At this point, we can recognize 
at least four types: specific, non-specific, definite and proper. This is illustrated as follows: 
 
(5) a. A dog is barking.   [concrete specific individual] 
b. Everyone brought a dog each. [concrete non-specific individual] 
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c. The dog is barking.   [concrete definite individual] 
d. Jack barks at night.  [concrete proper individual] 
 
I assume that these types have the same general logical form which can be modified variously to 
account for the minor differences. For example, (5a), will have the following logical form, 
leaving out events for now: ∃x [dog(x) ∧ barks(x)]. We can appeal to scope position to 
distinguish (5b) from (5a). For (5c), we can make use of the iota notation. For (5d), we might 
consider ‘Jack’ a referring expression (as in [barks(j)]) or a predicate bound by existential 
closure as in (5a-c). What seems to be common to each is binding by existential closure.  
Next, I consider the kind individual. According to the general assumptions of Carlson (1977), 
kind individuals are abstract individuals that may have actual instantiations. Since they are not 
concrete, they lack the kind of regular existential closure used for concrete individuals. There are 
broadly two ways in which we can implement the logical form of kind individuals. We can treat 
them as proper names with direct kind predication as in (6b); we can also assume that they 
involve variables with existential closure which are type-shifted into the kind individual. The 
latter way can be implemented in the various ways shown below (6c-e).  
 
(6) a. Dinosaurs are extinct.       b.	extinct	(dinosaurs)	
c. ∃x [dinosaurk (x) ∧ extinct (x)] (after Krifka et al 1995) 
d. ∃x [↑dinosaur (x) ∧ extinct (x)] (after Link 1995:382)  
e. ∃x [∪∩dinosaur (x) ∧ extinct (x)] (after Chierchia 1998) 
 
Another way to implement (6) is to assume that there is a Gen operator, which binds a type-
shifted variable that refers to the kind. I assume here that kind individual, as well as concrete 
individual, does not need the Gen operator and that it is only the generic individual that the Gen 
operator binds. This assumption is based on the following argument. I assume here that an 
inherent part of the concrete individual and the kind individual is that they are existentially 
identified in terms of ontology. For example, when we say a dog is outside, we can paraphrase 
this as ‘there is something in the world namely a dog that is outside’; likewise, when we say dogs 
are widespread, we can paraphrase this as ‘there is some kind in the world namely the kind dog 
that is widespread’; it will be awkward, however, to paraphrase a statement like dogs bark as 
‘there are some individuals in the world namely some dogs that bark’. Generic individuals are 
not existentially closed at least not in the sense that concrete and kind individuals are. 
One of the major assumptions of this paper is that there is a third kind of individual that is 
neither concrete nor is a kind individual. I identified this as the generic individual. Like kind 
individual, it is an abstract individual, but it gets its own properties from generalizations about 
instances of a kind. I assume here that since they are based on rough generalizations about 
instances of a kind individual, they are bound by the unpronounced Gen operator as in the 
following: Dogs bark = Gen x [dog(x) → bark (x)]. 
 
3 Eventualities 
 
Davidsonian events semantics (Davidson, 1967) assumes that verbs of action and change in 
natural language have a hidden event argument now commonly referred to as the E-position (see 
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Higginbotham, 1985:555). This idea has been extended in the neo-Davidsonian tradition 
(represented in such work as Parsons 1990 and 2000; Landman, 2000; Higginbotham, 2000, etc.) 
which assumes that all predicates, including statives, have the E-position. While this has been 
widely accepted in the literature, scholars such as Maienborne (e.g. Maienborn, 2007 and 2011) 
and Katz (e.g. Katz, 2000) have continued to argue for a Davidsonian view that only eventive 
predicates (Katz, 2000) and ‘Davidonian states’ like sit and sleep (Maienborn, 2007) have an E-
position. Maienborn (2007), for example, demonstrates that a kind of state she describes as 
Kimian state, ontologically and linguistically, defers from eventive predicates and Davidsonian 
states in a number of ways, arguing that they lack the E-position.  
For reasons of space, I do not address this distinction between eventives and Kimian states or 
what Moltmann (2013) calls ‘abstract states’ here but see Section 6 for the consequences of the 
proposal here for Kimian states. In the theoretical framework that I lay out shortly, I assume that 
all predicates have an E-position. I also assume (following Parsons, 1990) that there are three 
sorts of things that predicates generally encode: events, states, and processes, which I 
collectively refer to as 'eventualities' (Bach, 1986).   For the purpose of this paper, my focus is on 
events and states. First, I propose that there are different kinds of states and events with regard to 
their interaction with individuals, their duration and number of instances across time and space. 
For example, states such is extinct, only apply to kind individuals, a state such as is hungry is 
shorter in duration than a state like is intelligent, while a particular event such as smoked last 
night has one instance whereas an event such as smokes after dinner has multiple instances. It is 
based on these facts that the following ontological distinctions are made. I start with events. 
 
3.1 Events 
 
The general tradition in event semantics is to think of events in concrete terms. Events are 
located in space and time. We can have multiple events such as e1, e2, etc.; we can also have 
subevent (e’) commonly proposed for such constructions as resultatives and causative-
inchoatives. What is not common is to think of events as having uncountable instances. But there 
are some events which cannot be given the description of a particular event and which seem to 
have multiple instances that are not countable. Consider the following:  
 
(7) a. Mary smoked at the party. 		b.	∃e [smoking (e) ˄ ag (e, Mary) ˄ at_the_party (e)] 
 
(8) a. Mary smokes after dinner.   b. * ∃e [smoking (e) ˄ ag (e, Mary) ˄ after_diner (e)] 
 
While the interpretation in (7b) is accurate for (7a), ignoring tense and salience, (8b) does not 
give an accurate interpretation of (8a) for the reason that (8b) suggests that there is a concrete 
event which took place at a certain time but which does not take place with some regularity. This 
is against the meaning of (8a). Although (8a) can be given the standard analysis in the following 
way: GEN [x,s;] (x = Mary & smoke (x. s); after.dinner (s)) (Krifka, 1995:238), the question is: 
can event semantics handle the regularity that is associated with some events such as the one in 
(8a)? To answer this question, I first propose that there are two types of events. These are 
particular/concrete events and generic events.  This particular distinction can be found in the 
work of Montague (Montague, 1969) as reported in Pianesi and Achille (2013). According to 
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them, Montague distinguished between generic events (e.g. sun rises) and particular events (e.g. 
sun rose yesterday). For him, generic events are a kind of property and particular events are 
instantiations of generic events. Montague’s theory is metaphysical however, and its major 
assumption is that particular events are derived from generic events. In the system that I advocate 
in this paper, generic events are derived from particular events with an addition of a predicate. 
My own distinction between generic and particular/concrete events, therefore, is purely linguistic 
and ontological rather than broadly metaphysical. Let us start by observing the following: 
 
(9)       There are ontologically two kinds of events in natural language: 
            a. Particular/concrete events with countable instances     
            b. Generic events with uncountable instances 
 
I define particular events as a kind of event that is located in a specific time and location and 
does not express any form of regularity. I also assume that they have single instances. Of course, 
they can be distributive as in John buttered three loafs of bread, and have subevents, but they 
generally lack the property of having uncountable instances. A generic event, on the other hand, 
is an event which expresses some regularity. A generic event is true only when there is some 
regularity involved and it is not the case that it has definite instances. For instance, in the event in 
the expression Africans drink palm wine, it is hard to think of how many instances this event 
drink has. To formalize this regularity in the neo-Davidsonian framework, I propose that all 
events have an additional predicate that is either concrete (10a) or generic (10b). 
 
(10) a. [[concrete]]v,et = λPλe [P (e) ˄ con (e)]   b. [[generic]]v,et = λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)] 
 
When (10b) is applied to a standard neo-Davidsonian event, it turns such an event into one that 
occurs with some regularity and allows for counterfactuals, whereas when (10a) is applied to an 
event, it indicates that the event has a concrete instance. The distinction between (7a) and (8a) 
can now be handled as in (11a&b) respectively. 
 
(11) a. [λPλe [P (e) ˄ con (e)]] (∃e [smoke (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ at_the_party (e)]) = 
       ∃e [smoke (e) ˄ con (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ at_the_party (e)] 
b. [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] (∃e [smoke (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ after_dinner (e)]) = 
       ∃e [smoke (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ after_dinner (e)] 
 
This derivation defers from the standard treatment of events only with the introduction of the 
generic/concrete predicate. Introducing a new predicate is not uncommon in the event semantics 
literature. Parson (1990:28) for example, uses Cul and Hold to account for tense and aspect; 
gen/con is no less a predicate accounting for a functional category. Summarily, what 
distinguishes concrete events from generic events is the generic/concrete predicate. 
 
3.2  States 
 
Four distinct types of states can be identified in terms of duration, number of instances and the 
kind of individual that can be their argument. Let us start with (12): 
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(12) Four ontological kinds of states can be identified: 
a. kind-level state  b. stage-level state 
c. individual-level state d. generic state 
 
Kind-level states are a kind of state that only takes a kind individual as a theme. For example, is 
extinct is a state that can only be true of the kind the dinosaur. I borrow Carlson’s (1977) 
terminology of individual-stage-level predicates and distinguish between stage-level states and 
individual-level states. A stage-level state is one which applies to stages of an individual; this is 
tantamount to what one might regard as temporary state. Is hungry is an example of stage-level 
states. An individual-level state applies to each and every stage of an individual. This is what one 
might consider a permanent state. An example of this is is brave. Generic state is a kind of state 
that comes with some regularity and has multiple instances that are not definite. An example of 
this is is always hungry. This is neither a pure stage-level state nor an individual-level state. It is 
a state that is scattered among the stages of an individual and does not apply to each and every 
stage of such individual. I assume that the mechanism in (10) is applicable to the categories in 
(12) and use the predicate kind-l (s) for kind-level states, stage-l (s) for stage-level states and 
ind-l (s) for individual-level states. But for the sake of space, these predicates, and the ‘con (e)’ 
predicate are not indicated in the notations in subsequent sections. The predicate ‘gen (s)’ for 
generic state and ‘gen (e)’, however, are indicated, since they are the focus of the paper. The 
following examples illustrate the four types of state identified above:  
 
(13) a. Dinosaurs are extinct     
b. ∃s [being_extinct (s) ˄ kind-l (s) ˄ th (s, ↑dinosaurs)]  kind-level state 
 
(14) a. John is hungry. 
b. ∃s [being_hungry (s) ˄ stage-l (s) ˄  th (s, john)]  stage-level 
 
(15) a. John is clever.  
b. ∃s [being_clever (s) ˄ ind-l (s) ˄ th (s, john)]   individual-level 
 
(16) a. John is always hungry. 
b. ∃s [being_hungry (s) ˄  gen (s) ˄ th (s, john)]   generic 
 
The reader might find it unusual that the adverb of quantification always in (16a) has been 
reduced to a predicate in (16b), given that it is often treated as an operator. In the next section, I 
show that Yoruba treats both generic state and event the same, so that (16a) is expressed with the 
same grammatical means that generic events are expressed with.  
 
4 Generic eventualities in Yoruba 
 
In this section, I provide an account of how the various types of eventualities I have identified 
above are realized in Yoruba, with a focus on generic events and states. Let us start with non-
generic eventualities. These eventualities have the common characteristic that they are realized 
in the syntax with simple predication. No additional particle or marker is needed to express them. 
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Generic events and states, on the other hand, are explicitly marked in the language.  A generic 
eventuality is generally marked with the imperfective marker máa-ń. This marker has the 
function of taking particular events and turning them to events with indefinite instances. This is 
exactly what the gen predicate proposed above does. Let us give the logical form of (17a) as in 
(17b) and the denotation of máa-ń as in (18). (19& 20) show application of (18) to (17b). 
 
(17) a. Bọ́lá    jẹ ewé 
    Bọ́lá    eat leaf 
    ‘Bọ́lá ate leaves.’ 
  b. ∃e [eating (e) ˄ ag (e, bọ́lá) ˄ th (e, leaf)] 
 
(18) [[máa-ń]] = [[generic]]v,et= [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] 
 
(19) Bọ́lá máa-ń jẹ ewé (‘Bọ́lá eats leaves (habitually’)) 
 
(20) a. [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] (∃e [eating (e) ˄ ag (e, b) ˄ th (e, leaf)]) 
b. ∃e [eating (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, bọ́lá) ˄ th (e, leaf)] 
 
While (17b) states that there is a particular one-instance event of eating leaves that has Bọ́lá as 
an agent, (20b) states that there is an indefinite multiple-instance event of eating leaves that has 
Bọ́lá as an agent. The implication of (18), therefore, is that the category of events that was 
identified as generic event in the previous section not only has an ontological support but also a 
linguistic support in Yoruba. Next, let us consider the case of generic state. 
Linguistic support for the category of generic state is not readily available in English since 
what corresponds to máa-ń is not phonologically available. But this support is found in Yoruba. 
Generic states, just like generic events, are constructed from particular states (stage-level states 
in most cases) by using máa-ń (the generic predicate). Consider the following: 
 
(21) a. Bọ́lá    wà ní    ilé        ọtí 
    Bọ́lá   exist in    house   alcohol 
    ‘Bọ́lá is/was at the bar.’ 
 b. Bọ́lá       máa-ń     wà     ní     ilé        ọtí 
     Bọ́lá      gen         exist   in     house    alcohol 
     ‘Bọ́lá is/was at the bar in multiple indefinite instances (habitually).’ 
 c. ∃s [being-in-the-bar (s) ˄  gen (s) ˄ th (s, bọ́lá)] 
 
(21c) which is the logical form of (21b) states that there is a generic state of being at the bar 
whose theme is bọ́lá. Note that the generic state in (21b) can also be expressed in English as 
‘Bọ́lá is always at the bar’. But this cannot give the accurate information that is expressed in this 
sentence, because (21b) does not contain anything that corresponds to adverb of quantification. It 
only states that there are multiple occasions of Bọ́lá being at the bar, and does not specify 
whether this is usually, seldom or always. To do that, prepositional constructions that are similar 
to English adverb of quantification (e.g. ní ẹ̀ẹ̀kọ̀ọ̀kan ‘sometimes/seldom’, ní ọ̀pọ̀ ìgbà 
‘often/usually/ in most cases’, etc.) will have to be used. The consequent intuition, therefore, is 
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that máa-ń is a true generic predicate that modifies an eventuality variable to give it the property 
of having multiple instances of unspecified number.2 
 
5 Concrete, generic and kind individuals in Yoruba 
 
There are only two forms of NP in Yoruba that make reference to kind individuals and generic 
individuals. These are what I refer to in this paper as Bare NPs (BNPs) like ajá ‘dog’, ewúrẹ́ 
‘goat’, etc., and Plural NPs (PNPs) such as àwọn ajá ‘dogs’, àwọn ewúrẹ́ ‘goats’, etc. These two 
forms can also make reference to the different kinds of concrete individuals identified in Section 
2. The starting point then is to assume that these two forms are ambiguous between reference to 
kind, generic and concrete individuals. What determines which individuals they refer to is the 
type of eventuality in which they are serving as argument and the nature of the second argument 
in the eventuality. Let us start with the kind individual. The two forms are interpreted as kind 
individuals when they serve as a theme of a kind-level state (henceforth, K-state) as shown in 
(22ai). But only the BNP yields kind interpretation with individual-level sate (henceforth, I-state) 
as in (22bi); PNP is odd in this context. Also, when both forms are a theme of an I-state with an 
experiencer (see footnote 2), kind interpretation is obtained as in (22ci). Generic interpretation of 
BNP is also obtained in deontic modality even when the eventuality is a particular event as 
shown in (22di). In this latter case, it is assumed that the deontic modality turns a concrete event 
into a state (property) which can be predicated of a kind as shown in (22dii). This property can 
then be inherited by members of the kind in appropriate worlds. 
 
(22) a. BNP/PNP as theme of K-state → kind individual 
     i. (Awọn) Ajá wà káàkiri 
        (PL) dog be everywhere 
         ‘Dogs are everywhere.’ 
     ii. ∃s [being-everywhere (s) ˄ th (s, ↑dog)] 
b.  BNP as theme of I-state → kind individual 
      i. Ewúrẹ́ ní ẹ̀jẹ̀ 
          goat have blood 
          ‘Goats have blood.’ 
      ii. ∃s [having-blood (s) ˄ th (s, ↑goat)] 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
2	 In some constructions, the generic predicate reduces to a clitic í, whose surface representation is determined by 
phonological processes not addressed here. 
(i) a. Bọ́lá    kìí  mu ọtí    b. Gbígbó ni ajáá    gbó 
    Bọ́lá    NEG.gen drink beer               barking FOC dog.gen    bark 
      ‘Bọ́lá doesn’t drink beer (habitually).’           ‘BARKING is what dogs do (generically/habitually)’       
c. Ewúré kìí  gbó                          d. Ajá       níí  gbó 
      goat NEG.gen bark                            dog      FOC.gen bark 
      ‘Goats don’t  bark.’                                      ‘DOGS bark generically/ habitually.' 
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c. BNP/PNP as theme of K-state with an experiencer3 → kind individual 
      i. Bọ́lá fẹ́ràn (àwọn) ọmọdé 
          Bọ́lá like (PL) child 
          ‘Bọ́lá loves children.’ 
      ii. ∃s [loving (s) ˄ exp (s, bọ́lá) ˄ th (s, ↑child)] 
d. BNP as an agent of particular event in deontic modality → kind individual 
      i. Ayékòótọ́ lè kọrin 
          parrot  can sing 
          ‘A parrot can sing’ 
      ii.  λw ∃e [singing (e) ˄ ∃s [able-to-be-agent-of-‘e’ (s) ˄ th (s, ↑parrot) ˄ in (s, w)]]    
 
Let us next consider the concrete individual. The two forms are interpreted as concrete 
individuals when they are an agent or a theme of a particular event (henceforth, P-event) as in 
(23ai). They are interpreted as concrete individuals when they are an agent (23bi) or a theme 
(23ci) of a generic event (henceforth, G-event) with a concrete individual argument. 
 
(23) a. BNP/PNP as an agent or theme of P-event → concrete individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá jẹ egungun 
          (PL) dog eat bone 
         ‘A/the dog/ the dogs ate a piece (some pieces) of bone.’ 
      ii. ∃e [eating (e) ˄ ag (e, dog) ˄ th (e, bone)] 
b. BNP/PNP as an agent of G-event with concrete individual theme→ concrete individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá maa-n lé Bọ́lá 
          (PL) dog gen chase Bọ́lá 
           ‘A certain dog or some certain dogs chase Bọ́lá in indefinite occasions’ 
      ii. ∃e [chasing (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, dog) ˄ th (e, bọ́lá)] 
c. BNP/PNP as a theme of G-event with concrete individual agent → concrete individual 
      i. Bọ́lá maa-n lé  (àwọn) ajá   
          Bọ́lá  gen chase (PL) dog 
          ‘Bọ́lá chases a certain dog or some certain dogs in indefinite occasions’ 
      ii. ∃e [chasing (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, bọ́lá) ˄ th (e, dog)] 
 
Concrete individual interpretation is also obtained when BNPs and PNPs serve as the theme 
of a stage-level state (henceforth, S-state) (24ai) and as the experiencer of an I-state with 
concrete individual theme (24bi). They are also interpreted as concrete individuals when they are 
an experiencer in a generic state (henceforth, G-state) that has a concrete individual argument 
(24ci) or when they are a theme of a G-state with a concrete individual experiencer (24di).  
 
(24) a. BNP/PNP as a theme of S-state → concrete individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá dákẹ́ 
          (PL) dog be.silent 
																																								 																				
3	I use the term ‘experiencer’ to refer to the individual who is aware of a stimulus (following Hilpert, 2014:27).  The 
term is used here to distinguish between the arguments of verbs like love. For example, in Jane loves dogs, Jane is 
the experiencer and dogs is the theme. I use the notation ‘exp’ to signify the term ‘experiencer’ in logical forms.		
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          ‘The dog(s) are silent or the dog(s) became silent.’ 
      ii. ∃s [being-silent (s) ˄ th (s, dog)] 
b. BNP/PNP as an experiencer of S-state with concrete individual theme → concrete 
individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá fẹ́ràn mi 
          (PL) dog like 1SG 
          ‘The dog(s) like me.’ 
      ii. ∃s [liking (s) ˄ exp (s, dog) ˄ th (s, me)] 
c. BNP/PNP as an experiencer of G-state with concrete individual theme → concrete 
individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá máa-ń fẹ́ràn mi 
          (PL) dog gen like 1SG 
          ‘A dog/ some dogs like me in indefinite number of occasions’ 
      ii. ∃s [liking (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, dog) ˄ th (s, me)] 
d. BNP/PNP as a theme of G-state with concrete individual experiencer → concrete 
individual 
      i. Mo máa-ń fẹ́ràn (àwọn) ajá pupa 
          1SG gen like (PL) dog red 
          ‘I like red dog(s) in indefinite number of occasions’ 
      ii. ∃s [liking (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, I) ˄ th (s, dog)] 
 
A generalization that can be observed with regard to the interpretation of BNPs and PNPs as 
concrete individuals is that they require an aspect of a proposition to be concrete or to be located 
in time and/or place. That is, they require that either the eventuality is particular or that there be a 
second argument that is particular (concrete). For instance, we see in (23) and (24), that concrete-
individual interpretation is tied to P-events (23ai), S-state (24ai), and the requirement that the 
second argument has a concrete-individual interpretation (23bi, 23ci, 24bi, 24ci and 24di). It 
should be noted as well that there are different types of concrete individual in (23) and (24). For 
instance, ajá ‘dog’ and egungun bone in (23ai) refer to concrete specific individuals, ajá ‘dog’ 
and its plural form àwọn ajá ‘dogs’ in (23bi, 23ci, 24ci and 24di) refer to non-specific individual, 
ajá ‘dog’ and àwọn ajá ‘dogs’ in (24ai) and (24bi) refer to concrete definite individual, while 
Bọ́lá in (23bi) refers to a concrete proper individual.  
Let us start by observing that, generally, only BNPs are naturally interpreted as generic 
individual; PNPs either yield existential interpretation or are generally odd. One peculiar 
characteristic of interpreting BNPs as generic individuals is that they occur in generic 
eventualities. However, it should be noted that things are not as quite straightforward with this 
observation, as there are some of these eventualities that superficially appear as generic but are 
best analyzed as non-generic. The starting point then is to make the distinction between true 
generic eventualities in this regard and superficial generic eventualities and then see how the 
BNPs figure. Examples of true generic eventualities that yield generic interpretation of BNPs is 
given in (25). (25ai) shows how BNPs are interpreted as generic in G-event with no theme while 
(25bi) demonstrates generic intepretation in G-event with a concrete non-specific theme. 
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(25) a. BNP as an agent of G-event with no theme → generic individual 
      i. Ajá máa-ń gbó  
         dog gen bark 
         ‘Dogs bark.’ 
       ii. Gen x [dog (x) → ∃e [barking (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, x)]] 
 
 b. BNP as an agent of G-event with concrete non-specific theme → generic individual 
      i. Ajá máa-ń jẹ egungun  
         dog gen eat bone 
         ‘Dogs eat bones.’ 
      ii. Gen x [dog (x) → ∃e [eating (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, x) ˄ th (e, bone)]]  
 
What (25) basically shows is that when BNPs occur in generic eventualities, they are interpreted 
generically. The source of their generic interpretation can then be located in those generic 
eventualities. However, note that (25aii) and (25bii) defers from the standard Gen approach in 
two respects: first, the verbal predicate is interpreted as event and this event is taken to be 
generic; second, the generic interpretation of the NP is said to be tied to the genericity of the 
eventuality. As such, (25aii) states that generally for dogs there is some generic event of barking 
that they do, while (25bii) states that generally for dogs there is some generic event of eating 
concrete (non-specific individual) bones that they do. Next, consider the superficial generic 
eventualities that also yield generic interpretation for BNPs: 
 
(26) a. BNP as an experiencer of superficial G-state with kind theme → generic individual 
      i. Ajá máa-ń fẹ́ràn egungun  
         dog gen like bone 
         ‘Dogs likes bone.’ 
b. BNP as an experiencer of superficial G-state with concrete non-specific theme →    
       generic individual 
      i. Ewúrẹ́ máa-ń ní ìwo 
         goat gen have horn 
         ‘Goats have horn’ 
c. BNP as a theme of superficial G-state → generic individual 
      i. Mààlû máa-ń tóbi 
         cow gen be.big 
         ‘Cows are big.’ 
 
We can go ahead and give (26ai, bi and ci) the same kind of treatment as before, so that their 
logical forms are as in (27a-c) respectively. But this will be counter-intuitive as argued below. 
 
(27) a. Gen x [dog (x) → ∃s [liking (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, bone)]] 
b. Gen x [goat (x) → ∃s [having (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, horn)]] 
c. Gen x [cow (x) → ∃s [being-big (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ th (s, x)]] 
 
(27) states, wrongly, that some generic individuals undergo an I-state in an indefinite number 
of occasion. For instance, (27c) states that generally for cows, there is some state of being big 
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that they experience in an indefinite number of occasions. This is contrary to the meaning of 
(26ci) which only says that there is an indefinite number of occasions where a given cow is big. 
To resolve this mismatch, we have to do away with the generic predicate in (27) and treat the 
eventualities therein as I-states rather than G-states constructed from I-states. The implication of 
this then is that the source of generic interpretation for the BNPs in the examples in (26) cannot 
be located within the eventualities but must be from a different source in those sentences.  
The most available intuition is that, if the generic interpretation of the BNPs cannot be due to 
the eventualities in those sentences, then it must be due to the imperfective marker máa-ń, which 
has been argued above to be the generic predicate. The examples in (26) are different. Máa-ń 
does not turn the eventualities in those sentences to generic eventualities, but instead ensures that 
the BNPs in those sentences are interpreted generically. If this observation is in the right 
direction, then máa-ń does not serve as the generic predicate in those sentences, but as an 
operator that binds the variables supplied by the BNPs. From this viewpoint, máa-ń in (26), 
therefore, has a semantics that is very close to or the same as that given to the generic operator, 
Gen. We can then posit that máa-ń has the two denotations shown below:  
 
(28) a. [[máa-ń]] = [[generic]]v, et= [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] 
b. [[máa-ń]] = [[Gen]]e, t= λPλQ Gen x [P (x) → ∃e/s [Q(e/s) ˄ ag/th (e/s, x) ]]  
 
Let us illustrate (28b) with the example in (26bi) given as (29b) below. Recall that BNPs that 
serve as a theme/experiencer of an I-state are interpreted as kind individuals (see 22b). Without 
the imperfective marker máa-ń, the BNP in (26bi) is interpreted as a kind individual as in (29a). 
Consider the following: 
 
(29) a. Ewúrẹ́  ní  ìwo = ∃s [having-horn (s) ˄ exp (s, ↑goat)] = kind individual 
b. Ewúrẹ́  máa-ń ní ìwo = 
c.  Máa-ńx [Ewúrẹ́x  ní  ìwo] = 
d. Genx [Ewúrẹ́x  ní  ìwo] = 
e. Gen x [ ewúrẹ́ (x) → ∃s [ níní (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, ìwo)]] = 
f. Gen x [ goat (x) → ∃s [ having (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, horn)]] 
 
(29b-f) demonstrates the compositional derivation for máa-ń as an operator. (29c) demonstrates 
that máa-ń specifically targets a variable that is supplied by the BNP. The other examples in (26) 
has to be given the same logical form in (29f) where there is no generic predicate, but rather a 
generic operator that is phonologically available.    
If (28b) is correct and the derivation for máa-ń in (29b-f) is accurate, then it follows that the 
so-called silent operator Gen, may not be silent in some languages and some contexts after all. 
The discussion above has shown that, while it is silent in some constructions as in the examples 
in (25) where its presence is due to the nature of the eventuality, it has a pronounced counterpart 
in other constructions, as demonstrated by the examples in (26). The implication, therefore, is 
that Yoruba provides an empirical support for the so-called Gen operator. 
A generalization that can be taken from the discussion so far is that BNPs are naturally 
interpreted as abstract individual (kind or generic) while PNPs naturally have an existential 
interpretation of concrete individuals. It was shown that PNPs are possible as kind individuals 
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but this is rather far restricted. The fact that PNPs are generally odd as generic individuals also 
suggest that PNPs are naturally existential and that their interpretation as kind individual is rather 
due to a type-shifting operation whose source can be located in the eventuality. Existential 
interpretation of BNPs can also be explained away by a type-shifting operation that is occasioned 
by the eventuality. This type-shifting operation might be reminiscent of Carson’s theory, but I 
am not committed to that theory. I have only employed this conceptualization ad hoc to put the 
general distribution of these two forms of Yoruba NPs in proper perspective.      
 
6 Some preliminary advantages  
 
The most important advantage of the theoretical framework proposed in this paper is the freedom 
it allows for one to look at genericity in a language like Yoruba that has not been robustly 
researched in this area. I was able to account for genericity in Yoruba without having to commit 
to any specific theory of genericity whose limitations could have hindered exploratory pursuits. 
The framework also has cross-linguistic applicability. For languages whose generic sentences 
have not been researched before, the framework provides a general adaptable analytic guideline 
that makes use of ontological distinctions in individuals and eventualities which may be 
distinguished in different ways cross-linguistically.  
The framework is also able to account for not only subject arguments but also object 
arguments in terms of generic-kind-existential interpretation. Most theories of genericity 
concentrate on subject arguments (see Mari et al., 2013:2), but it seems that we need to be able to 
account for object arguments as well. The ability of this framework to account for both subject 
and object arguments means we can account for grammatically conditioned genericity in Yoruba 
as found in the syntactic account of Ajiboye (2005). As we saw above, sometimes, generic-kind-
existential interpretation of an NP may be conditioned by the nature of the second argument. 
Using events semantics makes it possible to account for this fact. 
This framework also avoids recourse to pragmatics, as is often the case in the standard Gen 
approach. For instance, (1d) repeated in (30a) will be given a logical form like that in (30b). 
According to this framework, the logical form of (30a) can be restated as in (30c). 
 
(30) a. It rains at night in Lagos. 
b. Gen s [s is a situation appropriate for raining in Lagos → it rains] 
c. ∃e [raining (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ at (e, night) ∧ in (e, lagos)] 
 
(30c) does not specify more than what is present compositionally in (30a). Since there is no 
generic individual in (30a), there is no need for the Gen operator. This is consistent with the 
assumption of the framework that only generic individuals are bound by the Gen operator.  
Another significance of this framework is in the fact that it makes some predictions that may 
have bearing on current issues in event semantics. Maienborn’s theory of statives and copula + 
adjectives (Maienborn, 2004, 2005 and 2007) states that statives and copula + adjective are 
Kimian states that lack Davidsonian event argument. If this assumption were true for Yoruba, 
then there would be nothing we can refer to as generic state. But as the discussion above has 
shown there is indeed a generic state in the language. Let us consider this here again: 
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(31) a. Ade   bínú   b. Adé máa-ń bínú  
    Ade   be.angry                 Ade gen be.angry 
    ‘Ade was angry.’       ‘Ade is generically angry.’  
 
First, note that (31b) is not available in English: the approximation ‘Ade is usually angry’ does 
not accurately represent the meaning of sentences like (31b) in that it does not contain any 
prepositional phrase that are equivalent to English adverb of quantification. (31b) only states that 
Ade is angry in multiple number of occasions that is not definite just as ‘Mary smokes’ indicates 
that Mary smokes in an indefinite number of occasions.  According to Maienborn’s theory, (31b) 
should not be possible since bínú ‘be.angry’ would lack a Davidsonian event argument. Our 
generic predicate máa-ń would, therefore, have no event argument to turn to generic. My 
argument here is that since Yoruba treats both regular events and Kimian states (like the one in 
(31)) the same by using máa-ń (the generic predicate) to turn them from particular eventualities 
to generic eventualities, generic states have an ontological as well as an empirical basis. This 
suggests that there may be languages where Kimian states can be shown to have a hidden event 
argument. If my assumptions are correct, Yoruba is one of those languages. This framework also 
led to the ambitious suggestion that máa-ń is an overt pronunciation of the Gen operator. 
Finally, the framework is able to handle issues relating to focus and ambiguity. Both 
individuals and eventualities can be put in focus. The mechanism developed here can be 
implemented variously to account for each case. (32a) and (33a), both repeated from (i)b and (i)d 
respectively in Footnote 2, demonstrate respectively how Yoruba grammatically puts generic 
eventualities and individuals in focus. Both sentences express the same idea; the difference is in 
what is put in focus. This difference is reflected in the logical forms in (32b) and (33b).  
 
(32) a. Gbígbó ni ajáá  gbó 
     barking FOC dog.gen bark 
     ‘BARKING is what dogs do (generically/habitually)’  
  b. ∃e [barking (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ Gen x [dog (x) → ag (e, x)]] 
 
(33) a. Ajá  níí  gbó 
    dog  FOC.gen bark 
    ‘DOGS bark generically/ It is dogs that bark generically or habitually.’ 
  b. Gen x [dog (x) ∧ ∃e [barking (e) ∧ gen (e) → ag (e, x)]]) 
 
We can illustrate how the framework handles ambiguity with the popular example ‘Typhoons 
arise in this part of the Pacific’. The two standard readings of this sentence are shown below: 
 
(34) a. Gen x [typhoon (x) → ∃e [arising (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ ag (e, x) ∧ in (e, this_part      
of_the_pacific]] 
b. ∃x [this_part of_the_pacific (x) ∧ ∃e [arising (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ ∃y [typhoon (y) ∧ ag (e,       
y)] ∧ in (e, x)]]) 
 
While (34a) contains both a generic individual and generic eventuality, (34b) contains a generic 
eventuality and concrete individual. (34a) states that the generic individual ‘typhoons’ is such 
that it generically occurs in this part of the Pacific, while (34b) states that this part of the Pacific 
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is such that some generic event of arising whose agent is concrete individual ‘typhoons’ occurs 
in it. Since (34b) does not contain a generic individual, Gen is not necessary. This also supports 
the idea that only generic individuals require the binding of the Gen operator.  
 
7 Conclusion 
 
The overarching claim of this paper has been that in the kind of sentences that we regard as 
generic, both individuals and eventualities can have generic interpretations. Perhaps the most 
notable proposal in this part of the system is that there is a generic individual which is distinct 
from kind individual and concrete (normal) individual. The distinction made between particular 
(concrete) and generic eventualities also appears to be conceptually and empirically supported. It 
was shown that Yoruba makes this clear distinction and that this distinction determines how 
noun phrases in the language are interpreted. Application of this framework to Yoruba generic 
sentences touches on two major issues related to current theories of genericity and event 
semantics. First, it was suggested that there is evidence in Yoruba that Kimian states do have the 
E-position which the generic predicate máa-ń applies to. Second, it was shown that the most 
intuitive treatment of máa-ń in certain constructions in the language is to give it the semantics of 
the Gen operator, thereby suggesting that Gen is not silent in all contexts in Yoruba after all. 
Adopting the framework also provides the opportunity to avoid recourse to pragmatics and an 
avenue to account for both subject and object arguments of generic sentences. The general 
prediction is that the different kinds of individuals and eventualities identified here are present 
cross-linguistically and that languages may have their own ways of expressing them. Further 
research will test some of the predictions and refine the system advanced here accordingly.  
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Intervention Effects in Palestinian Arabic: How question formation
becomes degraded 1
Julia Braun — Eberhard Karls Universita¨t Tu¨bingen
Abstract. This paper provides novel results from semantic fieldwork on Palestinian Arabic (PA)
on intervention effects. Theoretically, intervention effects can arise in simple and multiple wh-
questions, in alternative questions and in scope marking constructions. It will be clarified why this
is the case and why PA only exhibits effects in the latter two. Based on the empirical findings, it
will be argued that grammaticality is not a binary phenomenon and that intervention effects, rather
than turning a grammatical target sentence into an ungrammatical one, downgrade the judgements
but do not necessarily make the target sentence ungrammatical. In this sense, intervention effects
do exist, but the effect might not be as strong as predicted by the current theory. 2
1 Background: diagnosing intervention effects
Semantic explanations of intervention effects (Beck 2006, 2016; Howell et al. Ms. 2017; Hohaus &
Howell 2015) predict intervention effects to be cases of ungrammaticality caused by the interaction
of different semantic operators that evaluate alternatives.
In more detail, we expect that certain constructions do not surface because a wh-phrase may
not be separated from its associated Q-operator by an intervener3, e.g negation, a focus sensitive
operator or certain quantifiers, as exemplified in (1).
(1) *[Qi [...[intervener [...wh-phrasei...]]]]
Finding such intervention effects in a language is a special quest as it requires looking at construc-
tions that would normally not be uttered in everyday conversations.
In order to understand intervention effects as they are observed cross-linguistically as well as their
theoretical underpinning, the important questions to ask are:
(2) What kind of ingredients do we need in order to construct intervention effects in a
language?
(3) Are there intervention effects in the language we are interested in?
(4) Are the predictions of the semantic theory met, i.e. is there empirical evidence that inter-
vention leads to ungrammaticality of the whole construction?
1I would like to thank Team Lambda from Tu¨bingen and especially Anna Howell and Vera Hohaus for their
amazing support. A special thanks also goes to Susan Rothstein from Bar Ilan University who helped me to finalise
this paper. Thanks a lot!
2This paper is based on my BA-thesis on intervention effects in Palestinian Arabic and short passages from it might
be used in this paper.
3The set of problematic interveners can be different for each language, see Beck (2006)
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The plot for this paper is as follows: Section 1.1 provides a more detailed explanation of inter-
vention effects and section 1.2 discusses ways to elicit intervention effects in Palestinian Arabic.
In section 2, I will present data on PA and the results from studies on intervention effects in PA,
which will be discussed in section 2.3. In the outlook in chapter 2.4, I will mention some issues
that should be taken into account for future research. The appendix provides the meaning rules and
lexical entries of the relevant ingredients of intervention effects.
1.1 What are intervention effects?
Intervention effects have been elicited in a large number of languages including German, Korean,
Hindi, Turkish (Beck 1996), English, Japanese, French (Pesetsky 2000), Mandarin, Malayalam
(Kim 2002), Dutch (Honcoop 1998), Passamaquoddy (Bruening & Lin 2001), Thai (Ruangjaroon
2002), Amharic (Eilam 2011), Samoan, Yoruba, (Howell et al. to appear). Consider the examples
in (5) and (6) below:
(5) *Minsu-man
Minsu-only
nuku-luˆl
who-Acc
po-ass-ni?
see-Past-Q
(Korean)
‘Who did only Minsu see?’ (Beck, 2006, p.1)
(6) *Wen
whom
hat
has
niemand
nobody
wo
where
gesehen?
seen
(German)
‘Where did nobody see whom?’ (Beck, 2006, p.4)
Although the examples in (5) and (6) have a different syntatic structure, they are predicted to be
ungrammatical because of the same underlying principle: what makes these constructions unac-
ceptable is the way that the compositional interpretation of alternatives happens (cf. Beck 2006,
2016). Note that in both the Korean and the German question, there is a wh-phrase which has
stayed in-situ and which is c-commanded by an intervener. As described above, this constellation
separates the wh-phrase from its associated Q-operator at LF and thus leads to ungrammaticality.
In a compositional account of this ungrammaticality (Beck 2006), it is assumed that focus like in
(7) and questions (8) both introduce alternatives.
(7) Only SamiraF plays the piano. ! focus on ’Samira’ introduces alternatives {Beth, Ken, Ronja}
(8) Who plays the piano? ! question word also introduces the alternatives {Beth, Ken, Ronja}
To include these alternatives into the calculations, every node receives two different values: the
ordinary semantic value and an additional alternative semantic value (Rooth 1985, 1992). Both the
focused phrase as well as the question word are assumed to be evaluated by an operator. Rooth
(1985,1992) assumes a ⇠-operator to evaluate focused phrases in its scope, wh-phrases are evalu-
ated by a Q-operator (Beck 2006). Beck’s (2006) explanation of intervention effects is based on
the binding properties of these two operators. Her theory shows that the ⇠ unselectively evalu-
ates all alternatives4 in its scope including those that are introduced by the wh-phrase. Since the
Q-operator cannot bind an undefined value relative to g,h, the whole calculation collapses and the
4Or in Beck’s framework, all distinguished variables. In the following explanations, I will assume a distinguished
variable framework.
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structure becomes uninterpretable.5 Applied to the example in (5), we would get the LF in (9)
below.
(9) [CP Q2 [IP3 onlyC [IP2 ⇠ C [IP1 MinsuF1 saw who 2 ]]]]
As explained in Beck (2006) and Beck & Kim (2006), since [[who]]g is undefined, [[IP1]]g is also
undefined. The ⇠ then resets the value relative to g,h to the value relative to g which implies
that [[IP2]]g inherits the undefinedness from [[IP1]]g and that [[IP2]]g,h also gets undefined. Both
[[IP3]]g and [[IP3]]g,h also inherit the undefinedness. And because [[IP3]]g,h is undefined, [[CP]]g
is also undefined which means that the whole structure is undefined and thus uninterpretable.
1.2 ...and how can we find them in PA?
There are four different question types that lend themselves to the elicitation of intervention ef-
fects. In the following, I will briefly mention them all and illustrate why they are good candidates
to test intervention effects.
Simple wh-questions. As mentioned above, we need a wh-phrase that can be c-commanded by an
intervener. This is obviously only possible in languages that do not front wh-phrases. Korean is a
language that leaves its wh-phrases in-situ which means that intervention effects can easily be con-
structed. Consider again the Korean example below. The question word nuku-luˆl is c-commanded
by the intervener man which makes the whole question ungrammatical.6 A corresponding LF to
(10) is given in (11).
(10) *Minsu-man
Minsu-only
nuku-luˆl
who-Acc
po-ass-ni?
see-Past-Q
(Korean)
‘Who did only Minsu see?’ (Beck, 2006, p.1)
(11) [Qi ... [ ⇠ C [...whi...]]...]
Multiple wh-questions. In those languages that allow multiple wh-questions, it is also possible to
elicit intervention effects. The prerequisite is that one of the wh-phrases must stay in-situ so that
an intervener can be inserted. German is a language that allows multiple questions. However, if an
intervener is inserted between the two question words, the whole structure gets ungrammatical, as
illustrated in the example below.
(12) *Wen
whom
hat
has
niemand
nobody
wo
where
gesehen?
seen
(German)
‘Where did nobody see whom?’ (Beck, 2006, p.4)
(13) [Qi ... [ ⇠ C [...whi...]]...]
5The relevant meaning rules are provided in the appendix.
6For further evidence for this claim, see Beck 2006, p.3, ex.(2)
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Alternative Questions. A more adventurous route to take is to use alternative questions as a
means to elicit intervention effects. As observed by Beck & Kim (2006), the question in (14)
is ambiguous between a polar question reading and an alternative question reading, i.e. possible
answers to the former are “Yes/No” whereas the alternative question can be answered by naming
one of the alternatives.
(14) Does John like Mary or Susan?
Interestingly, as soon as an intervener is inserted, the alternative question reading vanishes and
only the polar question reading remains (Beck & Kim 2006), as illustated in (15). The way this
phenomenon is explained is by asuming that the “intervener prevents association of the disjunctive
phrase with a licensing interrogative complementizer” (Beck & Kim 2006, p.167):
(15) #Does only John like Mary or Susan? [*AltQ] (Beck & Kim 2006, p.167)
Empirically, it is an advantage that the disjunction stays in-situ as this means that there is a dis-
tance between Q and the disjunction. A focus-sensitive item like only can thus be inserted as an
intervener as shown in the intervention configuration below:
(16) [Qi...[⇠ C [NP ori NP]]]
ScopeMarking Structures. A fourth option is to use scope marking structures to test for interven-
tion effects. Dayal (1994) describes scope marking structures as instances of an expletive wh-item
extending the scope of a second meaningful wh-item. (17) shows an example of a scope marking
structure, (18) shows an extraction structure. Both examples are taken from Dayal (1994):
(17) Was
what
glaubst
think
du,
you
mit
with
wem
whom
Maria
Maria
gesprochen
spoken
hat?
has
‘Who do you think Maria has spoken to?’ (Dayal 1994, p.137)
(18) Mit
with
wem
whom
glaubst
think
du,
you
dass
that
Maria
Maria
gesprochen
spoken
hat?
has
‘Who do you think Maria has spoken to?’ (Dayal 1994, p.137)
Scope marking constructions give us exactly what we need in order to test for intervention effects:
a wh-item which can be c-commanded by an intervener because it has not been moved to the front.
Interestingly, Dayal also mentions so-called “sequential scope marking” of the form in (19)
and states that these sequential questions should also be regarded as scope marking constructions
because “they have a wh-expression that seems to be semantically inert and a wh that can be
construed as taking scope outside its syntactic domain” (Dayal 2000, p.171).
(19) What do you think? Who will Mary see?7 (Dayal 2000, p.171)
7There are a few reasons to believe that sequential questions are in fact not instances of scope marking: The
question ”What do you think?” could simply be an invitation to state your opinion. Secondly, in scope marking con-
structions as in (17), the order of the ”subquestions” cannot be changed but the order can be changed in (19). Thirdly,
it is fine to say in German: ”Was glaubt er, mit wemMaria gesprochen hat?” but according to Susan Rothstein’s native
speaker intuitions it is weird to say ”What does he think? Who will Mary see?”.
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To summarise the main argument of this section, consider the table in (20):
(20)
Type of construction: Possible candidate for testing intervention effects:
Simple wh-question X
Multiple wh-question X
Alternative question X
Scope marking structure X
Theoretically speaking, intervention effects in Palestinian Arabic could be found in any of these
question types. However, sometimes it is impossible to elicit the relevant data for a language due
to syntactic constraints, i.e. because multiple questions do not exist in that language or because
wh-phrases are obligatorily fronted. This is an interesting challenge and will be addressed in the
next section.
2 Data
In section 2.1, I will try to convince the reader that only alternative questions and scope marking
structures lend themselves to the elicitation of intervention effects in PA. I will then also introduce
focus, which is another necessary ingredient on our way to intervention effects. Section 2.2 then
provides data on intervention effects which will be discussed in section 2.3. Throughout all elic-
itations I used the guidelines discussed in Matthewson (2004), which means that my informants
were asked to do either translation tasks or judgement tasks.
2.1 Prerequisites
According to the Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics (A.L.L.), “Palestinian Arabic
is a native language to approximately 8.5 million people” (Shahin, 2011). It is a Semitic language
and belongs to the Afro-Asiatic language family (McCarus, Encyclopedia of A.L.L) Further, PA is
a pro-drop language and has an SVO word order as shown below, taken from Braun (2016): 8
8There is some debate in the literature as to what the word order in Palestinian Arabic is. I follow Shlonsky 1997
and McLoughlin 1982 in assuming an SVO word order because my participants only accepted this word order as the
declarative structure. VSO order was judged to be a question by my participants.
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Translation Task:
‘Samira writes a book’
(21) samiira
Samira
b-ti-ktib
IMP-FEM-write
ktaab.
book
‘Samira writes a book.’ 9
Surface Structure:
TP
NP
Samira 2
T’
T
btikitb1
VP
NP
t2
V’
V
t1
NP
ktaab
As shown in Braun (2016), when forming a polar question, the verb is moved into the head of C:
(22) b-ti-ktib
IMP-FEM-write
samiira
Samira
ktaab?
book
‘Does Samira write a book?’10
In order to form a simple wh-question, the question word needs to be fronted, as shown in Braun
(2016) and repeated below: A surface structure of the simple wh-question ’What is the teacher
doing?’ can be seen in (24) and the corresponding translation task is given in (23).
(23) Translation Task: ‘What is the teacher doing?’
shu
what
b-t-3mal
IMP-FEM-do
al-mu3lm-e?
the-teacher-FEM?
‘What is the teacher doing?’
(24) [CP [NP shu3 ][C’ [C bt3mal1 ] [TP [DP al-mu3lme2 ][T’ [T t1 ][VP [NP t2 ][V’ [V t1
][NP t3 ]]]]]]]
These data show that simple wh-questions cannot be used to test for intervention because the
question word is obligatorily fronted in PA. Another standard way to test for intervention effects is
to use multiple questions. However, this option is also ruled out as illustrated in (25), taken from
Braun (2016).
9For the tree structure: cf. Mohammad, 2000, p. 83; Shlonsky, 1997, p. 7f, where he assumes movement of the
verb from the head of V to some functional projection and then an additional movement of the subject to the head of
GP.
10The corresponding surface structure is:
[CP [; ] [C’ [C btiktib1 ] [TP [NP Samira 2 ][T’ [T t1 ][VP [NP t2 ][V’ [V t1 ][NP ktaab ]]]]]]]
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(25) Some of your friends (Anna, Polina and Alex) have moved to a different city and you lost
track which of your friends now lives in which city. You’ve got another friend who knows
where your friends live. You talk about Anna, Polina and Alex and then ask your friend:
Judgement Task:
a. *miin
who
bu-skun
IMP-live
ween?
where?
‘Who lives where?’
b. ween
where
bu-skun
IMP-live
kul
every
waaHad?
one?
‘Where does everyone live?’
My informants uniformly rejected multiple questions which leads me to conclude that multiple
questions are in fact ungrammatical in PA and thus do not lend themselves to test for intervention
effects. Alternative questions, on the other hand, do exist. The corresponding data are presented in
(26) and taken from Braun (2016).
(26) We went for a walk in the woods and it was very cold. We finally get back home and I ask
you:
a. bitHab
like(2.Ps.Sg.MASC)
qaHwe
coffee
’au
or
shaai?
tea?
‘Would you like coffee or tea?’
! PolQ
possible answers are: yes / no
b. bitHab
like(2.Ps.Sg.MASC)
qaHwe
coffee
willa
or
shaai?
tea?
‘Would you like coffee or tea?’
! AltQ
possible answers are: coffee / tea
The lexicon of PA contains two different disjunctive items, namely willa and ’au. While willa is
reserved for alternative questions, ’au can be used in polar questions as well as in declaratives.
This distribution of the two disjunctive items was also argued for in Winans (2013, 2015) for
Egyptian Arabic. Importantly, this means that alternative questions are valid candidates to test for
intervention effects.
Lastly, scope marking constructions do seem to exist in PA, too. The relevant data are given in
(27) and (28).
(27) shu
what
raijak,
opinion-your(MASC)
ma3
with
miin
who
Hakat
spoke
marijam?
Mariam
‘Who do you think that Mariam spoke to?’
(28) shu
what
fikrat
thought
monA
Mona
ween
where
raiH
went
3li?
Ali
‘What did Mona think where Ali went?’
All of the data from Palestinian Arabic are summarised in the table in (29).
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(29)
Type of construction: Possible candidate for testing intervention effects:
Simple wh-question ⇥
Multiple wh-question ⇥
Alternative question X
Scope marking structure X
As explained above, there is another important ingredient of intervention effects, namely focus.
The way that the ungrammaticality of intervention effects as in (10) or (12) is compositionally
calculated is by assuming that ”wh-phrases and focus make use of the same interpretational mech-
anism, and because of that, focus interferes with a wh-phrase in situ.” (Beck & Kim 2006, p.175)
There are three different focus-sensitive items in PA; namely bas (only), kamaan (also/too) and
Hataa (even). These three items can combine with focused phrases. And example of this is given
in (30), taken from Braun (2016).
(30) Salim, Ahmad and Mohammad are in a bookstore. All three of them looked at books, but
in the end...
Translation Task: ‘Only Salim[F ] bought a book.’ (and no one else did so.)
bas
only
saliim
salim
’ishtaraa
bought(3.Ps.Sg.M.)
ktaab.
book
‘Only Salim bought a book.’
2.2 Intervention effects
Firstly, I will present an intervention effect in an alternative question, taken from Braun (2016).
In a second step, I will present a small study on intervention effects in scope marking constructions.
Alternative questions. As usual, the informants were confronted with a context and asked to
judge the target sentence with regard to this context. Consider the example below:
(31) Mahmud is a very nice person and he enjoys eating and drinking. He is not picky when it
comes to food or drinks, so he also eats food that other people might find disgusting. Last
week, you(the participant) hosted a party and you offered tea and maqlubi (an Arabic rice
dish). One of those two things was very disgusting but you cannot remember which one
(you did not feel well on that night, this is why you cannot remember it.) You do know,
however, that Mahmud was the only guest that consumed the disgusting thing. You want
to host another party next week and you want to make sure that the disgusting thing will
not be offered again. You want to find out what only Mahmud ate because if you know
that, then you will know what was disgusting thing.
You ask:
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Judgement Tasks:
Intervention in AltQ with bas as intervener:11
a. *bas
only
maHmuud
Mahmud
’akal
ate(3.Ps.Sg.MASC)
maqluubi
maqlubi
walla
or
shirib
drank(3.Ps.Sg.MASC)
shaay?
tea?
‘Did only Mahmud eat maqlubi or drink tea?’
No intervention in AltQ:
b. ’akal
ate(3.Ps.Sg.MASC)
maHmuud
Mahmud
maqluubi
maqlubi
walla
or
shirib
drank(3.Ps.Sg.MASC)
shaay?
tea?
‘Did Mahmud eat maqlubi or drink tea?’
No intervention in PolQ with bas:
c. bas
only
maHmud
Mahmud
’akal
ate(3.Ps.Sg.MASC)
maqluubi?
maqlubi?
‘Did only Mahmud eat maqlubi?’
The corresponding LF to (31-a) is provided below:
(32) AltQ: *[Q [⇠ C bas maHmuudF [’akal maqlubi walla shirib shaay]]]
Scope marking constructions. As mentioned before, I then designed a small study: I used mini-
mal pairs, namely a scope marking structure without an intervener and the corresponding sentence
with an intervener. These sentences were of course accompanied by different contexts that made
the respective readings reasonable. An illustration of the experiment design is given in (33).
The target sentences were presented in Palestinian Arabic and the informants had to judge
whether these target sentences were natural or not. In order to have an objective means to write
down the judgements, I came up with a novel method which I will call the smiley method: as judge-
ment tasks involve a certain ”linguistic feeling” on the side of the informant, I asked the informants
to colour the smiley that they connected to the feeling they had when reading the target sentence.
An example of such a judgement is given in (34).
(33)
Scope marking without intervener: Scope marking with intervener:
(1a) shu fikrat Mona, ween raaH 3lii?
what thought Mona where went Ali
‘What did Mona think where Ali went?’
(1b) shu fikrat bas Mona, ween raaH 3lii?
what thought only Mona where went Ali
‘What did only Mona think where Ali went?’
11I would like to thank Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine for pointing out that it would be useful to elicit a simpler
version of this intervention configuration where only one verb is used, i.e. “Did only Mahmud drink coffee or tea?”.
Unfortunately, I have not been able to elicit this yet.
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Scope marking without intervener: Scope marking with intervener:
(2a) shu bitfakir samira, miin baas jooz-ha?
what thinks samira who kissed husband-her
‘What does S. think who her husband kissed?’
(2b) shu bitfakir bas samira, miin baas jooz-ha?
what thinks only samira who kissed husband-her
‘What does only S. think who her husband kissed?’
(3a) shu bitfakir susan, ma3 miin zaid
what thinks Susan with who Zaid
Tulla3 jitmashaa al-jaum?
went.outside to-walk today
‘What does S. think with who Z. went outside
for a walk today?’
(3b) shu bitfakir bas Mona, ma3 miin zaid
what thinks only Mona with who Zaid
Tulla3 jitmashaa al-jaum?
went.outside to-walk today
‘What does only M. think with who Z. went outside
for a walk today?’
(4a) shu bitfakir immha, ma3 miin Hakat
what thinks her-mother with who spoke
maram?
Maram
‘What does her mother think with who Maram
spoke?’
(4b) shu bitfakir bas bint chaalti, ma3 miin Hakat
what thinks only her-cousin with who spoke
maram?
Maram
‘What does only her cousin think with who Maram
spoke?’
(5a) shu bitfakir shams ay hadiye a3Taa 3mar
what thinks Shams which present gave Omar
liay Tifl?
to-which child
‘What does Shams think, which present Omar gave
to which child?’
(no 5b) – too difficult to construct
(34)
2.3 Results and discussion of the data
As indicated in (31), there was a visible difference of judgements for the alternative question with
and without an intervener. While (31-b) and (31-c) were absolutely acceptable for my informants,
the meaning of (31-a) seemed to be less clear. As is common in semantic field work, I only inter-
preted the judgements and comments of the informants as either pointing towards the grammati-
cality of the target sentence or towards its ungrammaticality. However, I believe that this notion of
grammaticality as a binary phenomenon should be dismissed (cf. Featherston 2007, 2008), simply
because a clear binary distinction of judgements is not empirically founded.
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In the follow-up study on scope marking constructions, I tried to give the informants a choice
between different judgements by using the smiley method mentioned above. I only had three infor-
mants, two of which were raised bilingually. The results provided in (35) and (36) might, however,
still show a tendency:
(35)
(36)
There seemed to be a rather clear effect for informant A - the monolingual Arabic speaker
represented by the black bars. He judged all of the scope marking sentences without an intervener
as fully acceptable whereas the corresponding sentences with an intervener were judged worse.
Informant B and C were the German, Arabic bilinguals. One could assume that they were influ-
enced by their German intuitions. However, they very clearly commented on the scope marking
constructions with an intervener that ”bas”/only should be left out. Comments included ”to use
bas here is really weird”, ”bas needs to be deleted”, ”everything is fine but we do not need the
bas”. So even though informant B and C did not give the same judgements as informant A, they
did comment on the inappropriateness of bas. It seems, however, that the results are not as strong
as expected by Beck’s theory (2006). All of the scope marking constructions with an intervener
should be absoultely uninterpretable. This is clearly not what I could find.
2.4 Outlook
It would be worthwhile to conduct a quantitative study with a less crude judgement scale and
with more informants. Ideally, those participants should not be bilinguals in order to exclude
transfer from any language other than Arabic. On top of that, in any future work on scope marking
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constructions in PA, it should be checked again whether scope marking sentences do in fact exist
in PA or whether they are cases of sequential questions as discussed in section 1.2.12
It would not be surprising to find that intervention effects are less strong than predicted by semantic
explanations. Beck’s (2006) theory of intervention predicts a total breakdown of compositional
interpretation, however, we do more or less understand what is meant in such intervention cases,
as the results in section 2.3 show. Thus, to think of intervention effects as cases that distinguish
grammatical structures from ungrammatical structures (because they have an intervener) might be
too strong of a claim. However, I do not want to deny that there certainly is a visible effect of
intervention. I believe that grammaticality is best presented by thinking of a scale that includes
different levels of acceptable and unacceptable structures as indicated in (37).
(37)
The way that I understand intervention effects is the following: the semantic calculation might
derive an uninterpretable structure as discussed in Beck (2006). However, the fact that the syn-
tax still sounds acceptable leads informants to judge the sentences as weird or downgraded but
not necessarily as ungrammatical, as mention in the previous section. One consequence of this
assumption would be that semantic factors of a sentence are more subtle than syntactic proper-
ties and that judgements on syntactic ungrammaticality are stronger than judgements on semantic
properties. Evidence for this is the fact that my informants very clearly rejected multiple questions
(which is a syntactic judgement) in PA. I believe it would be very enriching for semantic fieldwork
to stop thinking about grammaticality as a binary phenomenon and to start assuming that there are
different levels of grammaticality.
12Thanks to Lior Laks from the Bar Ilan University, Israel who pointed that out to me.
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Appendix
(1) (2)
Focus:
If ↵ =  Fi, then for any g,h:J↵Kg = J KgJ↵Kg,h = h(i) if i is in the domain of h,J↵ Kg otherwise
⇠ operator (unselective) :
If ↵ = [⇠ C ], then for any g,h:J↵Kg is only defined if
g(C) ✓ {J Kg,h| h is a total distinguished
variable assignment}.
Then, J↵Kg = J KgJ↵Kg,h = J Kg,;
(3) (4)
question operator Q (selective):
If ↵ = [Qi ], then for any g,h:J↵Kg = {J Kg,;[x/i]|x 2 D}J↵Kg,h = {J Kg,h[x/i]|x 2 D}
JonlyKg =
 C<<s,t>,t>. p<s,t>. w. p(w) = 1. 8q [q
2 C & q 6= p! q(w) = 0]
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Probing the ignorance of Epistemic Indefinites: A (non)-Familiarity
constraint1
Rahul Balusu — EFLU, Hyderabad
Abstract. Epistemic Indefinites (EI), with an added ‘ignorance’ component not seen with ordinary
indefinites, are licensed in broadly two contexts. In one, there is ignorance of the witness of the
existential claim among a plurality of referents in the domain. In the other, the witness of the
existential claim can be identified, but there is ignorance about certain aspects of this witness. The
first context is analysed as domain widening of some sort (Alonso-Ovalle and Menendez-Benito
2003, et seq). The second context is analysed as domain shifting (Aloni & Port 2010), with two
identification methods at play, one required for knowledge (the ignorance component) and one used
for specifying of the EI. Available identification schemes are naming, description, & ostension. We
focus on the second context, and show that the Telugu EI eed-oo/evar-oo (which-DISJ/who-DISJ)
‘some-thing/body’ can be used even when the speaker has access to all 3 methods of identification,
which should not be possible going by the domain shifting account. We propose a solution along
the lines that if the speaker has recognized the person, evar-oo/eed-oo cannot be used. Similar
to the familiarity theory of definiteness with discourse referents (Karttunen 1976) and ‘file cards’
(Heim 1983), we formalise this notion using mental referents and mental files (Recanati 2013,
2016).
1 Introduction
An Epistemic Indefinite (EI) has an added ‘ignorance’ component that is not present with an ordi-
nary indefinite, as shown in (1)-(2).
(1) a. oka
one/a
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi
fell
‘A book fell down.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).felldown(x)
b. eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi
fell
‘Some book fell down.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).felldown(x)
Modal component: The speaker does not know which book fell down.
(2) a. uma
Uma
naa-ku
I-DAT
oka
one
pustakamu
book
iccindi
gave
‘Uma gave me a book.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).give(Uma, x,me)
1We would like to thank the audience of TripleA 4, Gothenburg, 2017 for comments and discussion.
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b. uma
Uma
naa-ku
I-DAT
eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
iccindi
gave
‘Uma gave me some book.’
Existential component: 9x.book(x).give(Uma, x,me)
Modal component: The speaker does not know which book Uma gave.
The question that comes up in this context is what counts as ignorance. How much can you
know and still use eed-oo? What licenses some in English? When can you absolutely not use
eed-oo? What anti-licenses some? The other question is how to encode the ignorance. What is
the source? Is it pragmatic, an implicature, or is it conventionalized, part of the meaning, or is it
domain widening, or is it domain shifting?
EIs are common cross-linguistically. As Haspelmath (1997) notes, they involve a “(lack of)
knowledge of the speaker” and he also says that this phenomenon “has received very little attention
in the theoretical literature.” In fact, they were first noticed by Strawson (1974) who says “that the
choice of some rather than a embodies what might be called an acknowledgement or recognition
of the fact that the identification supplied, though perhaps the best the speaker can do, might be
regarded as inadequate to the circumstances of the case; and that the kind of identification which the
choice of some rather than a indicates or suggests inability to provide (though perhaps sometimes
accompanied by indifference to or unconcern about) may be either further kind-identification
or individual identification.” (Strawson 1974: 92). He illustrates with the example given in (3).
(3) Some V.I.P/cabinet minister/general has been shot.
Epistemic indefinites have been examined cross-linguistically in mostly Romance, Germanic and
Slavic languages: English singular some (Becker 1999; Farkas 2002; Weir 2012), German irgen-
dein (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Aloni 2007; Lauer 2010; Port 2010; Aloni and Port 2013,
Chierchia 2013), Spanish algu´n (Alonso-Ovalle & Mene´ndez-Benito 2003, 2008, 2010, 2011),
Greek kapjos (Giannakidou and Quer 2013), French quelque (Jayez and Tovena 2007, 2013),
Italian (un) qualche (Zamparelli 2007; Aloni and Port 2013; Chierchia 2013), Romanian vreun
(Farkas 2002, 2006, Fa˘la˘us¸ 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014), Russian -to series & -nibud series (Geist
2008), Czech -si indefinites (Simı´k 2016), Slovak vola- and si- series (Richtarcikova 2013), Sin-
hala wh-da & wh-hari (Slade 2011), and the Japanese wh- ka indeterminates (Sudo 2010; Kaneko
2011; Alonso-Ovalle and Shimoyama 2014). They differ from each other in the environments li-
censed –they are sensitive to different types of knowledge. Here we will examine the Telugu EI
eed-oo/evar-oo ‘what-DISJ/who-DISJ’ paired with singular NPs.
EIs vary in their properties. Some EIs don’t mind reinforcement, whereas others do. Some EIs
don’t mind cancellation, others do. Telugu eed-oo doesn’t like cancellation, as shown in (4).
(4) a. oka
one/a
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
adi
that
naa
my
diary
diary
‘A book fell down. It is my diary.’
b. eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
#adi
that
naa
my
diary
diary
‘Some book fell down. It is my diary.’
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Telugu eed-oo also doesn’t like being reinforced, as shown in (5).
(5) a. oka
one/a
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
adi
that
eed-oo
which-DISJ
naa-ku
I-to
teliyadu
know-not
‘A book fell down. I don’t know which one it is.’
b. eed-oo
which-DISJ
pustakamu
book
kinda
down
paDindi.
fell
#adi
that
eed-oo
which-DISJ
naa-ku
I-to
teliyadu
know-not
‘Some book fell down. I don’t know which one it is.’
This is in line with the generalisation in the literature that the more ‘specialized’ the morphologi-
cally, the more pronounced the ignorance effect.
In this paper we first examine the proposals for explaining the ignorance component in the
literature, and show how they fail with the Telugu data in §2, before attempting a formalization of
our own proposal for the Telugu indefinites, in §3.
2 What is the Speaker ignorant of?
Epistemic indefinites are licensed in broadly two contexts. In one, there is ignorance of the witness
of the existential claim among a plurality of referents in the domain. In the other, the witness of
the existential claim can be identified, but there is ignorance about certain aspects of this witness.
2.1 Case 1: Multiple referents
The speaker doesn’t know who or what the witness of the existential claim is:
(6) a. Context: Speaker is sitting with 3 others on a sofa. When he/she bends down to tie
shoelaces, one of the others pulls his/her hair. The speaker doesn’t see who.
b. (mii-loo)
you-in
evar-oo
who-DISJ
naa
my
juTTu
hair
laageeru
pulled
‘Someone (among you) pulled my hair.’
This can be captured using von Fintel’s formulation for some (that he adapted from Dayal’s what-
ever) –variation of the individuals satisfying the existential claim across the speaker’s epistemic
worlds.
(7) a. LF: some (P) (Q)
b. 9w0, w00 2 Dw [{x : P (w0)(x)&Q(w0)(x)} 6={x : P (w00)(x)&Q(w00)(x)}] (Dw is the
set of worlds compatible with the speaker‘s evidence in w)
This is also captured in an implicature approach (Alonso-Ovalle and Mene´ndez-Benito (AO-MB)
2003, 2008, 2010, 2011a; Chierchia 2006, 2013; Fa˘la˘s¸ 2009, 2011a,b, 2014) by saying that the EI
is a domain widener: The domain of existential quantification is maximal. Domain widening is
costly. It signals that alternative, more specific, smaller domains are false, lead to false claims. We
can illustrate with an example: Let’s say the 3 others sitting on the sofa are A, B, C. Then we get
the implicatures and their exhaustification as shown in (8).
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(8) a. In all accessible worlds, Someone among A, B, C pulled the Speaker’s hair.
b. Alternatives/Competitors:
In all accessible worlds, Someone among A, B pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among A, C pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among C, B pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among A pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among B pulled the Speaker’s hair.
In all accessible worlds, Someone among C pulled the Speaker’s hair.
But suppose there is only partial variation, and not all the alternatives are live, as shown in (9b).
Here Uma does not know where Ravi is, but not all rooms are epistemic possibilities. This is not
total variation or ignorance, only partial variation or ignorance.
(9) a. Context: Ravi and Uma are playing hide-and-seek. Uma knows that Ravi is hiding in
the house and she knows that he is not in the bedrooms, but he could be in any of the
others:
b. Ravi
Ravi
eed-oo
which-DISJ
room-loo
room-in
unnaaDu.
is
‘Ravi is in some room.’
AO-MB model this partial variation scenario as an anti-singleton constraint, as shown in (10):
(10) a. JalgunK =  f. Phe,ti : |f(P)|   1 . Qhe,ti 9x[f(P)(x) & Q(x)]
b. Domain (P) = {bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, study, dining room, living room}
c. f(P) = {bathroom, kitchen, study, dining, living}
d. In all accessible worlds, Ravi is in a room in Bath, Kitchen, Study, Dining.
e. Alternatives/Competitors:
In all accessible worlds, Ravi is in a room in Bath.
In all accessible worlds, Ravi is in a room in Kitchen. Etc.
f. All the alternatives are False.
2.2 Case 2: Single referent
In these cases, the speaker can identify the witness of the existential claim, by ostension, for
example, as shown in (11a).
(11) a. Context: At the conference dinner, the speaker is pointing out to his/her friend a
delegate who has climbed onto the table and is singing:
b. A: evar-oo
who-DISJ
delegate
delegate
table
table
ekki
climbed
paaDutunnaaru
singing
A: ‘Some delegate is singing climbing onto the table.’
c. B: evaru? ‘who’ A (pointing): atanu ‘that person’
The use of a demonstrative, a rigid designator, picks out the same individual across the speaker’s
epistemic worlds. There is going to be no variation, the variation condition is not met, as shown in
(12). But evar-oo is good here. So this analysis won’t work.
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(12) 9w0, w00 2 Dw [{x : P (w0)(x)&Q(w0)(x)}={x : P (w00)(x)&Q(w00)(x)}]
Should the variation condition be scrapped? A Lewisian ontology could save the variation condi-
tion (AO&MB), as shown in (13a).
(13) a. Individuals exist in only one world (the real one). Cross-world identity is modelled
via counterpart relations. Counterpart relations are similarity relations. For x to be a
counterpart of y, x and y have to be substantially similar, along a certain dimension.
b. 9w0, w00 2 Dw [{x : P (w0)(x)&Q(w0)(x)}6⌘{x : P (w00)(x)&Q(w00)(x)}]
⌘ is the counterpart relation that the context demands.
For example, if ostension is the counterpart relation that is available, but if the context demands
naming as the counterpart relation, the EI can be used felicitously.
Aloni & Port (2010, 2013) base their analysis on such a contextually determined ‘identifica-
tion’ condition, implemented in a dynamic semantics framework: “On the one hand, the indefinite
is used specifically. Traditionally, this means that the speaker has someone in mind, that is, she can
identify the referent of the indefinite. On the other hand, the use of an EI conveys that the speaker
does not know who the referent is, that is, she cannot identify the referent of the indefinite.” (Aloni
& Port 2015 p.129). As they say “two identification methods are at play here: the speaker can
identify on one method (for example by description) but not on another (for example naming)”
and the “referents of EIs are typically identified via a method different from the one contextually
required for knowledge.” Finally, “the notion of a Contextual Cover-shift is the technical counter-
part of this intuition.” For example, the “typical situation in which EIs are used is one in which the
speaker can identify the referent by description, but not by name. Another quite typical situation
is one in which she can identify by name, but not by ostension.” This is shown in (14).
(14) a. I have to meet some professor. He is the Head-of-Dept. But I don’t know his name.
Speaker-can-identify! Description, Contextually-required! Naming
b. I have to meet some professor. His name is Noam Chomsky. But I don’t know what
he looks like.
Speaker-can-identify! Naming, Contextually-required! Ostension
c. Some professor is singing on the table. Over there in the corner.
Speaker-can-identify! Ostension, Contextually-required! Naming
German: Good; Italian: Bad
The contrast between German and Italian motivates their ranking, as shown in (15):
(15) a. Ostension   Naming   Description
b. In Romance, but not in Germanic, the identification method required for knowledge
must be higher in order than the identification method required for specific uses of
EIs
So if a referent is identified by ostension, then EIs should be infelicitous in Romance, but not
in Germanic.
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2.3 The problem of the Telugu EI
The properties we know about EIs are that the EI is relativized to an epistemic modal base which
always obeys variation (and uniformity on one dimension): either the speaker doesn’t know who
the witness is among many others –a plurality of potential referents; or the speaker knows the
witness by one method of identification, but not by some other(s). An analysis to cover both
properties would say that variation is caused by indeterminacy of the existential claim: variation
of individuals yields non-constant reference; and variation of properties that lead to individuation
which are less fine-grained than getting all the way down to the individual yield a single referent but
varying on some dimension. The identification schemes that are in play are Naming, Description,
and Ostension.
But these Identification Schemes fail for the Telugu EI. Consider the example shown in (16),
where the Speaker has access to all three methods of identification, and yet use the EI.
(16) a. Context: Speaker can read the name-tag (with name and affiliation) of the person
standing on the table and singing:
b. Ravi
Ravi
Sen,
Sen,
HoD,
HoD,
EFLU
EFLU
ani
said
zevar-oo
who-DISJ
professor
professor
table
table
ekki
climbed
paaDutunnaaDu
singing
‘Some Professor called Ravi Sen, HOD, EFLU, is singing on the table.’
How can the EI be used if Naming, Description, Ostension are all available to the Speaker?
On the other hand, there are context where the Speaker cannot use the EI eed-oo/evar-oo, even
if there is an Identification Scheme that the speaker does not have access to, as shown in (17).
(17) a. Context: Speaker sees his next-door neighbor (of whom he knows nothing, except
that he lives next door) slip and fall on the road:
b. #evar-oo
who-DISJ
jaari
slipped
paDDaaru
fell
‘Somebody slipped and fell.’
In the above context the Speaker is more ignorant of the witness to the existential claim than in the
previous context where the Speaker knew the name and description. So there is more variation,
more possible worlds compatible with the speaker’s epistemic state in the above example than in
the previous example. Yet the example is bad. No variation story can save this situation. If the
Speaker has recognized the person, he cannot use the EI. But what does ‘recognized’ mean? How
do we formalize it?
3 Mental referents
Our proposal is that the Identification Scheme at work here is familiarity. We formalize it in the
following way. We already know Discourse Referents, going back to Karttunen, and Heim (1983)
and the familiarity theory of definiteness: A definite is used to refer to something that is already
familiar at the current stage of the conversation. An indefinite is used to introduce a new referent.
Karttunen reformulates the familiarity theory using the notion of “discourse reference”. A definite
NP must pick an already familiar discourse referent, whereas an indefinite NP always introduces a
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new discourse referent. An NP may have a discourse referent even when it has no referent. Heim
(1983) identifies Karttunen’s discourse referents with “file cards”, as shown in (18).
(18) A woman was bitten by a dog. (b) She hit it. (c) It jumped over a fence
3.1 Recognitional files, Mental Referents, and Mental Files
In our analysis we will make use of Recanati’s Mental Files (2013, 2016): To have a singular
thought about an object, a subject must have a mental file that refers to the object. To have a mental
file, the subject must be acquainted with its referent. Acquaintance is a relation through which a
subject receives information from an object –An Epistemically Rewarding (ER) relation. Mental
files are typed by acquaintance relations. Each file-type M is associated with an acquaintance
relation RM such that the referent of a file-token m of type M is the unique object o to which the
subject stands in the RM relation. The referent of a mental file is the dominant source of, rather
than the object that best satisfies, the (mis)information contained in the file. Thus mental files have
a non-descriptive semantics and so they are the mental analogues of referring terms.
Most mental files exist only as long as the relation they exploit contextually holds —demon-
strative files: “ when a demonstrative mode of presentation comes out of existence because the
demonstrative relation on which it is based no longer holds, another relation comes to hold, in
virtue of which I remember the object.”: memory demonstrative file Through our memories of
the object, we can focus our attention on it even after the perceptual encounter has ended. The
memory demonstrative itself is converted into a recognitional demonstrative file when the object
is re-encountered. Multiple exposure to that object then creates and maintains in the subject a dis-
position to recognize that object, via a stable recognitional file. The relation to the object is now
‘familiarity’. Our claim is that recognitional file anti-licenses eed-oo.
The recognitional file doesn’t have to contain perceptual information (visual, auditory, etc), it
can just be some ‘handle’ on that entity/individual, as shown in (19):
(19) a. Context: You’ve been telling your mother about a new friend youmade at work/university,
called Ravi. She doesn’t know how this Ravi looks like or sounds like. Ravi calls you
at home and your mother answers. If she makes the connection with the recognitional
file she has opened for Ravi then,
nii-koosam
you-for
(#evar-oo)
who-DISJ
Ravi
Ravi
phone
phone
ceeseeDu
made
‘Ravi has phoned for you.’
b. Context: If she doesn’t make the connection to the recognitional file:
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nii-koosam
you-for
Ravi
Ravi
ani
said
evar-oo
who-DISJ
phone
phone
ceeseeDu
made
‘Somebody called Ravi has phoned for you.’
3.2 Recognitional files: Human vs. others
Both eed-oo & some are sensitive to whether the referent is human or not, as shown in (20).
(20) a. Some professor is dancing on the table.
b. ??Some monkey is dancing on the table.
Weir (2012) takes recourse to the ‘anti-singleton’ constraint of Alonso-Ovalle & Menendez-
Benito (2010) to explain the contrast in examples like those in (21) and (22).
(21) a. ??Some statue is in the middle of the square. [looking at it]
b. ??I saw some building on my way through the desert.
c. ??There’s some letter in my mailbox [looking at it]
(22) a. Somebody is in the middle of the square. [looking at the person]
b. I saw someone on a camel on my way through the desert.
c. There’s somebody in my room. [looking at the person]
Weir (2012) states that “A speaker uses some NPthing to signal that she could not, if presented
with the extension of NP, reliably differentiate the witness of the existential claim from everything
else in the extension of NP. A speaker says some NPsub kind to signal that she cannot restrict to
a singleton the set of subkinds within the extension of NP to which the witness of the existential
claim belongs.”
We can here ask the question, why do humans go down to the level of individuals, and non-
humans to the kind/sub-kind level? We suggest that it is because that’s how we cognitively ‘parse’
them and ‘store’ them. Humans go down to the level of individuals. Non-humans stop at the
sub-kind/species level, as illustrated in the examples in (refsoup.
(23) a. naa
my
soup-loo
soup-in
eed-oo
what-DISJ
purugu
insect
undi
is
‘There’s some insect in my soup.’
b. ??naa
my
soup-loo
soup-in
eed-oo
what-DISJ
ciima
ant
undi
is
Intended: ‘There’s some ant in my soup.’
c. naa
my
soup-loo
soup-in
(oka)
(one)
ciima
ant
undi
is
‘There’s an ant in my soup.’
d. swimming
swimming
pool-loo
pool-in
evar-oo
who-DISJ
unnaaru
is
‘There’s someone in the swimming pool.’
The individual vs. sub-kind difference that eed-oo is sensitive to tracks the individual vs. sub-kind
86
© 2018 by Rahul Balusu
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 79-90
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
difference in recognitional files for humans vs. non-humans. Some non-humans like books, dogs,
pets, can go down to the individual level. On the other hand some humans can stop at the sub-kind
level like policemen, watchmen, soldiers, etc (people in uniform).
3.2.1 Kind files
We can capture this difference by using the distinction of natural-kind concepts: A variety of
recognitional files whose content is not an individual object. We can then posit that humans have
individual recognitional files, whereas non-humans have natural-kind recognitional files
(24) a. (i) I saw a camel on the way here.
(ii) #I saw some camel on the way here.
b. (i) I saw a man on a unicycle on the way here.
(ii) I saw some man on a unicycle on the way here.
c. (i) There is some plant growing out of the wall of my room (Weir 2012).
(ii) I saw some appliance/gadget on the kitchen table this morning.
This is similar to the type vs. token distinction in Japanese (Alonso-Ovalle & Shimoyama
2014), where dore-ka is for tokens and nani-ka is for types.
3.3 Recognitional Files: Celebrities
But in certain contexts, like with heads-of-state and celebrities, eed-oo is anti-licensed even where
there does not seem to be a recognitional file, as shown in (25a).
(25) a. Context: You are watching a news channel. They are telecasting live from the UN.
Suddenly there are gun-shots and commotion. The ticker flashes that the President
of Peru has been shot. You say to your friend:
Peru
Peru
President-ni
President-ACC
shoot
shoot
ceeseeru
did
‘Peru’s President is shot.’
b. Context: You are watching a news channel. The news is about a shooting in a school.
America
America
school-loo
school-in
John
John
Smith
Smith
anee
said
evar-oo
who-disj
student-ni
student-acc
shoot
shoot
ceeseeru
did
‘Some student called John Smith in a school in America was shot.’
So does this mean that celebrities or V.I.Ps are more easily familiar than non-celebrities? It
could also be that the notion of familiarity with a celebrity is suitably calibrated to the distance
that celebrities keep from ordinary folk, or some relative metric like that. Another possibility is
that these are actually Kind recognitional files and not Individual recognitional files. It could also
be that we expect hearers also to be familiar with them, taking hearers into the computation of the
notion of familiarity.
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3.4 Some doesn’t care for recognitional files
English some can be used for an entity that the speaker has a recognitional file for, as shown in
(26).
(26) a. Ravi is someone that I know from childhood.
b. This curry is something I’ve eaten since childhood.
This is of course not possible with eed-oo/evar-oo, as shown in (27).
(27) #Ravi
Ravi
naa-ku
me-to
evar-oo
who-DISJ
baagaa
very-well
telisinavaaDu
known-guy
Intended: ‘Ravi is someone that I know very well.’
So eed-oo/evar-oo and some split ways here. While recognitional files anti-license eed-oo/evar-oo,
they don’t anti-license some.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we saw clear evidence for an Indentification Scheme beyond Naming, Description,
Ostension to capture the distribution of the Telugu EI eed-oo —Familiarity. We made an initial
attempt at grounding this identification scheme in the notion of mental recognitional files of var-
ious kinds, with humans being sensitive to Individual recognitional files and non-humans being
sensitive to Kind recognitional files.
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Egophoric attitudes and questions
in Kathmandu Newar1
Stephen Wechsler — The University of Texas
David Hargreaves — Western Oregon University
Abstract. Kathmandu Newar (Sino-Tibetan) has an egophoric verb marking system: an egophoric
(or conjunct) verb form co-occurs with first person in declaratives and second person in inter-
rogatives. Egophoric marking is restricted to predicates of intentional action and also interacts
with evidential markers. This paper examines the distribution of egophoric marking in reports of
speech and attitudes, extending to this domain the analysis of egophoric marking as indicating
self-ascription by the epistemic authority for the utterance. This distribution reveals that egophoric
marking of a clause further introduces an implication that the epistemic authority believes the
proposition denoted by the clause.
1 Introduction
In egophoric verb marking systems, a special form of the verb called the egophoric (or conjunct)
form is found in first person statements and second person questions, while the non-egophoric, (or
disjunct) form appears elsewhere. Such a system is found in the Tibeto-Burman language Newar
(Nepal Bhasa) spoken primarily in the Kathmandu Valley. The characteristic interrogative flip
pattern of Newar is illustrated with the past tense forms of the verb meaning ‘go’ shown in Table
1. The egophoric form wan-a bears a special suffix and also neutralizes the perfective/imperfective
distinction found on the non-egophoric forms.
declarative interrogative
1st person wan-a wã: / wan-a
2nd person wã: / wan-a wan-a
3rd person wã: / wan-a wã: / wan-a
Table 1: Finite past forms of Newar ‘to go’. The non-egophoric forms distinguish perfective from
imperfective. The macron indicates vowel quality: a = low central vowel; a = low back vowel.
The egophoric verb form is glossed EGO in the following examples (from Hargreaves 2005, ex.
(51) to (56)):
(1) a. jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PST.EGO
‘I drank a lot.’
1We would like to thank our Newar consultants Rajendra Man Shrestha, Yogendra Rajkarnikar and Daya Shakya;
Elizabeth Coppock, for her helpful feedback on the analysis; and the audience at the Triple A conference for their
comments.
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b. jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-PFV.NON.EGOQ
la.
‘Did I drink a lot?’
(2) a. chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PFV.NON.EGO
‘You drank a lot.’
b. chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-PST.EGOQ
la.
‘Did you drink a lot?’
(Glosses below are simplified to EGO and NON.EGO, omitting any indication of the tense/aspect.
All such examples are in the past tense.). EGO marking also interacts with evidentiality, as we shall
see below. In previous work we have sought to specify the semantics of the EGO marker (Harg-
reaves, 2005, in press; Wechsler, in press; Coppock & Wechsler, to appear). This paper continues
that project, focusing now on evidence from the use of EGO in subordinate clauses expressing the
contents of speech and attitude reports.
Following that earlier work, we posit that the EGO morpheme signals that the proposition de-
noted by its clause is the content of an attitude one has about oneself, called a de se attitude or
a self-ascription (Lewis, 1979a). The role of the participant in the utterance context who self-
ascribes that content is called the epistemic authority: roughly the speaker uttering a declarative
and the addressee hearing a question, modulo the systematic effects of evidential markers. When
the EGO morpheme marks a subordinate clause in Newar, we find that the self-ascriber of that
clause’s content must be the reported epistemic authority, and not the root authority. For exam-
ple, in reports of attitudes, coreference with the reported attitude-holder (Ram in (3)) determines
EGO-marking in the subordinate clause:
(3) a. Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
cal-a.
be.aware-PFV.
‘Rami realized (lit. became aware) that hei￿∗j had done enough work.’
b. Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yat-a
do-NON.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
cal-a.
be.aware-PFV.
‘Rami realized (lit. became aware) that he∗i￿j had done enough work.’
With EGO on the subordinate verb, its subject is coreferential with the matrix subject; with NON.EGO
it is not. Interestingly, if the attitude verb in a sentence like (3a) is negated (‘Ram didn’t real-
ize. . . ’), the EGO marking in the subordinate clause disappears, even if the subjects are coreferen-
tial (see Section 3).
Next we review the distribution of Newar EGO marking in main clauses (Section 2) and em-
bedded clauses (Section 3), followed in Section 4 by a summary of formal analysis in Coppock &
Wechsler (to appear). Then we modify the formal analysis to account for new data from clausal
complements (Section 5).
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2 Semantic properties of Newar EGO-marking
As shown above, first person declarative clauses are typically EGO marked. However, when certain
evidential words appear, first person subjects can cooccur with the NON.EGO form of the verb.
(4) jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-NON.EGO
khanisa.
EVID
‘It appears I drank a lot.’
Sentence (4) would be appropriate if the speaker doesn’t remember drinking, perhaps because
heavy drinking wiped away any memory of the event. Without EGO, the evidential source for
the information expressed in the utterance is understood to be indirect or inferential. In contrast,
the EGO form is used, as in (1a), by a speaker who remembers carrying out the action described.
Conversely, evidential marking can also enable an EGO-marked verb to cooccur with a third person
subject, if the individual denoted by the subject is understood as the source of the report:
(5) a. syam-ã
Syam-ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
hã
EVID
‘According to Syami, hei drank a lot.’
b. wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-NON.EGO
hã
EVID
‘It is said that he drank a lot.’
In sentence (5a) with EGO marking, Syam is understood as the source of the report. But in (5b)
without EGO, the source is understood to be hearsay originating from someone other than a partic-
ipant in the event.
Summarizing so far, the subject of an EGO-marked verb is the (epistemic) authority for the
utterance (Hargreaves, in press; Hale, 1980).2 In declarative sentences the authority is typically the
speaker, in which case the subject is in first person. But authority can be deferred in evidentials,
leading to third person uses. In interrogatives, the authority is the addressee of the utterance, so
the subject is in second person.
EGO appears only in descriptions of intentional actions. With a first person subject, the verb
thwan in EGO form indicates intentional kicking, but in NON.EGO form it indicates accidental
bumping:
(6) a. jı˜:
1.ERG
wa-yata
3-DAT
thwan-a.
kick-EGO
‘I kicked him/her [intentionally].’
2Other terms for notions equivalent or closely related to epistemic authority include: commitment holder (Krifka,
2014), informant (Bickel, 2008), epistemic source (Hargreaves 2005), seat of knowledge (Speas & Tenny, 2003),
locutionary actor (Hale, 1980), locutor (Aikhenvald, 2004), and judge (McCready, 2007).
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b. jı˜:
1.ERG
wa-yata
3-DAT
thwan-a.
kick-NON.EGO
‘I bumped against him/her [by accident].’
Inherently non-intentional predicates like thyan- ‘arrive’ and thul- ‘understand’ never take the EGO
form. Still others, like the verb twan- ‘drink’ in example (1) and (2) above, indicate intentional
action by default, hence take EGO form, but this default can be overridden with modification by
macaeka ‘unwittingly’, in which case the NON.EGO form is used.
As noted in the introduction, the EGO morpheme signals the content of a de se attitude held
by the epistemic authority. In other words, the epistemic authority knowingly self-ascribes that
content. This property of EGO marking is best shown with subordinate clause uses. Consider the
following scenario: Syam is looking at a photo from a wild party in which someone is wearing a
lampshade on his head. Syam points at the besotted partier and says to you, ‘That guy drank too
much’; unbeknownst to Syam, it is himself in the picture. This scenario can be reported with the
English sentence (7a), but not with the controlled infinitive in (7b):
(7) a. Syami said that hei drank too much. (need not be de se)
b. #Syami claimed PROi to have drunk too much. (de se only)
The Newar sentence (8) is syntactically like the English (7a), but semantically like (7b):
(8) #Syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
Like the English control construction, (8) cannot describe the scenario above: the EGO marking
forces the interpretation in which Syam knowingly self-referred.
We take this de se-ness to be a fundamental semantic property of EGO morphology. From this
fundamental property, together with certain general assumptions about conversational pragmatics,
we will derive the restriction to first person in root declaratives (unless deferred using evidentials)
and second person in root interrogatives.
3 Egophoricity in embedded clauses
In the clausal complements of speech and attitude verbs, EGO-marking is determined by the re-
ported authority rather than the root authority for the utterance. In reports of statements, first of
all, coreference with the reported speaker determines EGO-marking in the embedded clause:
(9) a. syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
b. syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-NON.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hej drank too much.’
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The reported speaker is the epistemic authority for the embedded declarative clause.
In reports of questions, coreference with the reported addressee determines EGO-marking in
the embedded clause:
(10) Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
wa-yata
3SG.DAT
[wã:
3SG.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
/
/
yat-a
do-NON.EGO
dhaka]
COMP
nyan-a.
ask-PFV
‘Ram asked himi whether hei￿j (EGO/NON.EGO) did enough work.’
The reported addressee is the epistemic authority for the indirect question.
Finally, in reports of de se attitudes, coreference with the reported attitude-holder determines
EGO-marking in the subordinate clause. This is shown in example (3) above. The reported attitude-
holder is the epistemic authority for the embedded clause.
Summarizing, the subject of an EGO-marked verb in a complement clause must refer to the
reported epistemic authority. Assuming, as we will later, that the authority is a parameter of
the context, then the behavior of EGO-marking in embedded clauses indicates a kind of indexical
shift, where the authority index has shifted to the embedded context. A similar authority shift
has been observed for many evidential systems (Korotkova, 2016). To get a proper understanding
of embedded egophoricity in Newar, we should consider further that negated attitude verbs reject
EGO-complements:
(11) Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
cal-a.
be.aware-PFV
‘Rami became aware (realized) that hei￿∗j had done enough work.’
(12) *Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-ca:.
NEG-aware.IPV
‘Rami wasn’t aware that hei￿j had done enough work.’
In (11) EGO-marking on a verb in the complement clause indicates that the subject of the EGO-
marked verb refers to the reported bearer of the attitude (Ram), as usual. But in (12), where the
attitude verb has been negated, we find that the embedded verb cannot take the EGO form even if
its subject is coreferential with the attitude bearer.
The badness of (12) can be explained as follows. The verb ca- ‘be aware’ is factive, so the
content of the complement clause is presupposed. We posit that when a clause is EGO-marked, its
content includes the information that the authority believed it at reference time. But that directly
conflicts with (12), so the sentence is bad.
We will say that EGO-clauses must be authorized: the authority in the context should believe
the proposition denoted by the clause. We explore some further consequences of that claim below.
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4 Formal analysis
4.1 Overview
To capture the semantics of an attitude de se, Coppock &Wechsler (to appear) posited a perspecti-
val agent parameter as a refinement on semantic content. The content of a statement, for example,
is not a set of worlds but rather a set of world-agent pairs, or centered worlds (Quine, 1969; Lewis,
1979a). EGO-marking on a verb identifies its subject with that agent parameter. When a sentence
is uttered, the authority in the utterance context, whose commitment to the centered world proposi-
tion is at issue, effectively centers those worlds on herself, thus self-identifying as the perspectival
agent. As explained below, the semantic content interacts with the pragmatic theory to predict the
person restrictions on the subjects of declaratives and interrogatives, as well as the exceptions due
to the deferring of the authority by means of evidential words.
In this paper we address EGO-marking in complement clauses. Like Coppock & Wechsler (to
appear) we assume that the Kaplanian context has a parameter for the authority. For EGO-marking
in complements of speech/attitude verbs, the authority parameter shifts to the reported authority.
We further posit that EGO-marking projects a belief by the authority in the centered proposition
denoted by the clause. The latter assumption effectively explicates the notion of authority.
4.2 EGO marks self-ascribed content
Coppock & Wechsler (to appear) use a logical representation language that they call Egophoric
Logic (EL). The extension of an expression of EL is relative to a model M , an assignment g, a
Kaplanian context of utterance c, and an intensional index i. The Kaplanian context c is a tuple
of the standard parameters for the speaker spc, addressee adc, time of utterance tc, and location of
utterance lc— plus an authority parameter auc:
c = ￿spc, adc, tc, lc, auc￿
The intensional index i for a sentence contains parameters for worlds wi and agents ai:
i = ￿wi, ai￿
(We will add aui and ti later.) So the extension depends on an agent a, which serves as the perspec-
tival center. This idea derives from the idea of centered worlds (Quine, 1969; Lewis, 1979a), and
has been implemented similarly for the analysis of obligatory control by Anand & Nevins (2004)
and Pearson (2012), among others, and for the analysis of evidentials by Korotkova (2016).
We define the extension of an EL expression   relative to modelM , context c, variable assign-
ment g, and intensional index i, and write it as follows: J KM,g,c,i. The centered intension of  
is a function from agent-world pairs to extensions, shown in (13a); the uncentered intension is a
function from worlds to extensions, shown in (13b).
(13) a. J KM,g,c¢ = f ∶ f(￿a,w￿) = J KM,g,c,￿a,w￿
b. J KM,g,c,a$ = f ∶ f(w) = J KM,g,c,￿a,w￿
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So the centered intension of a sentence (wrt. a given M , g and c) will be a centered worlds propo-
sition, and the ordinary/uncentered intension of a sentence (wrt. a given M , g, c and a) will be an
ordinary possible worlds proposition.
With these tools, we can define an egophor as a form that picks out the agent at perspectival
center. We designate the constant SELF as an egophor in EL. The extension of this expression with
respect to agent a is a, shown in (14a). By way of contrast, the constant for a first person indexical
is shown in (14b):
(14) a. JSELFKM,g,c,i = ai (egophor)
b. JIKM,g,c,i = spc (1st person indexical)
Using these constants, the first person pronoun jı˜: translates into EL as I:
(15) EL translation for Newari first person singular pronoun
jı˜: ￿ I
The EGO marker is a partial identity function on predicates that takes a predicate P and returns a
predicate that holds of x if P holds of x and is defined if x is SELF, the perspectival center.
(16) EL translation for Newari conjunct marker
a ￿  Pet . x .P (x) ∧ @(x = SELF)
Here @ can be read ‘partial’; it yields undefinedness when the formula in its scope is not true
(Beaver, 2001; Beaver & Krahmer, 2001). Assuming an appropriate translation for ‘drank a lot’,
and appropriate composition rules (Function Application, etc.), the translation for jı˜: a:pwa twan-a
‘I drank-EGO a lot’ will then be as follows:
(17) jı˜: a:pwa twan-a￿ DRANK-ALOT(I) ∧ @(SELF = I)
The centered intension of the formula in (17) with respect to context c is a function that picks out
the set of centered worlds ￿a,w￿ such that a = spc and a drank a lot in w. This proposition is
something that can serve as the object of an attitude de se, following Lewis (1979a).
4.3 Updating the discourse context with centered worlds propositions
We treat speech acts, including assertions and questions, as updates on discourse contexts (Lewis,
1979b; Ginzburg, 1996; Roberts, 1996; Farkas & Bruce, 2010, i.a.). In an assertion, the centered
intension of the clause corresponding to the at-issue content will be what the authority of the
context becomes committed to. If participant x is committed to a set of centered worlds P , then
for all centered worlds ￿a,w￿ in P , x publicly commits to the belief that he or she may be a in w.
But it cannot be this de se belief that the addressee acquires in communication: if Syam ex-
presses his de se attitude by saying to Mary, ‘I drank a lot’, then Mary does not come to believe
that she (Mary) drank a lot. So centered worlds propositions do not directly update the the com-
mon ground. Instead the centered proposition is uncentered with the authority, and the resulting
ordinary (uncentered) proposition enters the common ground.
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We implement this idea with a discourse model that tracks the individual commitments of the
discourse participants, namely a variant of Farkas & Bruce (2010), adapted slightly for use with
centered worlds propositions. Each participant is associated with a set of Discourse commitments,
which are sets of centered worlds. We also have a Table, following Farkas and Bruce, which is
a stack of questions under discussion (QUD’s). We assume that these questions under discus-
sion are sets of centered worlds propositions. The Common Ground on the other hand is a set of
non-centered, ordinary possible worlds. We also adopt from Farkas and Bruce a notion of a Pro-
jected Set, which is a set of projected future common grounds corresponding to different ways of
resolving the issue on the table.
Speech acts are operations that update such contexts. If   is asserted in context c, then the
centered intension of   is added to auc’s discourse commitments. The singleton set containing
the centered intension of  , {J KM,g,c¢ }, is placed on the Table. And finally, a common ground is
projected in the Projected Set which integrates the authority-uncentered intension of  , J KM,g,c,auc$ .
This is an ordinary possible worlds proposition that is obtained by saturating the perspectival center
parameter with the authority of the context. So when the proposal is accepted, the other discourse
participants need not acquire a de se attitude to the centered worlds proposition.
Let us consider some examples of assertions. In (18), repeated from (1) above, EGO-marking
indicates that the proposition expressed is centered around the subject, and since the subject is a
first person pronoun, it is centered on the speaker. So all pairs ￿a,w￿ in the centered intension are
such that a = spc. The speaker is the authority, who commits to this centered intension, and no
problems will arise when we put the authority-uncentered version in the common ground.
(18) jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PAST.EGO
‘I drank-EGO a lot’
In (19) the centered intension is centered around the addressee:
(19) *chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PAST.EGO
‘You drank-EGO a lot.’
But the authority is still the speaker, so this is problematic. The speaker probably does not want
to self-ascribe being the addressee, and furthermore, the authority-uncentered version will be a
contradictory proposition, the empty set.
The authority of the context auc is usually but not always the speaker, as Faller 2006 and Mur-
ray 2010, i.a., have emphasized in connection with evidentials, so it is not always the speaker that
becomes committed to the centered intension of  . In the case of reportative evidential marking,
we propose that the source of the information being reported be considered the authority of the
context auc. This individual, rather than the speaker, is committed to the content of the clause.
Since evidential marking is used to indicate that the authority is someone other than the speaker,
we predict that there should not be egophoric marking on the verb in the presence of evidential
marking with a first person subject.
98
© 2018 by Stephen Wechsler and David Hargreaves
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 91-105
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
5 EGO-marked clauses must be authorized
In section 3 we saw that the subject of an EGO-marked verb in a complement clause is the reported
epistemic authority: in reports of declaratives, the reported speaker; in reports of interrogatives,
the reported addressee; and in reports of attitudes, the reported attitude holder. And we saw in (12)
that negated attitude verbs reject EGO-marked complements. To account for this fact, we stipulate
that EGO-clauses must be authorized: the authority in the context should believe the proposition
denoted by the clause.
To formalize the authorization requirement, we first define a doxastic accessibility relationRdox: ￿a,w￿ stands in Rdox to ￿a′, w′￿ iff it is compatible with what a believes in w for a to be a′
in w′. We will say that an agent a believes P in world w according to M iff for ￿a′, w′￿ such that￿a,w￿ Rdox￿a′, w′￿: P(￿a′, w′￿) = T.
The believes relation is used to define a new logical constant AUTHORIZED in EL:
(20) JAUTHORIZEDKM,g,c,i = f ∶ f(P) = T iff auc believes P in wi at tc according to M .
Now let us revise our EL translation for EGO:
(21) -a ￿  Pet . x .P (x) ∧ @(x = SELF ∧ AUTHORIZED(ˆ P (x)))
Whereˆ is a Montagovian ‘hat’ operator giving the centered intension: Jˆ  KM,c,g,￿w,a￿ = J KM,c,g¢
Next we will consider how authorization works in root clauses, before turning to embedded clauses
in the next section.
In a simple declarative, EGO indicates that the speaker believes herself to be the individual
denoted by the subject, and believes de se the proposition denoted by the clause. Example (1) is
repeated here:
(22) jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
‘I drank-EGO a lot’
Due to the condition of authorization imposed by the EGO marker, an utterance of (22) implies that
the speaker (qua authority) believes herself to be the speaker (qua referent of the subject jı˜: ‘I’) and
to have drunk a lot. If a second person pronoun replaces the subject of (22) but the verb remains in
EGO form, then the sentence implies that the speaker believes herself to be the addressee. Hence
such a sentence is unacceptable, as shown in (19).
When evidentials defer authority to a third party then that third person subject must authorize
the clause:
(23) syam-ã
Syam-ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
hã.
EVID
‘According to Syami, hei drank a lot.’
Here authority is conferred upon Syam. The use of the EGO form implies that the authority (Syam)
believes himself to have drunk a lot.
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We saw that in root questions with second person subjects, EGO-marking is required:
(24) chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
la?
Q
‘Did you drink-EGO a lot?’
Let us assume that the meaning of a polar question is the set containing the propositions denoted
by the prejacent and its negation (Hamblin, 1958; Karttunen, 1977).
J? KM,g,c¢ = {J KM,g,c¢ , J¬ KM,g,c¢ }
For the question to be answerable, the addressee should believe some proposition in that set. So
our new generalization is that EGO-marking on a clause denoting a set ⇡ of propositions indicates
that the authority believes some proposition in ⇡.
(25) Revised definition of AUTHORIZED:JAUTHORIZEDKM,g,c,i = f ∶ f(⇡) = T iff there is a P ∈ ⇡ such that auc believes P in wi
according to M .
The translation of EGO into EL remains the same; it is given in (21) above.
With this new definition of AUTHORIZED, the EGO marker in (24) now implies that the author-
ity for an utterance of that sentence, namely the addressee since it is a question, believes either the
prejacent or its negation. So the addressee believes either that she is the addressee (qua referent
of the subject chã ‘you’) and that she drank a lot, or that she is the addressee and that she did not
drink a lot. In other words, it implies that the addressee could answer the question sincerely.
We cannot replace the subject with a first person pronoun and keep the EGO marking:
(26) *jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
la?
Q
‘Did I drink-EGO a lot?’
Here the authorization requirement means that the addressee (qua authority) believes herself to be
the speaker (qua referent of the subject pronoun). The addressee does not believe herself to be the
speaker so the sentence is out.
A rhetorical question expresses an assertion, so the speaker, not the addressee, is the authority.
As a result, EGO marking behaves as if the sentence were a declarative:
(27) Ji
I.ABS
ana
there
wan-a
go-EGO
la?
Q
‘Did I go there? (I most certainly did not!)’ (Hale, 1980, p. 100)
The EGO form means that the speaker believes herself to be the referent of the subject pronoun,
and to have either gone there or not.
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6 Analysis of egophoricity in embedded clauses
For clausal complements of speech and attitude predicates, the authority in the context shifts to the
reported authority in the attitude/speech event described in the matrix clause. Shifting is nearly
obligatory (an exception is discussed below):
(28) a. *laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
jı˜:
1.ERG
gakka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
siu:.
know.IMPV
‘Laxmi knew that I worked enough.’
b. laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
jı˜:
1.ERG
gakka
enough
jya
work
yat-a
do-NON.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
siu:.
know.IMPV
‘Laxmi knew that I worked enough.’
The EGO marker is not possible in (28a), despite the first person subject of that verb. While the root
authority is speaker in the utterance, hence the referent of that first person subject, the authority
has shifted to the reported authority, namely Laksmi.
Following previous accounts of the shifting of person indexicals (Anand & Nevins, 2004, i.a.)
and shifting of the epistemic authority for the interpretation of evidentials (Korotkova, 2016), we
posit that the authority and time contextual parameters auc and tc are replaced with corresponding
parameters of the intensional index. The utterance context is a tuple of parameters for the speaker,
addressee, time of utterance, location of utterance, and authority:
c = ￿spc, adc, tc, lc, auc￿
Our intensional index previously had world and perspectival agent parameters, to which we now
add parameters for the authority and time:
i = ￿wi, ai, aui, ti￿
The interpretation of most sentences of Newar will not depend upon aui or ti. But speech and
attitude reports will depend upon those parameters. The authority parameter aui is fixed to be
the reported speaker or attitude bearer, and the time ti is the time of the reported speech event or
attitude.
A special shifting operator OP is defined for EL:
(29) JOP  KM,g,c,i = J KM,g,c[au￿aui,t￿ti],i
When OP combines with a constituent  , it overwrites the authority and time parameters of the
utterance context with the authority and time values of the intensional index, for the interpretation
of  . The operator OP is a ‘monster’ in the sense of Kaplan (1977): it operates on the character of
the item in its scope, the function from contexts to contents.
This monstrous operator is encoded by the Newari complementizer dhaka, whose EL transla-
tion is given here:
(30) dhaka: ￿ OP
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The complementizer dhaka is a grammaticalized form of the verb dha- ‘to say’. As far as we know,
authority-shifted complement clauses in Newar are always marked with dhaka.
Consider first speech reports. When dhaka combines with the bracketed embedded clause in
(31), the authority for the interpretation of that bracketed clause is set to be the reported authority,
Syam; and the time is set at the time that Syam spoke:
(31) syam-ã
Syam-ERG
[wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a]
drink-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hei drank a lot.’
The translation of (31):
(32) SAYS(SYAM,OP([ˆ DRANK-ALOT(x)∧ @(x = SELF∧AUTHORIZED(ˆ DRANK-ALOT(SYAM)))]))
The effect of AUTHORIZED is to imply that what Syam said is not just that he drank a lot, but that
he believed he drank a lot.
Negating a speech report has no effect on the EGO-marking in the complement clause:
(33) Syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-PST.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-dha:.
NEG-say.IMPF
‘Syami didn’t say that hei drank a lot.’
Here Syam did not say that he believed himself to have drunk a lot. There is no contradiction in
(33).
However, negating an attitude verb is different:
(34) *Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-ca:.
NEG-aware.IPV
‘Rami wasn’t aware that hei￿j had done enough work.’
The effect of the AUTHORIZED condition, contributed by the EGO marker, is to imply that at
reference time, Ram believed himself to have done enough work. But (34) entails the opposite, so
the sentence is unacceptable due to a presupposition failure.
In indirect questions that are reports of direct questions, authority shifts to the reported ad-
dressee. So EGO-marking depends on whether the subject refers to the reported addressee, namely
the referent of the dative pronoun wa-yata ‘him’:
(35) Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
wa-yata
3SG.DAT
[wã:
3SG.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka]
COMP
nyan-a.
ask-PFV
‘Ram asked himi whether hei did enough work.’
As with a direct question, let us assume that an indirect question denotes the set of propositions cor-
responding to possible answers (Karttunen, 1977). Given our revised definition of AUTHORIZED
in (25), the EGO-marking on the verb in (35) indicates that at the time of the reported asking, the
authority either believes that he did enough work, or believes that he did not do enough work.
Indirect question complements of attitude verbs are similar:
102
© 2018 by Stephen Wechsler and David Hargreaves
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 91-105
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
(36) laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
[su-yata
who-DAT
dheba
money
biy-a-gu
give-EGO-NMLZ
dhaka:]
COMP
siu:.
know.IMPV
‘Laxmii knows who shei gave the money to.’
The denotation of the constituent question ‘who she gave the money to’ is a set of propositions of
the form ’she gave the money to x’, where x ranges over people. The use of the EGO form implies
that the reported authority (Laxmi) believes some proposition from that set, which is completely
consistent with the meaning of (36).
However, if the attitude verb is negated, then this implication is inconsistent with the meaning,
and so EGO-marking disappears from the indirect question.
(37) *Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka
COMP
(wã:)
3.ERG
ma-siu:.
NEG-know.IMPV
‘Rami doesn’t know whether hei￿j did enough work.’
The use of the EGO form implies that either (i) Ram believes he did enough work or (ii) Ram
believes he did not do enough work. In other words, it implies that Ram knows whether he did
enough work. But this presupposition directly contradicts the sentence itself, so it is unacceptable.
We noted above that shifting to the reported authority is nearly obligatory, citing (28a). But
there is at least one situation in which shifting is blocked, illustrated in (38).
(38) laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
jı˜:
1.ERG
gakka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-siu:.
NEG-know.IMPV
‘Laxmi didn’t know that I worked enough (but I know I did).’
The sentence (38) explicitly denies that Laxmi could be the authority for the complement clause.
So there is no shifting, and EGO is licensed instead by the root authority, the speaker. An utterance
of this sentence implies that the speaker believed herself to have done enough work. Here the
context has not shifted. Note that siu:, like English ‘know’, is a factive verb in Newar. Sentence
(38) implicates that the complement clause is true, so given the maxim of quality, the speaker who
utters this sentence implies that she believes she worked enough.
7 Conclusion
Following earlier work, we have analyzed EGO morphology as marking the content of a self-
ascription. We have further postulated that EGO-marking also indicates that the epistemic authority
believes de se a proposition in the denotation of the clause; when such propositions are centered,
then the authority self-identifies as the agent at the center. For complements of speech/attitude
verbs, the authority can (and normally does, unless blocked) shift to the authority of the reported
context.
We are modeling the epistemic authority as a parameter of the utterance context, thus assimi-
lating it to the more familiar elements of the context that are picked out by indexical expressions:
speaker, addressee, time, and place of utterance. The tools developed for shifted indexicals have
been repurposed for authority shifting. But the authority differs from those other parameters in an
important respect. The authority is not a special target for reference; there are no expressions of
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Newar that directly refer to the authority. Instead the authority is a component of the discourse
pragmatic system itself: the authority is the person whose commitment to a proposition is either
being made (as in an assertion) or being questioned. So it should not surprise us that shifting, while
relatively rare and generally optional for the more familiar indexicals, is nearly obligatory for the
authority. After all, the point of embedding a sentence under a speech or attitude predicate is to
shift responsibility for it to the reported agent.
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How do Degrees Enter the Grammar?
Language Change in Samoan from [-DSP] to [+DSP]1
Vera Hohaus — Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
Abstract. The paper presents the result of a diachronic corpus study on Samoan, tracing a recent
change in the setting of the Degree Semantics Parameter (Beck et al. 2009). We suggest that
an earlier stage, Samoan had a negative setting of said parameter. Appropriation of another scalar
concept then paved the way for the introduction of degrees into the grammar. Lexical and syntactic
re-analysis of the directional particle atu (‘forth, away’) result in a new parameter setting.
1 Introduction
Languages vary in the semantics of gradable predicates. This variation is captured in the Degree
Semantics Parameter in (1). In this paper, we argue that Samoan, a Polynesian language from the
Austronesian family has recently undergone a change from [-DSP] to [+DSP].
(1) DEGREE SEMANTICS PARAMETER [+/-DSP]:
A language {does/ does not} have gradable predicates (type hd, he, tii and related),
i.e. lexical items that introduce degree arguments.
(Beck et al. 2009, p. 19, no. (62))
The paper is structured as follows: The next section briefly reviews the semantics of compar-
ison under the two possible settings of the Degree Semantics parameter. Section 3 provides an
overview over the compositional semantics of comparison constructions in present-day Samoan
and reviews the evidence for [+DSP]. Section 4 shows that we have evidence for positing an early
stage of the language at which it was [-DSP]. We then go on to model this change in section 5.
Section 6 concludes with some general remarks about the nature of language change.
2 The Degree Semantics Parameter
In this section, we will briefly review the diagnostics for [+DSP] and sketch a semantics for the
comparative under both parameter settings. For more extensive discussion, see Beck et al. (2009),
Bochnak (2013), Bochnak & Bogal-Allbritten (2015), and Bowler (2016). For an introduction to
degree semantics, see Beck (2011).
1I am indebted to the more than fifty speakers of Samoan that have contributed to my research over the past years.
For comments and discussion, I would also like to thank Nadine Bade, Sigrid Beck, Remus Gergel, Verena Hehl,
Wanda Rothe, Malte Zimmermann, and the audiences at TripleA4 in Gothenburg and at FoDS2 in Saarbrücken. Zahra
Kolagar, Amrah Gadziev, Benjamin Ulmer and Alina Schumm have provided invaluable help with the corpus search. I
would also like to thank the staff at the archives of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Samoa-Apia, at the Macmillan
Brown Library at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch and at the New Zealand Glass Case special collection
at the University of Auckland library for their help in retrieving the materials for the corpus of 19th century Samoan.
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Functional degree morphology used in a variety of comparison constructions like English (2)
to (4) is indicative of a degree semantics. A differential comparative construction (DiffComp),
however, requires a degree-based analysis. Let us briefly explain why.
(2) a. C.J. is tallerc. (Contextual Comparative, ContextComp)
b. C.J. is four inches taller than Josh. (Differential Comparative, DiffComp)
c. C.J. is taller than 6ft. (Comparison with a Degree, DegComp)
(3) a. Sam is as tall as Leo. (Equative, Eq)
b. C.J. is the tallest. (Superlative, Sup)
(4) a. How tall is Josh? (Degree Question, DegQ)
b. Charlie is 5’8” tall. (Measure Construction, MeasC)
c. Leo is this tall, too. (Pronominal Measure Construction, PMeasC)
Under degree-based accounts, under which the lexical entry of a gradable adjective like English tall
is (5) (or related, see, e.g. Svenonius & Kennedy 2006), the analysis of the DiffComp is straight-
forward, as addition and subtraction of degrees are easily definable (see also Stechow 2008). A
sample lexical entry for a phrasal differential comparative operator inspired by Bhatt & Takahashi
(2011) is in (6). In (7), we sketch the interpretation of (2-b) using this operator.
(5) J tall [+DSP] K =  d. x. HEIGHT(x)   d (type hd, he, tii)
(6) J -er (phrasal, differential) K =
 d. y. Rhd,he,ti. x. MAX( d0. R(d0)(x) = 1)   MAX( d00. R(d00)(y) = 1) + d
(7) J [C.J. [[[-er 4 in] [than Josh]] tallhd,he,tii]] K= 1 iff J -er K(4 in)(J)(J tall K)(C.J.) = 1
iff MAX( d. HEIGHT(C.J.)   d)   MAX( d0. HEIGHT(J)   d0) + 4 in
‘The maximal degree d such that C.J. is d-tall exceeds
the maximal degree d0 such that Josh is d0-tall by at least four inches.’
Differential measure phrases are however well known to be problematic for vague predicate-
approaches in the spirit of Klein (1980), which do not employ degrees (see the discusson in Ste-
chow 1984a,b). A simplified degreeless lexical entry for a gradable adjective is in (8). With respect
to a contextually provided comparison class C (a set of individuals), the adjective partitions its do-
main into two sets, those considered tall and those who are considered not tall. We can then define
a phrasal comparative operator as in (9), which generates the interpretation in (10) for a simple
comparative.
(8) J tall [-DSP] KC =  x. x counts as tall with respect to C (type he, ti)
(9) J -er (phrasal) K =  y. Rhe,ti. x. R(x) = 1 & R(y) = 0
(10) J [C.J. [tall [-er [than Josh]]]] KC = 1 iff J tall KC(C.J.) = 1 & J tall KC(J) = 0
iff C.J. counts as tall with respect to C & J doesn’t count as tall in C
Considering the semantics for the comparative in (9) and the compositional interpretation in (10),
it is however unclear how to analyze the meaning contribution of a differential measure phrase.
Vague-predicate approaches are thus only suitable if a language lacks DiffComp.
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3 Comparison constructions in present-day Samoan
Crucially, present-day Samoan (PDS) has DiffComp and is [+DSP] (Hohaus 2010, 2012, 2015).
In the terminology of Stassen (1985)’s typology, the comparative construction in PDS is a particle
comparative that allows for ContextComp, DegComp, and DiffComp, as illustrated in (11) to (13).2
(11) E
TAM
umi
tall
atu
DIR.
Malia.
Mary
“Mary is taller.”
(ContextComp)
(12) E
TAM
umi
tall
atu
DIR.
Malia
Mary
i
PREP.
le
the
lima
five
futu.
foot
“Mary is taller than 5ft.”
(DegComp)
(13) E
TAM
umi
tall
atu
DIR.
Malia
Mary
i
PREP.
le
the
lua
two
inisi
inch
i
PREP.
lo
COMP.
lona
POSS.3.sg.
uso.
sister
“Mary is two inches taller than her sister.”
(DiffComp)
Outside of comparatives, the directional particle atu also combines with motion predicates like alu
(‘to go’) to indicate movement away from a contextually determined location like the starting point
of the event or the position of the speaker. An example is in (14).
(14) Ua
TAM(inch.)
alu
go
atu
DIR.
Sina.
Sina
‘Sina has just left.’
Villalta (2007) and Hohaus (2010, 2012, 2015) conclude from their analyses of data like (11)
to (13) that Samoan employs a degree semantics. Predicates like umi (‘tall’) are thus analyzed
like their English counterparts, see (15-a). We follow Hohaus (2015) in analyzing the particle
atu in comparatives (below referred to as comparison-atu, as opposed to motion-atu in (14)) as a
contextual comparative operator with an optional differential degree argument, as (15-b).3
(15) a. J umi (‘tall’) K =  d. x. HEIGHT(x)   d (type hd, he, tii)
b. J comparison-atu Kc =  Rhd,he,tii. x. MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1) > cJ comparison-atu (differential) Kc =  d. Rhd,he,tii. x. MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1)   c+ d
c. JMAXK =  Dhd,ti. ◆d [8d0 2 D : d   d0]
Under this analysis, the compositional interpretation of the contextual comparative in (11) proceeds
along the lines of (16), where the context provides some degree c as the comparison standard.
(16) J [Mary [tallhd,he,tii comparison-atu]] Kc = 1 iff
2Abbreviations used in glosses include COMP. = marker of comparison standard, CON. = connective, DEM. =
demonstrative, DIR. = directional particle, EMPH. = emphatic marker, FOC. = focus marker, inch. = inchoative, neg.
= sentential negation, pl. = plural, HUM. = prefix for counting humans, POSS. = possessive, PREP. = preposition, PRN.
= pronoun, sg. = singular, and TAM = tense-aspect marker.
3Under this analysis, the i lo-phrase in (13) is not an argument of the comparative operator but is treated as a frame
setter that indirectly manipulates the contextual standard of the comparison (see Hohaus 2015, pp. 118-127).
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[ Rhd,he,tii. [ x. MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1) > c]]( d. x. HEIGHT(x)   d)(M) = 1
iff MAX( d. HEIGHT(M)   d) > c
‘The maximal degree d such that Mary is d-tall
exceeds some contextually provided height degree.’
Even though Samoan employs a degree semantics under this analysis, it differs from other [+DSP]
languages like English in two respects, (i), the inventory of comparison constructions, and (ii), the
interpretation of the unmarked form of the gradable predicate.
The inventory of comparison constructions. Samoan lacks functional morphology for other
degree constructions like Eq and Sup and does not allow for DegQ, MeasC and PMeasC (Beck
et al. 2009; Villalta 2007; Hohaus 2010, 2012, 2015). Relevant examples are provided in (17) to
(18). See the references cited for grammatical alternatives to all these constructions without the
degree predicate.
(17) a. *E
TAM
umi
same(pl.)
tutusa
Mary
Malia
and
ma
John
Ioane.
(Intended:) ‘Mary is as tall as John.’
(*Eq)
b. *E
TAM
aupito
absence.of+next
umi
tall
Miriama.
Miriam
(Intended:) ‘Miriam is the tallest.’
(*Sup)
(18) a. *‘O
FOC.
le
the
a¯
what
umi
tall
Malia?
Mary?
(Intended:) ‘How tall is Mary?’
(*DegQ)
b. *E
TAM
umi
tall
Malia
Mary
le
PREP.
lima
the
futu.
five foot
(Intended:) ‘Mary is five foot tall.’
(*MeasC)
c. *E
TAM
umi
tall
foi
also
Malia
Mary
lea.
DEM.sg.
(Intended:) ‘Mary is this tall, too.’
(*PMeasC)
The interpretation of bare adjectives. Hohaus (2015, pp. 118-147) additionally reports varia-
tion in the interpretation of the morphologically unmarked (positive) form of the degree predicate.
Compare the judgments for English and Samoan in (19) and (20).
(19) a. Picture context: A picture displaying five very lean men and two obese men, John
and Joseph. It is clear that Joseph however weighs even more than John.
b. #E
TAM
puta
fat
Ioane. c.
John
E
TAM
puta
fat
Iosefo. d.
Joseph
{John / Joseph} is fat.
‘John is the fattest.’ ‘Joseph is the fattest.’
(20) a. Picture context: A photo of two basketball players, Mary (6ft) and John (6ft 2in).
b. #E
TAM
umi
tall
Malia. c.
Mary
E
TAM
umi
tall
Ioane. d.
John
{Mary / John} is tall.
‘Mary is the tallest.’ ‘John is the tallest.’
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Hohaus (2015) suggests to capture this variation by positing a covert operator for the positive
form in Samoan that is essentially a superlative, (21). The compositional interpretation of (20) is
sketched in (22). Crucially, under this analysis, Mary needs not be considered tall against some
standard of tallness derived from the comparison class, but her height is required to exceed that of
everyone else in the comparison class, which in this case is only John.
(21) JOp KC =  Rhd,he,tii. x. 8y [y 2 C & y 6= x
! MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1) > MAX( d0. R(d0)(y) = 1)]
(22) J[Mary [[tallhd,he,tii Op]]KC = 1 iffJOp KC( d. z. HEIGHT(z)   d)(M) = 1 iff
8y [y 2 C & y 6= M ! MAX( d. HEIGHT(M)   d) > MAX( d0. HEIGHT(y)   d0)]
‘For all individuals y in the contextually provided comparison setC butMary, the maximal
degree d such that Mary is d-tall exceeds the maximal degree d0 such that y is d0-tall.’
Further support for this analysis comes from the behavior of additives like fo‘i (‘also’). In the
context provided in (23), both Mary and Temukisa are quite tall. It is also true that Temukisa is
taller than Mary. Crucially, though, in PDS, I cannot follow up on such a comparison by saying
that Mary is tall, unlike in English.
(23) a. Context: Mary’s height: 185 centimeter, Temukisa’s height: 190 centimeter
b. E
TAM
umi
tall
atu
DIR.
Temukisa
Temukisa
i
PREP.
lo¯
COMP.
Malia.
Mary
#‘Ae
but
e
TAM
umi
tall
fo‘i
also
Malia.
Malia
‘Temukisa is taller than Mary. But Mary is also tall.’
Interim summary. To summarize this brief overview of the grammar of comparison in PDS: The
availability of a DiffComp provides evidence that Samoan is [+DSP] and has a degree semantics. In
terms of degree operators, we have argued that PDS has a contextual comparative operator, which
optionally takes a differential degree argument, and a covert superlative-like operator, which is
used in the interpretation of the positive form of the degree predicate. These key ingredients of the
grammar of comparison in PDS are summarized again below.
(24) The grammar of comparison in present-day Samoan:
a. parameter setting: [+DSP]J (gradable predicate) K 2 Dhd,he,tii
b. inventory of degree operators in functional lexicon:J comparison-atu Kc =  Rhd,he,tii. MAX( d0. R(d0)(x)) > cJ comparison-atu (differential) Kc =  d. Rhd,he,tii. x. MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1)   c+ dJOp KC =  Rhd,he,tii. x. 8y [y 2 C & y 6= x
! MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1) > MAX( d0. R(d0)(y) = 1)]
Both, the fact that PDS lacks any other comparison constructions apart from the particle compara-
tive and the fact that the particle atu may occur with degree as well as motion predicates, raise the
question whether this comparative construction and thus the [+DSP] setting are a recent innovation.
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4 Comparison constructions in Early Written Samoan
Data indicative of such a change in parameter setting come from three sources, early descriptions
of the language (section 4.2), synchronic variation in acceptability (section 4.3), and a quantitative
study on a corpus of written texts from the 19th century and on a corpus from the 21st century
(section 4.4). The next section provides some historical background on the language.
4.1 Historical background
The Samoan archipelago was settled approximately 3,500 years ago.4 The written record of the
islands however starts much later, in 1834, when missionaries from the London Missionary Soci-
ety develop a writing system for the language based on the Latin script. The first bible translation,
a dictionary and a brief grammatical description all were published in 1862 by George Pratt, fol-
lowed by a first wave of other publications on and in the Samoan language. We will focus here
on the period until the early 20th century, when the islands – as a result of the conflicting colo-
nialist interests of the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States (and much civil unrest) –
were partitioned into two protectorates, the Germany colony of Western Samoa and an American
protectorate. We will refer to the language in this period as Early Written Samoan (EWS).
4.2 Early grammars
Crucially, none of the philological descriptions of EWS mentions the particle comparative de-
scribed above (see also Stassen 1985, pp. 330-331). Neffgen (1903, pp. 7-8) even explicitly com-
ments on the unavailability of English-like comparison constructions: „Eine eigentliche Kompa-
ration kennt der Samoaner nicht. . . Mitunter gebraucht der Samoaner überhaupt keine Steigerung,
besonders dann, wenn keine Verwirrung oder Verwechslung entstehen kann.“5
EWS appears to have used a conjoined comparative construction, a hallmark of degreeless
languages. Funk (1893, p. 3) characterizes this construction as follows: „Bei der Komparation
wird das Eigenschaftswort nicht gesteigert, sondern es werden zur Bildung des Komparativs zwei
Adjektiva, von denen das eine das Gegenteil des anderen bedeutet, im Positiv zusammengestellt.“6
Pratt (1862, p. 8) writes: “Comparison is generally affected by using two adjectives, both in a
positive state not in itself, but in comparison with the other.” He provides the example in (25).
(25) E
TAM
lelei
good
lenei,
this
a
but
e
TAM
leaga
bad
lela.
that
‘This is good, but this is bad.’ (Pratt 1862, p. 8)
We conclude from this survey of the philological literature that EWS lacked the particle compara-
tive construction of PDS that provides a crucial diagnostic for categorizing Samoan as [+DSP].
4See A History of American Samoa (Honolulu: Bess Press, p. 21) by the Amerika Samoa Humanities Council.
5Translation: “The Samoan does not have a comparison proper. Frequently, the Samoan does not use any compar-
ison morphology, especially when no confusion or misinterpretation can occur.”
6Translation: “For a comparison, the adjective does not change. Instead, two adjectives of which one means the
opposite of the other are put together in the Positive.”
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The particle comparative is first mentioned in Holmer (1966, p. 27), who reports that “. . . it is
generally stated that the comparative degree in the Polynesian languages is expressed by placing
any of the local adverbs ake (‘up’) or atu (‘away, beyond’) after the adjective.” As a dispreferred
strategy, conjoined comparatives are however reported as late as Marsack (1975, p. 66), who pro-
vides the example in (26). The example is also relevant because it shows that in their bare, positive
form, predicates like laitiiti (‘small’) are not evaluative (in the sense of Rett (2015)), that is, they
do not make reference to an independent standard for size.
(26) a. Even in the case of giant vessels like the Queen Mary and the Aquitania this con-
struction would be used. To indicate that the 85,000-ton Queen Mary is bigger than
the 45,000-ton Aquitania, a Samoan of the old school would say:
b. ‘Ua
TAM(inch.)
tele¯
big
le
the
Queen
Queen
Mary,
Mary
‘ua
TAM(inch.)
la‘itiiti
small
le
the
Aquitania.
Aquitania
‘The Queen Mary is big, the Aquitania is small.’
Later grammatical descriptions do not mention the conjoined comparative anymore (Hunkin 1992,
Mosel & Hovdhaugen 1992, Mosel & So’o 1997), suggestion that it fell out of use.
4.3 Synchronic variation
If the particle comparative (and the loss of the conjoined comparative construction) is an innovation
that dates back no more than a century, we might expect to see this change reflected in synchronic
variation in acceptability when it comes to conjoined comparatives (see, e.g., Roberts & Roussou
2003, p. 236). And indeed, the construction is not consistently accepted by speakers of PDS. We
discuss two exemplary cases here, the acceptability judgments pertaining to (27) and (28).
In an informal questionnaire study with six speakers, the target sentence in (27) was judged
acceptable only by three speakers. One speaker rejects the sentence, while the remaining two find
it only maybe acceptable. One such participant suggests to use the particle comparative instead.
The example in (28) is an item from a questionnaire study with nine speakers, of which six found
the conjoined comparative acceptable in this context. Two participants judged the target sentence
unacceptable and one wasn’t sure as to its acceptability. The latter as well as a speaker who had
judged the conjoined comparative acceptable additionally expressed a preference for the particle
comparative in their comments.
(27) a. Context: The tallest family members I have are my aunt Sulu and my brother Alofa.
Both are quite tall. Sulu’s height is 6’2". Alofa is even 6’4" tall.
b. E
TAM
maualuga
high
Alofa,
Alofa
e
TAM
puupuu
small
Sulu.
Sulu
‘Alofa is tall, Sulu is small.’
(28) a. Picture context: A Lego family with two children, Mary who is indicated to be three
years of age and John who is indicated to be five years of age.
b. E
TAM
matua
old
Ioane
John
ae
but
laitiiti
young
Malia.
Mary
‘John is old, but Mary is young.‘
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We hypothesize that the observed variation in the acceptability of conjoined comparatives in PDS
is a result of language change from [-DSP] to [+DSP], a change that was triggered (as we will spell
out in section 5) by the introduction of the particle comparative. This change made the conjoined
comparative construction superfluous.
4.4 The corpus study
Under this hypothesis, the particle comparative is a recent innovation in the language. Given the
facts in PDS, it is conceivable that comparison-atu diachronically derived from motion-atu. The
available philological literature reviewed in section 4.2 plausibly suggest that EWS constitutes a
language stage at which the particle had not yet taken on this double duty, but was used only with
motion predicates. In this section, we report the results of a corpus study in which we compare the
frequency of comparison-atu in a corpus of EWS to its frequency in a corpus of PDS. The results
strongly suggest that EWS had not yet acquired comparison-atu.
Methodology. For the study, we constructed a corpus of Early Written Samoan from seven texts
published between 1849 and 1900. The only criteria for inclusion in the corpus were the publi-
cation date (as early as possible) and the accessibility of the text. Table 2 provides an overview
over the corpus. Note that four of the texts are translations into Samoan. In all those cases, second
language speakers of Samoan were in charge of the translations, but, judging from the reports of
several missionaries (see, e.g., Lundie Duncan 1846; Turner 1861, 1884), native speakers were
usually extensively involved in the preparation of the manuscript. In the absence of any other pub-
lications in the language from the mid-19th century, we felt that the inclusion of those texts in the
corpus was nevertheless warranted.
short reference description
Mataio (1849) Gospel of Matthew from a translation of the New Testament,published by the British and Foreign Bible Society in London
Kenese (1862) Book of Genesis from the first Bible translation,published by the British and Foreign Bible Society in London
Violette (1875) translation of a popular Germanreligious textbook by Ignaz Schuster
Pratt (1890) translation of popular fables by missionary George Pratt
Stübel (1896) collection of 111 short Samoan storiescollected between 1889 and 1891 by German diplomat Oscar W. Stübel
Fraser (1898) five Samoan stories and songs from the archives of missionary George Prattoriginally collected by missionary Thomas Powell
Sierich (1900) collection of Samoan stories by German lawyer F. Otto Sierich
Table 1: Corpus of Early Written Samoan
Unfortunately, comparatives are not a highly frequent construction. For English, Hohaus,
Tiemann & Beck (2014) find an average of approximately five comparatives per 1,000 utterances
in a corpus study of adult care giver speech. A low proportion of comparison-atu in the EWS
corpus can thus only be a meaningful indicator of language change if it is considerably lower
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than the frequency with which we find it in present-day Samoan. For purposes of comparison, we
therefore also constructed a corpus of PDS built from eight short books for children and young
adults, published between 2004 and 2017 (Salesa 2004, Wai 2012a,b, Carlie & Chu Ling-So‘o
2013, Wai 2014, Va‘afusuaga 2016). The corpus additionally included 854 posts from the online
edition of the Samoana section of the Samoan Observer7 and from the Samoa Times8 published
between December 2016 and October 2017. The posts included a large number of sermons (and
were thus close in genre to some of the texts in the EWS corpus).
We conducted a manual search of the EWS corpus for occurrences of atu, which were then
categorized for use as motion-atu, comparison-atu, or as unclear. Unclear cases comprise cases
of structural ambiguity in which the context did not allow us to decide between motion-atu and
comparison-atu as well as cases where the translation of the sentence was unclear. Within the PDS
corpus, we performed a computerized search of the news items and a manual search of books for
occurrences of atu, which were then again categorized according to the above classification.
Results and Statistical Analysis. Tables 2 and 3 report the results of the search on the respective
corpora. While there are no clear cases of comparison-atu in the EWS corpus among the more than
3,500 occurrences of the particle, comparison-atu accounts for 7.22 percent of the 2,007 hits in the
PDS corpus. An example of motion-atu from the EWS corpus is in (29). Examples of motion-atu
as well as comparison-atu from the PDS corpus are in (30) and (31).9 (See (34) below for an
example categorized as unclear.)
source # total # motion # comparison # unclear
Mataio(1849) 723 721 0 2
Kenese (1862) 821 820 0 1
Violette (1875) 1002 994 0 8
Pratt (1890) 155 155 0 0
Stübel (1896) 954 953 0 1
Fraser (1898) 0 0 0 0
Sierich (1900) 76 76 0 0
total 3,731 3,719 (99.68%) 0 (0.00%) 12 (0.32%)
Table 2: Results of search in the EWS corpus
source # total # motion # comparison # unclear
book publications 48 40 (83.33%) 8 (16.67%) 0 (0.00%)
newspaper items 1,959 1,809 (92.39%) 136 (6.95%) 13 (0.66%)
total 2,007 1,849 (92.13%) 144 (7.22%) 13 (0.65%)
Table 3: Results of search in the PDS corpus
7The Samoan Observers is an Apia-based newspaper with a daily print edition. Its online edition is available at
<http://www.samoaobserver.ws/>. Last accessed November 16, 2017.
8The Samoa Times is an Auckland-based weekly community newspaper whose online edition is available at
<http://www.samoatimes.co.nz/>. Last accessed November 16, 2017.
9The latter examples are from T. Aruna Loiani, “Olaga tausi aiga o le tina ia Ana,” Samoa Observer (July 24, 2017)
and V. Maiava & S. Sanerivi, “Fa‘aaoga tatau lou taule‘ale‘a,” Samoa Observer (January 4, 2017), respectively.
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(29) ua
TAM(inch.)
[o
go(pl.)
atu]
Leaga
Leaga
and
ma
the
le
offspring
fanau
PREP.
i
the
le
night
po. . .
‘Leaga and his family had left during the night. . . ’ (Stübel 1896, p. 23)
(30) O
FOC.
le
the
tasi
first
o
of
ona
3sg.
alo
child(pol.)
o lo‘o
TAM(ipfv.)
[malaga
travel
atu]
DIR.
i
to
Savaii.
Savaii
‘His oldest child is travelling to Savaii.’
(31) E
TAM
leai
neg.
lava
EMPH.
se
any
nofoaga
dwelling
e
TAM
[sili
good
atu]
DIR.
nai
from
lo‘o
COMP.
Samoa,. . .
Samoa
‘There’s absolutely no better place to live than Samoa,. . . ’
The observed difference in proportion of comparison-atu between EWS and PDS is highly signif-
icant (p < .0001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test). We interpret this result to mean that EWS lacked
comparison-atu and thus the particle comparative.
Interim Summary. Taken together, the early descriptions of the language, the synchronic varia-
tion in the acceptability of conjoined comparatives, and the results of the corpus study allow for a
characterization of EWS as in (32).
(32) The grammar of comparison in Early Written Samoan (EWS):
a. parameter setting: [-DSP]
b. inventory of degree operators in functional lexicon: ;
So far then, Samoan is the only language for which we have evidence for a change in the [+/- DSP]
parameter setting. This change appears to have taken place within the last one hundred years.10 In
the next section, we will analyze the individual developmental steps, lexical and syntactic, that are
necessary to go from the grammar of EWS in (32) to the grammar of PDS in (24). For this analysis,
a certain type of examples classified as unclear in our corpus search will be relevant, which is why
we discuss them below. We will then move on to section 5.
Unclear Corpus Examples. While the number of unclear cases is extremely low in both corpora,
we consider a certain type of ambiguous example relevant for the compositional analysis of the de-
velopment of comparison-atu from motion-atu. Several occurrences of the particle were classified
as unclear because of surface ambiguities that were not resolved by the immediate context. Those
ambiguities arise when a verb is followed by both, an adverb and the directional particle as in (34).
Here, the surface syntax is compatible with the two underlying structures in (33).
10Given the data discussed in this paper, we however cannot provide a more precise timeline of this change.
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(33) a. [[V Adv] motion-atu]
b. [V [Adv comparison-atu]]
(34) a. Context: The pharaoh learns about the beauty of Abram’s wife Sarai.
b. Ona
CON.
[agalelei
treat+well
atu]
DIR.
lea
DEM.sg.
o
FOC.
ia
PRN.
ia
PREP.
Aperamo. . .
Abraham
‘So he [= the pharaoh] treated Abram well. . . ’ (Kenese/ Gn. XII:16)
In (34), under the first structure, the pharaoh’s treatment is directed towards Abram (motion-atu)11,
and he treats him well (or better than anybody else, depending on the interpretation of the positive
form). The second structure would generate a reading where the pharaoh – as a consequence of
learning how beautiful Sarai is – treats her husband better than before. Crucially, the relevant bible
chapter under our reading is compatible with both interpretations. We will argue that this type of
surface ambiguities was essential for the introduction of comparison-atu into the grammar.
5 Modeling the change in parameter setting
Our starting point for this section is the semantics of motion-atu as used in EWS and PDS (section
5.1). An analysis of the changes involved in the development of a degree semantics in Samoan will
have to address three questions: Which lexical and syntactic changes underlie the development of
comparison-atu frommotion-atu? How does a predicate of type hd, he, tii develop from type he, ti?
How does this change bring about the covert operator that PDS employs for the interpretation of
the positive form? As we have not yet looked at the interpretation of the positive form in the EWS
corpus, our focus in this paper will be on the first question (section 5.2).
5.1 Directed motion in EWS and PDS
Building on Hohaus (2010, 2012), we adopt an analysis of motion-atu under which it operates on
paths. We can conceptualize paths as sequences of locations (l0, l1, l2, ..., ln) whose length exceeds
1 (but see also Cresswell 1978, Piñón 1993, Krifka 1998, a.o.). Verbs of motion like alu (‘to go’)
do not only describe a manner of motion (i.e. walking, as opposed to running), but also relate an
entity to its movement paths (type l). We will be working with the lexical entry in (35).
(35) J alu (‘go’) K =  p. x. x walks along p (type hl, he, tii)
Intuitively, in examples like (36), motion-atu introduces an additional requirement of directionality
on the path described by a motion predicate: It requires of every non-initial location l1, ..., ln in
the movement sequence that it be further away from the sequence’s initial location l0 than the next
lower ranked location in the sequence, ln 1, see also the figure. The paths that make a sentence
with motion-atu true thus consist of totally ordered sets of locations. We adopt the lexical entry in
(37), under which motion-atu quantifies off the path argument of the verb.
11This type of use of motion-atu, where the motion path is somewhat more abstract, is very frequent in Samoan (see
also Hohaus 2010). The most common usage is probably with verbs of speech like fai (‘say’) and tali (‘reply’).
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(36)
(37) Jmotion-atu K =  Rhl,he,tii. x. (type hhl, he, tii, he, tii)
9p [R(p)(x) = 1 & 8l [l 2 p & l 6= beg(p)! l >< pre(l)]]
‘For any R 2 Dhl,he,tii and x 2 De, Jmotion-atu K(R)(x) = 1 iff there is a path p
that makes R(p)(x) true, and for every non-initial location l in this sequence of locations,
l is ranked higher with respect to <-scale than its immediate predecessor location.’
For any location l, the underlying order < is defined as a distance measure from the beginning of
the path, DISTANCE(l, beg(p)). The beginning of a path beg(p) is the location l such that there is
no other location that precedes l. For any location l, pre(l) returns the next lower ranked location
in the movement sequence.
Applied to our example sentence, this analysis derives the truth conditions in (38). The sen-
tence is true if and only if Sina walked further and further away from where she started. Somewhat
more precisely, for every non-initial location in the path that Sina walked, Sina’s distance to the
beginning of the path increases compared to its immediate predecessor in the sequence.
(38) J [Sina [walk motion-atu]] K = 1 iffJmotion-atu K( p. x. x walked along p)(S) = 1 iff
9p [S walked along p & 8l [l 2 p & l 6= beg(p)! l >< pre(l)]]
The directed movement path which motion-atu describes shares all important structural proper-
ties of a degree scale. We would like to suggest that this shared conceptual structure allowed
for a lexical re-analysis of motion-atu (type hhl, he, tii, he, tii) as a comparative operator of type
hhd, he, tii, he, tii. We spell this idea out in the next section.
5.2 Lexical and syntactic steps in the development of comparison-atu
How can we model the development of comparison-atu from (37), both in terms of lexical seman-
tics and in terms of syntax? Degree comparison shares all the conceptual properties of directed
movement as defined in (37). To see this, consider (39) again. The difference between Mary and
the contextually provided comparison standard c on the height scale is a directed path (of degrees,
rather than locations in space): The comparison standard is its beginning (and Mary’s height is its
end point). Given the nature of the height scale, it is indeed also true that every non-initial element
of this set of degrees is further away from the beginning of this differential measurement path than
the element that immediately precedes it. We would like to suggest that motion-atu in EWS there-
fore allowed for a generalization from locations in a directed movement path to degrees: Both are
abstract entitites that are totally ordered. Such a transfer might have resulted in a lexical entry for
comparison-atu along the lines of (40).
(39)
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(40) step 1a: type transfer from locations to degrees
For any R 2 Dhd,he,tii and x 2 De, J comparison-atu Kc(R)(x) = 1 iff
9D [D = {d : d   c & d  MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1)} & |D| > 1
& 8d00 [d00 2 D & d00 6= c! d >< pre(d)]]
Let’s dissect this lexical entry a little: The movement path of motion-atu is the set of difference
degrees D, our red dots in the diagram in (39). Just like paths are sequences of a length greater
than 1, this set must have a cardinality greater than 1. The counterpart to the beginning of the path
here is the contextually provided degree c, the standard of the comparison.
As degrees are by definition elements of a linearly ordered set, the ordering requirement ex-
pressed by the last conjunct in (40) will always be met. We can therefore re-write (40) as (41-a),
which is equivalent to (41-b). We remain agnostic here as to when in this developmental sequence
the differential degree argument that PDS comparison-atu allows for was introduced.
(41) step 1b: simplification
a. For any R 2 Dhl,he,tii and x 2 De, J comparison-atu Kc(R)(x) = 1
iff 9D [D = {d : d   c & d  MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1)} & |D| > 1]
b. For any R 2 Dhl,he,tii and x 2 De, J comparison-atu Kc(R)(x) = 1
iff MAX( d.R(d)(x) = 1) > c
While the conceptual similarities between directed motion and comparison made the shift from
locations to degrees in the semantics of motion-atu possible in the first place, the introduction of
comparison-atu must have occurred in tandem with a change in the lexical semantics of predicates
like umi (‘tall’). It would however also have required that the language provide the right kind of
syntactic environment to support both lexical changes.
Sentences like (42) from above, categorized as unclear in the EWS corpus, provide this kind
of environment because of their potential surface ambiguity.
(42) Ona
CON.
[agalelei
treat+well
atu]
DIR.
lea
DEM.sg.
o
FOC.
ia
PRN.
ia
PREP.
Aperamo. . .
Abraham
‘So he [= the pharaoh] treated Abram well. . . ’ (Kenese/ Gn. XII:16)
The string consisting of a motion verb, a gradable predicate and the directional particle supports a
re-analysis from motion-atu to comparison-atu, as sketched in (43).
(43) step 2: syntactic re-analysis of surface ambiguities
[[(verb) (adverbhe,ti)] (motion-atu)] [(verb) [(adverb)hd,he,tii (comparison-atu)]]
Crucially, though, comparison-atu operates on degree scales and requires that its first argument be
of type hd, he, tii. The addition of comparison-atu to the functional lexicon of Samoan will thus
have been accompanied by a change in parameter setting from [-DSP] to [+DSP]. We don’t believe
that this change was “an abrupt change in grammars, reflecting a new parameter setting” (Lightfoot
1997, p. 171), but rather would have been a result of decomposition of a degreeless predicate into
a predicate of type hd, he, tii and the covert superlative-like operator that we find in PDS.
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6 Concluding remarks
In Samoan, then, degrees enter the grammar through two well-known mechanisms of language
change, borrowing from another domain and syntactic re-analysis of a potentially ambiguous sur-
face string. Typological data suggest that borrowing from the spatial domain is very frequent in
comparison constructions across languages (Stassen 1985). Interestingly, however, we are not
aware of languages where the comparative is modeled after the temporal domain.
The resulting transition from [-DSP] to [+DSP] raises some interesting questions about the
nature of semantic change. Language change is often argued to be “cyclical change” (Gelderen
2016, p. 4) or to resemble a spiral. The change from [-DSP] to [+DSP] however seems to be
directional. Roberts & Roussou (2003) suggest to capture such directionality as markedness of
one parameter setting over another. They also hypothesize that parametric change is mediated
through the introduction of new functional heads. In the case of the transition from [-DSP] to
[+DSP], this functional head is the degree head, comparison-atu.
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